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Abstract
Trust is a fundamental building block of human behavior for dealing with complex
situations. The world of distributed computer systems and especially the Internet have
become increasingly complex, resulting in the proposition of using trust in them as
well. The research done in this domain has increased significantly in the last years,
producing the new field of trust management.
Current results in trust management focus on the establishment of procedures for va-
rious threats and different domains, including e-commerce, networked systems, sensor
networks, etc. These frameworks are still theoretical, and there are only limited possi-
bilities to compare the performance of various solutions. To learn more about the pos-
sibilities of trust management it is necessary to deploy trust management frameworks
into real-world settings. The deployment is currently hindered by the high complexi-
ty of individual trust management frameworks, the difficulties to relate the solutions
to real-world requirements, and the high amount of uncategorized solutions to select
from.
This work addresses these problems and provides the TrustMUSE system as a soluti-
on approach. The TrustMUSE system applies a meta model to decrease the complexity
of individual trust management frameworks and modularize them into clearly defi-
ned functional elements. These elements are specified over standardized APIs that ena-
ble trust management experts to provide their implementations in combinable way.
Through our process, these implementations can be annotated with standardized at-
tributes that translate trust management functionality into architectural qualities and
services. These attributes translate implementation details into terms that are familiar
to the stakeholders responsible for designing software systems. We integrated the indi-
vidual components of our approach into a tool that helps narrowing down the number
of trust management implementations applicable to specific application scenarios, and
helps browsing and comparing them until specific implementations can be added to
the target software. Our tool not only decreases the time necessary to find an applicable
solution for specific application scenarios but also provides extensive information re-
garding trust management procedures and possibilities, thereby helping the tool’s users
to gain a better understanding of the domain and the capabilities of trust management.
We created the model-driven approach for trust management by investigating available
research in the domain and applying grounded theory to it. On top of the meta model
we developed processes and tools that address the transition of theoretical trust ma-
nagement research into applied software design. We developed the components of the
TrustMUSE system by applying user-centered design, continuously inviting our target
users to provide feedback on our iterative prototypes. In our final evaluation the par-
ticipating users were able to provide trust management framework designs similar to
those of domain experts, thereby illustrating the soundness of our approach.

vZusammenfassung
Vertrauen ist eins der wichtigsten Konzepte, welches uns hilft in komplexen Situatio-
nen Entscheidungen zu treffen. Sicherheitsentscheidungen in neusten Netzwerksyste-
men sind a¨hnlich komplex zu denen im wirklichem Leben. Daher existieren Ansa¨tze,
um auch dort das Konzept von Vertrauen anzuwenden. Diese haben eine Anzahl von
Lo¨sungen motiviert die das Gebiet Trust Managemente¨tabliert haben. Trust Manage-
ment besteht aus verschiedenen Komponenten, welche die Sicherheit in Anwendugs-
gebieten wie etwa E-Commerce, Agenten- und Sensornetzwerke verbessern wollen.
Obwohl es schon Arbeiten gibt, die existierende Ergebnisse aus dem Bereich des Trust
Management kategorisieren, fehlt immer noch die Etablierung von bewa¨hrten Metho-
den, und jetzige Trust Management Lo¨sungen werden immer von neu entworfen. Um
die Methoden identifizieren zu ko¨nnen, die in unterschiedlichen Situationen am besten
Funktionieren, ist es notwendig Trust Management Lo¨sungen in wirklichen Anwen-
dungen zu erproben. Momentan ist dies aufgrund der hohen Komplexita¨t einzelner
Lo¨sungen, der Inkompatibilita¨t zwischen vorgeschlagenen Systemen sowie der Anzahl
nicht kategorisierter Alternativen nur begrentzt mo¨glich.
Um diese Probleme zu behandeln, stellen wir in dieser Arbeit das TrustMUSE System
vor. Es basiert auf einem Meta-Modell fu¨r Trust Management, welches die Komple-
xita¨t einzelner Lo¨sungen senkt in dem sie in funktionale Elemente aufgeteilt werden.
Diese Elemente sind durch Schnittstellen spezifiziert, die es Trust Management Exper-
ten ermo¨glichen, ihre Implementierungen in kombinierbarer Weise bereitzustellen. Der
entwickelte Prozess ermo¨glicht die Erstellung einer Repra¨sentation dieser Implemen-
tationen, die fu¨r IT-Systemarchitekten vertraut ist. Die Konzepte unserer Arbeit sind
in einem ganzheitlichen Werkzeug integriert, welches die Anzahl der mo¨glichen Im-
plementationen auf eine geringere Anzahl anwendbarer Mo¨glichkeiten einbeschra¨nkt.
Das Werkzeug ermo¨glicht Entwicklern und IT-Systemarchitekten einen leichten Ver-
gleich der aufgezeigten Lo¨sungen, um schließlich der Zielsoftware eine finale Auswahl
an Implementationen hinzu zu fu¨gen. Das Werkzeug beschleunigt nicht nur die Aus-
wahl einer passender Trust Management Lo¨sung, sondern verhilft Benutzern durch
die eingebetteten Beschreibungen und Hilfetexte zu einem besseren Versta¨ndnis u¨ber
Funktionalita¨t und Mo¨glichkeiten von Trust Management.
Wir haben den aktuellen Stand der Forschung im Bereich Trust Management unter-
sucht und gegenstandsbezogene Theoriebildung angewandt, um einen modellgetriebe-
nen Ansatz fu¨r Trust Management zu entwickeln. Darauf aufbauend haben wir die not-
wendigen Prozesse und Visualisierungen entwickelt, die die oben beschriebene Proble-
me adressieren. Die Komponenten des TrustMUSE Systems wurden mit einem Benutzer-
zentriertem Ansatz entwickelt, innerhalb dessen wir unsere Zielbenutzer kontinuier-
lich eingeladen haben, uns Feedback u¨ber unsere iterativ hergestellten Konzepte zu ge-
ben. Die Benutzerevaluation mit unserem finalem System hat gezeigt, dass das Trust-
MUSE System unseren Benutzern ermo¨glicht, a¨hnliche Trust Management Lo¨sungen
zu erstellen wie es ein Experte tun wu¨rde.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Trust is the human approach for dealing with an uncertain world; a world where we
cannot calculate probability and extent of harm due to the complexity and interde-
pendence of social structures. Because of this high complexity and interdependence,
we regularly choose to reduce complexity in our decisions by the application of trust to
achieve quickly the best utilization of available possibilities (cf. [Luhmann et al., 1979]).
There are multiple forms of trust and factors that influence it. These have been thor-
oughly investigated from a social science perspective, and [Mcknight and Chervany,
1996] provide a categorization of the different meanings of trust.
Additionally to the uncertainties we face during everyday life, we regularly maneuver
in an environment where we face similar uncertainties and possibilities of harm: the
Internet. The Internet is an open environment where the entry level to present infor-
mation, provide services, sell goods, and exchange data is cheap. The speed at which
online services are deployed and consumed proves the significance of them from either
a private or business perspective. Online services are increasing in capacity, and open
market places and federated services create similarly complex structures as we know
them from real-world interactions. Such a highly visited environment with its ease
to join generates ideal circumstances for malicious entities and software to seek easy
profit. Internet users require every day adequate mechanisms to protect themselves
when connecting to the global network. Based on the observation that traditional, hard
security solutions – like passwords, keys and certificates – cannot adequately protect
such open environments the introduction of soft security methods based on social con-
trol was proposed by [Rasmussen and Jansson, 1996]. Trust management is one of such
soft security methods. Entities observe each other’s behavior, and exclude those they
find to act maliciously, similarly as we do in real-world interactions. Everyone has
a deep understanding what characteristics to look for during an interaction. We rate
these characteristics, eventually decide to interact, and subsequently rate how well our
trust assessment worked out. Additionally to our own observations, we also rely on
people around us who have already proved to be trustworthy. There are many mech-
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anisms people apply for trust decisions; now the question is, how to translate these
mechanisms to applications making interactions in Internet-like environments.
1.1 Problems with Integrating Trust Management
To enable online and distributed applications to autonomously make such decisions,
it is necessary to have formal models of trust that can be evaluated against specific
input, resulting in measurable trust assessments. Starting from the first heuristic for-
malism of [Marsh, 1994] there are multiple models and complete trust management
frameworks that provide methods for making trust related decisions in specific envi-
ronments, as e-commerce platforms, P2P file sharing applications, packet routing in
resource-constrained networks, or emergency scenarios (cf. [Artz and Gil, 2007]).
While these solutions promise to be effective at increasing systems’ robustness and se-
curity, they rarely get implemented in real-world, commercial applications. There are
multiple aspects that can be identified as cause for this:
• Complexity of trust management frameworks: Frameworks designed by researchers
for designated tasks consists of multiple interwoven parts. They deal with dis-
covering information, merging gathered data with own observations, calculating
trust assessments, balancing load between multiple candidate service suppliers,
etc. Due to the high complexity of these trust management frameworks it is dif-
ficult to understand, apply, and implement them into dedicated applications. As
shown in the survey of [Doyle and Hanna, 2003], 85% of questioned IT users
stated the complexity of PKI being an obstacle to its deployment – and there are
trust models far more complicated than PKI (cf. [Usable, 2004]). Less complex
trust management frameworks, as used for example by popular e-commerce plat-
forms, may have a positive impact on business but have serious vulnerabilities (cf.
[Josang et al., 2007]).
• Lack of security expertise present during development: There is a general lack of
security expertise present during the development of applications, as also identi-
fied in [CISCO, 2014]. Consequently, even though trust management frameworks
provide sound procedures for many common threats, they are not integrated into
systems as developers are not aware of them or lack the time to explore and select
the most fit solutions. To avoid this problem two basic steps are necessary: first, it
has to be ensured that designers of distributed applications have a general under-
standing of trust management and available solutions; secondly, developers need
support with regards to developing or integrating trust management frameworks
into specified scenarios.
• Lack of proven solutions: Trust management frameworks already build on a num-
ber of common aspects, share a common understanding of the goal, and greatly
rely on known social mechanisms. However, there is little experience about the
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performance of these individual solutions, and there is even less any acknowl-
edged set of building blocks for trust management frameworks. The result of this
is that trust management frameworks are designed as a whole, and generally have
a high complexity. This makes it difficult for researchers, who wish to transform
solutions to specified environments, to identify available and approved solutions
they could benefit from. With the words of [Josang et al., 2007], who identify a
similar problem as we do, the problem is formulated like this:
”A general observation is that the proposals from the academic com-
munity so far lack coherence. The systems being proposed are usually
designed from scratch, and only in very few cases are authors build-
ing on proposals by other authors. The period we are in can therefore
be seen as a period of pioneers, and we hope that the near future will
bring consolidation around a set of sound and well recognized princi-
ples for building trust and reputation systems, and that these will find
their way into practical and commercial applications.”
• Uncovered use cases: although there is a great number of trust management
frameworks available, there will always be specific use cases or new applications
that still lack a framework provided by research. As formulated in [Fernandez-
Gago et al., 2007]:
”It is clear that any trust management system has to be specially
designed and prepared for reacting against the particular issues ... that
can be found in [its] environments.”
With no complete framework available and no possibility to compose appropri-
ate frameworks based on available results, there will always be applications that
remain unprotected against malicious activities.
Looking at some of the above problems, and given the vivid research in trust manage-
ment over the last years with the great number of frameworks that have been proposed
for simulating trust, there is a research direction to characterize and categorize these
frameworks. Such categorization is done based on targeted environments, applied
mathematical principles, or blocks of functionality (cf. [Josang et al., 2007] and [Artz
and Gil, 2007]). There are also first approaches to standardize (cf. [Go´mez Ma´rmol and
Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010]) or provide generic models for simulating specific implementa-
tions (cf. [Kinateder et al., 2005]), but these are at an early stage and are not addressing
complete frameworks in detail.
1.2 Thesis Claim and Solution Approach
Seeing the problems from the previous section, we believe that by dividing trust man-
agement frameworks into more elementary building-blocks, and by describing these
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building blocks based on easily understandable concepts, it is possible for system de-
signers and architects not trained in IT security to learn and find the most appropriate
trust management methods for their specific application use cases. This would enable a
faster transition from trust management research to applied application designs. There-
fore we formulate following research questions for our work:
How to decrease complexity of trust management frameworks?
Trust management frameworks should be divided into more elemental and easily un-
derstandable functional parts, where it is clear which functionality influences which
and in what manner. This could enable the comparison of individual solution ap-
proaches and clarify the advantages and disadvantages of one solution over the other.
While also beneficial for the research community, this would ease the task of system
designers and architects who have clear requirements and operational conditions their
system should accommodate. A proper analysis of elemental functionalities allows the
decision whether a solution meets the conditions or not.
How to make trust management solutions more understandable and relevant for sys-
tem designers?
Trust management frameworks are designed with specific scenarios and challenges in
mind. Although not purely theoretical, these scenarios are highly abstract and can only
be partially mapped to real applications’ needs. This generates a gap between what
is available and what can be applied in terms of trust management solutions. Trust
management research results need to be more specifically described in terms what they
offer, when they are applicable, and what kind of input they need. This would enable
system architects to exclude trust management frameworks that are not compatible
with their needs, allowing them to focus on the few remaining solutions they should
consider, and from which they have to select the best performing one.
How to achieve selection of the most appropriate trust management solutions for
specific application designs?
Additionally to system designers having to be able to understand trust management
frameworks, they still somehow have to learn about all the solutions that are available
in the literature. If they first have to find and read all solutions before selecting the most
appropriate one, they will become trust management experts themselves; this way, they
will not have gained anything from an increased applicability of trust management –
although, they probably will not have the time to read the complete literature on the
topic, and will simply avoid using trust management. Users need a tool where they can
easily browse solutions, understand security considerations and relevant approaches,
select their preferences, and receive suggestions on trust management frameworks that
are probably appropriate for their needs. During the design of such a tool it has to be
considered that the user might not be familiar with security concepts, and might even
have a rejecting attitude towards them.
To conclude these research questions and the approach with which we wish to address
these, our work can be summarized by following claim:
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By providing a meta model by which trust management frameworks can be
described, it is possible to create a process that increases the understanding
of trust management, and eases the integration of trust management into
specific application scenarios.
1.3 Thesis Contribution
Our solution approach is called the TrustMUSE system (Trust Management Usable Soft-
ware Suite), and it consists of a meta model for trust management called the TrustMUSE
Model, a process for describing solutions for specific application use cases in terms of
the model – named the TrustMUSE Process – and a tool that integrates and presents the
whole TrustMUSE system for the target users – called the TrustMUSE Builder. These
are shown in figure 1.1
Figure 1.1: The three main contributions of this work: the TrustMUSE Model, the TrustMUSE
Process with accompanying TEML format, and the TrustMUSE Builder.
The TrustMUSE Model enables to divide complete trust management frameworks into
more elemental building blocks, and provides well-defined interfaces over which these
elements can communicate. For researchers this allows to separately analyze the per-
formance of specific solutions, identify reusable functionalities, and benefit from the
results of others when designing trust management frameworks for new application
areas. By enabling to compose trust management frameworks through the combina-
tion of elemental functionalities that are communicating over standardized interfaces
the variety of solutions can increase, and the time to compose a working framework de-
creases significantly. This allows for a more effective performance evaluation of given
solutions at given threat models. As the separate analysis of building blocks is per-
formed, system designers and architects can benefit from these results and will be able
to compose frameworks specifically for their application scenarios based directly on the
findings of the research community.
Instead of dividing trust management frameworks by the means of the TrustMUSE
Model, the TrustMUSE Process provides a view on trust management functionalities
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through the individual elements of the model and allows filtering frameworks based
on the services they provide. The TrustMUSE Process consists of an author and a con-
sumer sub-process: the author sub-process is for those who have implemented a func-
tionality according to a TrustMUSE Model element and wish to describe their imple-
mentation in terms of services it provides; the consumer sub-process allows someone
searching for a composition of functionalities for a specific application to view possible
services and gradually narrow down the choices to the most fitting solution. By list-
ing all possible services provided by trust management frameworks by elements the
TrustMUSE Process draws the attention from individual implementations to needs for
a target application; this enables a quick filtering of possibilities and significantly re-
duces the amount of solutions that should be investigated in depth before selecting one
to be applied. Given an adequate understanding, an experienced professional in the
field of distributed applications can go through these limited set of possibilities and
make a well-informed decision regarding the best trust management framework to be
used for increasing robustness of a given application.
The presentation and automation of the TrustMUSE system is realized in the Trust-
MUSE Builder: a tool designed for enhanced usability, having specifically the target
users of our approach in mind. The TrustMUSE Builder is the main interface by which
our target users encounter the TrustMUSE system, and is therefore the main target of
our user evaluations: it is developed over three iterations, during which we collect
feedback through focus group workshops, think aloud tests, open and semi-structured
interviews, and questionnaires. The aim of the tool is to guide users through the con-
sumer sub-process of the TrustMUSE Process; during each step it provides additional
supporting information regarding the elements of the TrustMUSE Model, the signifi-
cance of the various possible services provided by trust management frameworks, and
further references if eventually there are still open questions regarding proposed so-
lutions. Therefore, apart from supporting the composition of designated trust man-
agement frameworks, the TrustMUSE Builder also serves as an e-learning platform to
inform about common security practices for distributed systems.
1.4 Methodology and Research Agenda
User-centered security (cf. [Zurko, 2005]) is addressing the problem that most security
related implementations lack usability and thereby imply significant security threats
by not considering users in their designs. This problem has been identified in multi-
ple application areas of security, like passwords, file sharing, mailing, etc. Instead of
saying – as multiple security experts do – that humans are the weakest link of infor-
mation security, we would point to the work of [Mitnick and Simon, 2001] from which
we see that attackers simply investigated more into the human element of security,
and that security designers should consider doing the same (cf. [Sasse and Flechais,
2005]). One suggested approach for dealing with this problem is by applying user-
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centered design, and combining it with traditional security engineering steps (cf. [tom
Markotten, 2002]). Another approach, more related to the development of applications
and ensuring the transparency and consistency of security policies, is Model-Driven
Security (MDS) (cf. [Basin et al., 2006]). MDS starts by having model based representa-
tions of system components and involved actors and automatically generates matching
object-oriented implementations or access policies based on the models; gained benefit
therefore is that stakeholders can profit from easily understandable views, and admin-
istrators can be sure that documentation and system-state match.
Learning from these approaches we structured our research according to user-centered
design (cf. [Nielsen, 1993]): executing multiple iterations – with design, implemen-
tation, analysis steps – with early prototypes and involving users from the very be-
ginning. The individual steps of the research, their design and role is presented next.
A summary of the steps of the research illustrated similarly to the incremental spiral
model of [Boehm, 1988] can be seen in figure 1.2.
Definition of target users and collecting needs for the TrustMUSE system: The Trust-
MUSE system has the aim of moving trust management from security research to an
applied activity in distributed systems. To achieve this, we analyzed stakeholders of a
system development and identified system designers and architects as the target users
of our system. Subsequently, we collected their needs for trust management frame-
works integrated into applications. We conducted multiple focus group workshops
with different main questions and scenarios in each of them to capture a broad range
of needs.
Design of the TrustMUSE Model: Driven by the collected needs, we analyzed existing
trust management frameworks, surveys and models, and identified common proper-
ties and shortcomings by applying grounded theory (cf. [Strauss and Corbin, 1994]).
During the application of grounded theory, we started from already existing surveys
as axiomatic codes, and applied selective coding for the composition of the TrustMUSE
Model.
Validation and first iteration of the TrustMUSE Model: Validation happened in two
steps: first, a selected set of trust management frameworks were tested to be describable
by the TrustMUSE Model. Afterwards, two TrustMUSE solutions were provided for
specific applications, i.e. trust management frameworks implemented in accordance to
the TrustMUSE Model. The criterion was that the TrustMUSE Model should be able
to support this development and provide a thorough structure for the implementation.
Using the lessons learnt from this validation and the newly defined needs, we iterated
and refined the TrustMUSE Model for the first time.
Collecting needs for the TrustMUSE Builder: Having a first sound model underlying
our work, we continued with developing a first version of the tool that was to sup-
port our target users. The earlier collected needs were kept in mind, as the tool is the
only interface users have to the TrustMUSE system, but additional needs specifically
targeted towards the tool had to be collected. Collection of these needs started with
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similar focus group workshops as applied previously.
Iterative TrustMUSE Builder prototype implementation: The development of the Trust-
MUSE Builder and underlying TrustMUSE Process happened in two iterations, consist-
ing of paper prototypes (cf. [Greenberg et al., 2011]) and a clickable prototypes. Each
prototype was evaluated with observations and semi-structured interviews; the results
were used for the subsequent iteration of the TrustMUSE system.
Iteration of the TrustMUSE system: Building on the input collected through the Trust-
MUSE Builder prototypes, which was also input on the TrustMUSE Model and Trust-
MUSE Process, we went back to the beginning of the work and reviewed it based on
the collected feedback. This step ensured that not only the user interface of the Trust-
MUSE system but also its basic structures met the users’ needs and provided an under-
standable basement to build on. Using the refined versions of the TrustMUSE Model
and Process we also iterated the TrustMUSE Builder and thereby prepared for the final
evaluation of the TrustMUSE system.
Evaluation of the TrustMUSE system: The final TrustMUSE Builder provided the plat-
form for an evaluation of the whole TrustMUSE system. The identified target user
group was invited to an experiment where the participants’ performance with support
from the TrustMUSE system was compared to the performance of an expert group with-
out support. Aim of the experiment was to find out how well the TrustMUSE system –
thus a model-driven approach for trust management – is able to bridge the gap from ex-
pert knowledge of researchers to applied knowledge of our target users. Furthermore
a questionnaire filled by the participants after the experiment provided feedback about
the usability of the solution, and allowed us to draw final conclusions regarding our
results.
1.5 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 provides an overview of state of the art and theoretical foundations for this
work. Starting from the first definitions and formalizations of inter-human trust, we
show how computer simulated trust evolved and was introduced into multiple do-
mains. We introduce common solution aspects from across these solutions and anno-
tate them with a formal terminology for this work. We also extend the terminology with
our own definitions where it seems necessary. After the introduction to trust manage-
ment we present literature that supports and guides us in our work. We elaborate on
the literature reviews of trust management, present the definitions and approaches for
improving usability of security applications, and show the advances in MDS, what kind
of modeling languages have been used, and how new meta models can be designed.
According to our user-centered approach, chapter 3 introduces the first step of our work
where we elaborate on different user groups and their problems. After identifying
software designers and architects as our target users – as we find them to benefit most
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from our solution – we organize multiple focus group workshops to identify initial
needs. We evaluate these needs to see how our users understand the area, and to deduct
the direction our research should take.
From the collected requirements we conclude that our target users want an abstract
and clear modularization of frameworks. Therefore in chapter 4 we develop a meta
model for trust management using grounded theory. After the design of the TrustMUSE
Model, we validate it by describing well-approved trust management frameworks and
show how they implement the individual elements of the model. For validating the API
of the TrustMUSE Model we implement two trust management solutions for dedicated
applications and used the gained experience to iterate the meta model.
Chapter 5 builds on the previously developed TrustMUSE Model and provides the
TrustMUSE Process: a method for trust management framework authors to describe
their solution in terms of services provided to an application. With the accompanying
TEML format, with which such descriptions can be put into a standardized descrip-
tion, consumers can uniformly handle multiple alternative approaches and select the
one that best fulfills their applications’ needs. We support the definition of the Trust-
MUSE Process by the application of paper prototypes. With this we also define the
visualization and interaction method for the later TrustMUSE Builder tool.
The iterative implementation of the TrustMUSE Builder tool, which is the main inter-
face over which our target users interact with the TrustMUSE system, is presented in
chapter 6. We implement two prototypes additionally to the previous paper prototype:
first, an initial clickable prototype; then, using the engine from the previous one, a full
functional prototype. Both prototypes are evaluated with users, and the collected feed-
back guides us in the improvement of the system.
Chapter 7 presents the final evaluation of the TrustMUSE system. We conduct two sep-
arate tests, one with our target users and one with trust management experts. Both
are given the same tasks, and we compare how well our target users are able to make
expert-like decisions with the support of our solution. From the results of the evalua-
tion we conclude our work in chapter 8, evaluate the power of our solution, and draw
final conclusions for our research questions. Based on the findings of the final evalua-
tion we also identify future directions of our work and sketch how the results can be
picked up by others.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art and Theoretical
Foundations
What is computational trust? Where do we use it? What is trust management? What
kind of mechanisms does it use? This chapter deals with these and many other simi-
lar questions that are relevant for understanding the contribution of this thesis. While
the introduction to our research area as presented in this chapter is rather compact, we
tried to structure it as to start with easy, every day principles and gradually move to-
wards specific and more theoretical concepts. We also provide sufficient references for
further reading or to support understanding of our argumentation, wherever a detailed
discussion of the topic is not scope of this work.
While the first section mostly deals with the general introduction of trust management,
section 2.2 discusses specific approaches that we adopt for our research. There are three
main areas we identify from which we can benefit and which we present: literature
reviews on trust management, usable security, and Model Driven Security (MDS). At
the end of the chapter, we collect related work and show how our approaches differ.
2.1 Background: Ways Software Knows Whom to Trust
In this first section, we briefly present work on the sociological interpretation of inter-
personal trust. This broad research enables a better understanding of the concepts that
flowed into its computational formalization. We show what computational trust can be
used for and why it is relevant for today’s Internet-based applications. As a next step,
we put computational trust into complete frameworks, thus introducing trust manage-
ment.
Initial research on trust management provides multiple results which are inspired by
mechanisms used by humans for forming trust. In section 2.1.2, we present some of
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the most acknowledged trust management results and collect the most basic building
blocks applied across these. The identification of these blocks will show the current
state of the art and where our work sets off. While reviewing these results, we intro-
duce terminology and definitions as we are going to use them in this work. We stick
to the terminology most commonly used in the research community; in case of sev-
eral existing definitions, we select one specific definition. In some cases, however, we
introduce our own definitions if we find it necessary for avoiding ambiguities.
2.1.1 From Interpersonal Trust to Trust Management
There are multiple areas where computer systems try to get inspired by biological phe-
nomena or want to imitate human behavior. Research areas like this include neural
networks, formal languages, swarm intelligence, etc.; and trust. Everyone has an un-
derstanding of trust and uses it every day (cf. [Luhmann et al., 1979]): we make choices,
believe in good intention of others, depend on strangers in situations of risk. Although
apparently it is very simple to use trust, it is very difficult to define it properly. There
have been multiple approaches to define it based on different views and aspects, but in-
stead of finding a consensus the definitions remain diverse, as identified by [Mcknight
and Chervany, 1996]. [Mcknight and Chervany, 1996] define six related types of trust
to harmonize and better clarify possible uses of the term:
• Trusting Beliefs: ”extent to which one believes (and feels confident in believing)
that the other person is trustworthy in the situation”, thus supporting a trusting
intention;
• Trusting Intention: ”the extent to which one party is willing to depend on the
other party in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though
negative consequences are possible”;
• Trusting Behavior: actually, voluntarily depending on the other party based on
the trusting intention;
• System Trust: the belief about impersonal structures – as structural assurances
and situational normality – that enable successful interactions, and thereby sup-
port trusting intentions;
• Dispositional Trust: ”the extent that s/he has a consistent tendency to trust across
a broad spectrum of situations and persons”;
• Situational Decision to Trust: the dispositional trust for a specific situation, i.e.
”an intention to trust every time a particular situation arises”.
Looking at these six definitions may seem to be blurring the problem, considering how
natural it is for everyone to use trust; even more importantly, the question arises which
concept is meant when speaking of trust in the remainder of this work. By introducing
these definitions we wish to showcase that selecting one definition of trust is not simply
2.1 Background: Ways Software Knows Whom to Trust 13
difficult but necessarily reduces the complex meaning the term has. Therefore when we
select a definition here, it is not for the sake of arguing next to a specific definition, but
to ease understanding and to put our work into relation with available state of the art.
For this reason, we select the definition from [Josang et al., 2007], saying
”Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on something
or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even
though negative consequences are possible.”
Acknowledging that trust is such an essential concept for human interaction and soci-
ety, we still miss the connection to computer systems. Clearly computer science and
especially security engineering (cf. [Anderson, 2008]) came up with plenty and sound
solutions to protect computer systems. Where should such a blurry concept like trust
be of use in the precise world of IT? While traditional computer systems did not require
other solutions than the hard protection mechanisms like passwords and keys, today’s
open and Internet connected applications have become larger and more complex than
to be easily protected by traditional means. As illustrated in figure 2.1, hard security
gets broken once a single vulnerability is found. Open systems as the Internet, which
resemble in their structures more and more human societies, require mechanisms that
enable the system to identify malicious entities and thereby enable system participants
to proactively protect themselves. This category of mechanisms is called soft security,
where an actor is allowed to interact ”as long as her actions aren’t harming anyone else,
but if her behavior changes, she will loose the ability to act” [Rasmussen and Jansson,
1996]. Trust management can be considered as a soft security measure.
The relation of trust management and traditional security is hard to define, and both
mechanisms are necessary in modern distributed applications. [Jensen, 2014] argues
that trust management is even part of traditional security measures, although rarely
acknowledged or made explicit. Examples are easy to find, as with certificates in the
Public Key Infrastructure (cf. [Housley et al., 1999]) the validation of signatures is based
on the trust in the Certificate Authority, or with symmetric keys the parties trust that
the other party is not sharing the key with someone else. While this kind of application
of trust is straightforward, it is not completely identical to that implied by [Rasmussen
and Jansson, 1996] when introducing the term soft security. A good distinction where
the role of traditional security and where that of trust management lies can be given
based on the work of [Gans et al., 2003]. They introduce the confidence-trust-distrust
approach for social networks, where confidence is related to the network infrastruc-
ture and trust to the actors of the network. A party using a system has to be confi-
dent in the infrastructure to be able to engage into interactions. Such confidence can
be best achieved with the introduction of security methods that ensure confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (cf. [N.U, 2005]). Trust, on the other hand, is used to cope
with the interactions between the actors, where uncertainty and thus vulnerability is
explicitly accepted (cf. [Rasmussen and Jansson, 1996]).
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Figure 2.1: Hard security compared to soft security (cf. [Rasmussen and Jansson, 1996])
To be able to integrate trust into computer systems, it is necessary to have a clear com-
putational concept describing the establishment and evolution of trust in entities. While
this already seems a challenging endeavor simply by looking back at the blurry nature
of the term trust, it additionally raises questions like intervals, granularity, semantic
meaning of values, etc. One of the first formalisms of trust for agents is the one pro-
posed by [Marsh, 1994]. The work is motivated by the observation that
”If we are to expect our agents to survive in the ‘real world’ (i.e., outside the
sterile confines of the research laboratory), we must make them more robust
in respect of their interdependence with others, their reliance on others. Re-
lying on others’ good behaviour is not enough. An argument of the present
work is that the incorporation of trust into an intelligent agent’s consider-
ations of others will be a step forward in providing the needed robustness
...”
In its endeavor to incorporate trust into multi-agent systems, the work identifies as
main types of trust T an agent X may have at a given time being basic trust of X ,
general trust of X in another agent Y , and situational trust of X in Y in situation α.
Situational trust of X in Y in α is further influenced by the situational utility U(α) and
importance I(α) of X in α. The heuristic formalism, as introduced by [Marsh, 1994],
is shown in formula 2.1, where all variables in the formula take their value from the
interval -1 to 1.
Tx(y, α) = Ux(α)× Ix(α)× Tx(y) (2.1)
Additionally to the level of trust an agent has, [Marsh, 1994] introduces the cooperation
threshold, that is the amount of trust necessary for X to cooperate in a situation. The
cooperation threshold additionally to the previously introduced factors depends on the
situational competence of Y and risk. The work of [Marsh, 1994] is often referred to as a
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trust model, although not named as such in his work, and this term is also widely used
across literature. As trust model is a term commonly used without clear definition, we
define it for our purposes as in definition 2.1.
DEFINITION 2.1: (COMPUTATIONAL) TRUST MODEL
A trust model is an implementable formalism that defines how an entity X
can assess the trust in another entity Y in a specific situation.
While the work of [Marsh, 1994] is a significant step towards a computational formal-
ism for trust that enables simulation of trust by computer systems, it is only a heuristic;
that is, it does not define clear operations or specific information that influence the level
of trust in an entity. The first identification of the trust management problem has been
provided by [Blaze et al., 1996]. It is a more realization oriented work towards computer
simulated trusting behavior, and defines trust management as
”a coherent intellectual framework ... for the study of security policies, se-
curity credentials, and trust relationships.”
Their PolicyMaker solution provides a policy language to describe what services are
accessible given a specific set of credentials – thereby extending traditional certificate
based authorization. They approach can be summarized as a solution that frees systems
from identity based authorization, and rather enables authorization based on evidences
and policies.
[Josang et al., 2005] aimed at a more specific definition of trust management and estab-
lished it by narrowing the scope to online environments. He defines it as
”the activity of creating systems and methods that allow relying parties to
make assessments and decisions regarding the dependability of potential
transactions involving risk, and that also allow players and system owners
to increase and correctly represent the reliability of themselves and their
systems”.
Holding on to this definition, let us explore some systems that have been established
through this activity. The PolicyMaker system fits the definition, as it provides a system
that is able to make decisions regarding access to services based on certificates. eBay’s
reputation system, as analyzed in [Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002], can also be seen as an
example of such systems: it provides the means for buyers of goods to decide whether
the seller will behave correctly, and the transaction will be successful. Although created
before the establishment of trust management, concepts from identity management can
similarly be categorized under this activity. The Public Key Infrastructure (cf. [Housley
et al., 1999]) with its accompanying infrastructure provides the means to delegate the
trust decision to a Certificate Authority (CA). For each interaction, the clients only have
to evaluate the evidence the CA provides. Shortcoming of the original PKI system is its
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limited scope and lack of fine-grained authorization decisions. OpenPGP (cf. [Zimmer-
mann, 1995]) also applies the term trust model to describe its underlying evaluation
mechanisms. It distinguishes the trust question between introducer trust and trust in
someone’s identity, thereby increasing the capabilities of pure PKI based implementa-
tions.
There are multiple terms used to refer to results of trust management. [Quercia et al.,
2006] and [Zouridaki et al., 2007] call their systems trust frameworks, [Josang et al.,
2005] distinguish between trust and reputation systems, [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez
Pe´rez, 2010] use the same trust model term that we found necessary to define with a
more limited scope, and [Fernandez-Gago et al., 2007] simply talk about trust manage-
ment solutions. We propose the use of the term trust management framework, as we
find the previous terms to be misleading or too ambiguous. We propose the definition
2.2, based on the work of [Josang et al., 2005].
DEFINITION 2.2: TRUST MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
A trust management framework is a system that allows relying parties to
make assessments and decisions regarding the dependability of potential
transactions involving risk, and that also allows players and system owners to
increase and correctly represent the reliability of themselves and their systems.
Since its first introduction, the concept of trust management has become more and more
popular in the research community, and trust management frameworks have been pro-
posed for a number of scenarios. Decentralized solutions, like that of [Kamvar et al.,
2003], approach the trust management problem by removing any kind of central au-
thority providing or storing trust related data. Such approaches can be used in a num-
ber of scenarios: in P2P file sharing environments to protect against malicious software
distribution (like done by [Kamvar et al., 2003]), in mobile ad hoc networks for reliable
data packet delivery (even in the presence of byzantine behavior as in [Zouridaki et al.,
2007]), in wireless sensor networks to protect against injection of false measurements as
by [Atakli et al., 2008], or generally speaking in any kind of multi-agent environment
where agents provide and consume services (cf. [Das and Islam, 2012].
The EigenTrust solution of [Kamvar et al., 2003] is one of the most cited decentralized
trust management frameworks. It has been designed for P2P networks to increase the
number of satisfactory downloads. The framework is based on the distributed compu-
tation of a global trust matrix C, of which the left principal eigenvector converges to
the global reputation vector including each node. The distributed implementation of
the calculation of C is based on the component-wise summary of trust vectors, where
each vector is the partition of C that was acquired by an individual peer while doing
regular interactions with other peers of the network. The assessed trust values are used
for weighting the received information about other peers and also for assigning the
probability with which a peer is selected as source for a file. To help bootstrapping the
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calculation of C and protect against malicious collectives there is a set of pre-trusted
peers. The trust assessments of these pre-trusted peers are always included into the
computations with a higher weight than those of any other peers.
[Zouridaki et al., 2007] propose the Byzantine Robust Hermes (BR-Hermes) framework
for improving packet routing in mobile ad-hoc networks. They base their trust compu-
tations on beta distribution functions, where they call the mean of the distribution the
trust value and the standard deviation the confidence value. They derive a trustworthi-
ness value by mapping trust and confidence onto an ellipse placed into the unit square.
To extend this trustworthiness calculation also to non-neighboring nodes the authors
introduce an opinion value, which is based on computing trust values for chains of
nodes from source to destination node. The opinion a node has in a distant node is
the maximum trust value of all possible chains from the source to the destination. To
calculate the trust for these chains the framework piggybacks a trust enhanced shortest
path computation on the standard routing protocol used in the network. The calculated
trustworthiness and opinion values are used to specify the most trusted chain of nodes
from source to destination, and this chain is then selected for forwarding messages.
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have often been identified as targets for attacks. One
of the main threats is that the reasoning of a WSN is affected by a number of compro-
mised sensors that report different readings about the same phenomenon as the other
nodes next to it. [Atakli et al., 2008] address this issue by introducing a trust value for
nodes in the WSN. When reporting, the report of each node is compared to reports of
other nodes. If one nodes lies too much outside the observations of other nodes, its
trust and thereby its weight in the reasoning gets decreased with a constant weight.
The authors of SecuredTrust (cf. [Das and Islam, 2012]) propose a framework for multi-
agent systems, incorporating many of the commonly applied methods of trust man-
agement research. According SecuredTrust, taking agent A who regularly consumes
service s of other agents, the selection of an appropriate provider for s looks as follows.
Given an agent C that provides s, A calculates a satisfaction level SatC by aggregat-
ing her ratings of previous interactions together. If A has only a limited number of
interactions, making her Sat calculations uncertain, she asks other agents to provide
recommendations about C, for example agent B. The evaluation of feedback credibil-
ity FCreB ofB is done by looking at the similarity of recommendationsB has provided
before and A’s own experience. All collected recommendations are aggregated into the
indirect trust measure ITA,C through combining the feedback each agent provided and
the FCre of the particular agent. Apart from having these aggregated values, behav-
ioral patterns are also taken into account by A before interacting with C. These behav-
ioral patterns are deduced from the change in A’s assessments of SatC and ITC values.
Additionally if A or C have been inactive for a long time and no recent information is
available, the SatC values are gradually decreased through a decay function. Finally
all these measurements are combined into the overall trust metric TrustA,C . The calcu-
lated Trust values are interpreted as probability measures, meaning the value of Trust
of an individual agent is used to determine the probability with which this particular
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agent should be contacted compared to other possible providers.
Trust management also received public attention now, because of its introduction into
popular online services. eBay1 introduced a reputation system for rating sellers and
buyers of goods. The displayed rating is the sum of unique positive ratings minus
the sum of unique negative ratings. Timeliness is achieved by filters that display the
described rating for specified time windows. Despite showing multiple weaknesses
(cf. [Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002]), the applied framework seems to have a posi-
tive impact on eBay’s business indicating general customer satisfaction. The PageRank
computation proposed by [Page et al., 1999] can also be seen as a trust management
framework, providing the reputation of individual pages. A web page’s reputation is
calculated by the number of other pages linking to it, also taking into account the rep-
utation of the page displaying the link. Google uses spiders to crawl the web (cf. [Brin
and Page, 1998]) and gather the information required for calculating the PageRank,
which determines the order in which search results are then displayed to the user.
2.1.2 Aspects of Trust Management
We have seen that research in trust and trust management evolved since its first in-
troduction. Since the first computational trust formalism, multiple complete domain
specific solutions have been developed until today. This vivid research has identified
multiple aspects of trust management that are either used or investigated across solu-
tions.
Trust Versus Reliability
As already identified by [Marsh, 1994], trust is situation as well as function dependent.
Main distinction to make, as introduced by [Josang et al., 2006], is between referral
and functional trust. As an example, Alice may have no functional trust in Bob to fix
her car, but may have referral trust that Bob can suggest a proper car mechanic. The
same concept may be called reliability of a referral, as by [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez
Pe´rez, 2010]. Other systems may further distinguish trust for different contexts – as for
example done in [Xiong and Liu, 2004], where trust from similar contexts may be used
to assess trust in an entity for the target context – but functional and referral are the most
basic ones. To simplify further discussions, from here on we will refer to functional trust
simply as trust, and to referral trust as reliability.
There are a number of common approaches for assigning reliability values to received
referrals. [Kamvar et al., 2003] argue trust to be transitive, and therefore it is possible
to apply the same trust assessments to various scopes. Another approach for deter-
mining reliability is through comparing how much the opinions relate for mutually
1http://www.ebay.com Last visited 16th August 2014
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known entities. [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] propose to compare the difference of
the received referral and the held observations to a configured allowed deviation d. If
the difference is larger than d, the referral is dropped, else it is accepted with a limited
weight. Based on the outcome of the deviation test, also the reliability of the node is
updated. [Das and Islam, 2012] introduce a difference value for referrals that is cal-
culated through taking the standard deviation between referral and own stored trust.
Depending on the size of the difference, either a high punishment or a low reward is
added to the reliability value. Introducer trust from [Zimmermann, 1995] can also be
seen as a reliability value, and it is configured per hand by the user.
Trust and reliability lead us to the distinction between direct and indirect trust in an
entity (cf. [Josang et al., 2006]) (or sometimes also called first-hand and second-hand
trust – cf. [Zouridaki et al., 2007]). Direct trust is building on direct experience with
the target entity; indirect trust, on the other hand, is mostly relevant where there has
been no direct interaction with the target. In the latter case, based on referrals and
their level of reliability, indirect trust is formed, enabling the assessment of risk for
interacting with the unknown target entity. From our previous example, if we think
Bob’s suggestions to be reliable, Alice will have indirect trust in the car mechanic of his
choice.
Observations, Recommendations and Reputation
Similarly to first-hand and second-hand trust, it is possible to speak about first-hand
and second-hand observations: first-hand observations are observations done by an
entity itself, second-hand observations are those that have been sent to the entity by
others. Second-hand observations are most commonly called recommendations and
are defined by [Mahoney et al., 2005] as
”a statement of trust about a remote entity made by an intermediate entity.”
A recommendation always has a sender and a recipient. This enables the assignment
of a reliability value to the recommendation, and also the evaluation of the recommen-
dation after interacting with the target of the recommendation.
Opposed to recommendations, reputation is a general belief about an entity. As [Josang
et al., 2007] defined it,
”reputation is what is generally said or believed about a person’s or thing’s
character or standing.”
Reputation does not have a sender or a recipient: it is an aggregation of different enti-
ties’ trust about a target. Although possible to assign reliability to it, reputation is like
using recommendations from an anonymous source. Reputation may provide the ad-
vantage of reflecting a larger observation pool, it is however also more general and less
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situational. An illustration of the difference between recommendations and reputation
can be seen in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Difference between recommendations and reputation.
The method of collecting second-hand information significantly influences the archi-
tecture of the trust management solution: it can either be centralized or decentralized,
and the applied techniques in these solutions can differ significantly. Centralized solu-
tions always involve a commonly trusted online entity that is either trusted to provide
trust information, e.g. by means of certification, or to collect observations and provide
access to them. In decentralized solutions each entity stores and evaluates its own ob-
servations and gathers second-hand observations to enrich its own view on the system.
Nodes either query the whole network, ”friends-first” (cf. [Marti and Garcia-Molina,
2004]) or nodes their already interact with (cf. [Kamvar et al., 2003]); addressing scal-
ability issues, both [Chandra et al., 2012b] and [Jiang and Baras, 2004] propose the use
of randomized crawlers for collecting second-hand observations in the network.
Calculating and Using Trust Measures
The most thoroughly investigated aspect of trust management by the research commu-
nity is how to asses trust given a set of first and second-hand information, i.e. how
the trust model looks like. Trust models are strict computational rules that describe
the transformation from collected information to assessed trust. There are a number
of approaches to imitate human trust assessment. [Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 2000]
propose a trust model based on real-world characteristics of trust, introducing discrete
levels from which the one with the most evidence is selected. Beta distributions are
a popular method for representing trust (cf. [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] and
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[Quercia et al., 2006]) as they hold the probability of multiple levels of trust simultane-
ously, fundamentally incorporate the concept of certainty, and allow the easy updating
of the assessment through positive and negative observations. An example of trust
assessments in forms of Beta distributions with various numbers of positive and neg-
ative observations can be seen in figure 2.3. A more complex representation of trust is
through the application of hidden Markov models (HMM), as done by [ElSalamouny
et al., 2010]. A HMM models the assessed entity through a number of distinct hidden
states, where the observer tries to assess the probability of particular responses the en-
tity gives in each state and the transitions between these states. The list of approaches
for coming up with a perfect trust model is even longer, but the questions that most
approaches tackle are focused around a number of key issues: levels of trust measure,
uncertainty of assessments, and time based adoption of trust assessments.
Figure 2.3: Beta distributions with various number of good and bad observation values
The question of interval and granularity of the trust measure has already been identi-
fied by [Marsh, 1994]. He decided to represent trust on a continuous range from -1 to
1, where -1 represents complete distrust, 0 is called no trust (or similarly no informa-
tion), and 1 stands for blind trust. Similarly, the approach from [Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes, 2000] takes a symmetric range but with discrete values: very untrustworthy,
untrustworthy, trustworthy, very trustworthy. A widely applied approach for thinking
about trust is by means of probability (cf. [Josang et al., 2005]); ranging from 0 to 1, it is
the probability that a target entity will behave correctly. This understanding had also
motivated to think about trust as a probability function (cf. [Buchegger and Le Boudec,
2004]).
As by its definition, trust is used in situations of risk and uncertainty. A decision has to
be made, even if there is only a limited number of evidence to help a decision. This kind
of uncertainty can be formalized in trust models and incorporated into trust related de-
cisions. There have been multiple approaches for tackling uncertainty: [Abdul-Rahman
and Hailes, 2000] introduce an uncertainty factor if it is not possible to determine an un-
ambiguous trust value; in [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] probability functions are
used for capturing trust assessments, and the expected value is used to make decisions;
in the Hermes framework (cf. [Zouridaki et al., 2007]) trust and certainty are inputs for
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calculating trustworthiness of entities in accordance to user configured priorities.
There are two main motivations for adopting trust assessments with time:
1. [Marsh, 1994] calls it forgiving, [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] call it redemp-
tion: enabling entities to improve their services, and thereby enable an admission
back into the system once service provision has improved.
2. [Xiong and Liu, 2004] want to protect against maliciously behaving nodes that
try to build up positive trust to exploit it for later attacks. Such solutions aim
at quickly reacting to negative changes in entities’ behavior and excluding them
before they can inflict harm to other system participants.
To enable these kinds of adoptions significance or weight of older evidence may get
gradually decreased by introducing a decaying factor, as is done for example in [Das
and Islam, 2012] or [Jiang and Baras, 2004] and illustrated in equation 2.2.
Trustt = Trustt−1 × eλ∆t;λ = decaying constant, t = time (2.2)
Compared to decaying, where – although with decreasing significance – older values
always influence the assessment, the use of windows with specified sizes enable a faster
adoption (cf. [Marsh, 1994] and [Xiong and Liu, 2004]). Windows regulate the amount
of evidence stored per entities, thereby permanently deleting information about previ-
ous behavior. The parameters selected for both mechanisms have to be carefully con-
sidered: quick forgetting hinders the establishment of a stable pool of trusted entities,
whereas slow forgetting may hinder the proper effect of these mechanisms all together.
Figure 2.4: Relation between stake, trust, and risk as of [Solhaug et al., 2007]
After establishing a pool of trust assessments about different entities participating in
the system – using all the concepts we have discussed so far, it is still to be answered
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how these assessments can be used in situations of risk. [Marsh, 1994] introduced the
concept of cooperation threshold that depends on risk. According to his work, higher
risk results in a higher cooperation threshold; thereby if the transaction we are going
to participate in involves something precious or has a high chance to fail, the depen-
dent one should have high trust in the provider to make the transaction. [Josang and
Presti, 2004] have a similar view and say that every entity has a decision surface that is
dependant on reliability trust and the involved investment: if the involved investment
and thus risk is higher, the same reliability trust may not be enough. [Solhaug et al.,
2007] take a different approach and state that trust and stake are inputs for assessing
risk. If high trust is available, the dependant generally faces smaller risk in making a
transaction. An often referenced figure from their work can be seen in figure 2.4.
To illustrate the difference between the two approaches we use a simple example. Given
an old ladder that no one uses for reaching apples in the garden, would you use it if
it was the escape possibility from a burning house? The question now is whether you
use the ladder because your risk acceptance changed, or because the level of trust you
require in the ladder to save your life is different than for picking apples.
2.2 Theoretical Foundations: What We Build Upon
In our endeavor of developing a model based utility, easing the application of trust
management, we are able to build on a number of areas and related approaches. This
section collects them, and presents work we acknowledge as our foundation.
Literature reviews take current state of research, collect multiple results and identify
similarities, provide characterizations, or go even further and formalize their charac-
terizations into draft models. We can greatly benefit from these results as they had al-
ready provided guidance into different research areas and identified main similarities.
In chapter 4 we also use some defined models as first step for our own solution.
Usable security is a solution approach that goes against the general misbelief that iden-
tified users as the main weakness in information security. Researchers in this field con-
ducted multiple studies regarding cognitive models of security, misdesigned user inter-
faces and security procedures, and have developed guidelines for proper involvement
of users into enhancing system protection. Our work greatly relates to these approaches
and can benefit from the developed results.
MDS aims at integrating security at a higher level into a system. Similarly to general
model-driven approaches, MDS wishes to ensure the integrity between design and im-
plementation by introducing direct mapping capabilities from domain specific models
to an executable source code. Additionally, MDS provides an abstraction that eases pre-
sentation of a systems’ underlying security considerations, enabling not only security
engineers, but also other stakeholders to master the design.
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2.2.1 Literature Reviews on Trust Management
We identify two main sorts of literature review work: characterizations and models.
When speaking of characterizations we understand an undertaking that collects a larger
number of publications and sorts them according to identified similarities, methods,
and approaches; in the end they provide a draft characterization for sorting available
results. A model based literature review is less attentive to methods, but rather identi-
fies abstract blocks that have defined relations and appear across most findings.
There are two popular surveys on trust management in the last 10 years that we discuss
here. [Artz and Gil, 2007] approach trust management from the view of semantic web,
and their work provides a very broad picture of applications of trust in it. It divides
the discipline into four areas – namely policy-based trust, reputation-based trust, gen-
eral models of trust, and trust in information sources. While each of these areas can be
further divided into sub-categories, these four areas hold unique characteristics either
by the approach they are applying or the area where they can be applied. By review-
ing these four areas, the authors identify several dimensions that are relevant when
discussing trust in computer science: its target, its digital representation, the method
for determining it, the management of it, the quantification of it, or its purpose. The
work of [Josang et al., 2007] pays more attention to reputation management, i.e. how to
establish a general reputation of entities rather than holding individual subjective as-
sessments. It identifies multiple common mathematical principles for computing trust
across results – including simple summation, Bayesian systems, and belief models. Af-
ter analyzing a few commercial and live reputation systems, the authors present com-
mon vulnerabilities these systems have. They argue that live systems are mostly settled
around simple solutions and that commercial systems are not considering adequately
the advanced solutions provided by academia.
There are also multiple examples of literature reviews resulting in models, and these
are discussed in detail in section 4.3. Here, we would like to highlight two models that
are the most similar to our approach, and that greatly influenced the direction this work
took. UniTec, a generic trust model by [Kinateder et al., 2005], defines common proper-
ties which are shared across multiple trust models – trust measure, trust certainty, trust
context, trust directness, and trust dynamics – and emulates them by choosing appro-
priate parameters for these properties. Called pre-standardization approach for trust
and reputation models, [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010] identify a common
life cycle that trust related information goes through: from a system gathering it, mak-
ing a decision upon it, to finally providing feedback on it; an illustration of the steps
can be seen in figure 2.5. This work provided a general guideline for our research – as
seen in section 3.2 – until we were able to develop our own model.
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Figure 2.5: Steps in the pre-standardization work of [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010]
2.2.2 Usable Security
A widely applied rule of information security engineering is to consider the user as the
weakest link in a system, and thus apply methods that force users to apply intended
procedures. Such design principles resulted in applications that made users circum-
vent security procedures or make disastrous mistakes as shown in [Whitten and Tygar,
1999] and [Adams and Sasse, 1999]. [Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975] identify psychologi-
cal acceptability as one of the main causes for such mistakes:
”the extent that the user’s mental image of his protection goals matches the
mechanisms he must use ... If he must translate his image of his protection
needs into a radically different specification language, he will make errors.”
These observations motivated the work of [Zurko and Simon, 1996], who introduce
user-centered security as a term
”to refer to security models, mechanisms, systems, and software that have
usability as a primary motivation or goal.”
The authors identify a final state, where security procedures meet user intuition and
achieve the protection goals of companies that security related systems should aim for.
They also provide a number of examples that in their eyes meet this goal – including
the decentralized trust management work of [Blaze et al., 1996]. In [Zurko, 2005] the
authors extend their scope and combine methodologies from security and usability en-
gineering, thus introducing usability enhancing mechanisms in the design process of a
security product.
With the same aim, [tom Markotten, 2002] explicitly combines common user-centered
design methods with security engineering design steps. The resulting discipline is
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called user-centered security engineering, where key aspects to address are:
• Error avoidance: user interfaces should avoid mistakes in advance as actions are
often non-revocable;
• User guidance in critical situations: critical situations have to be identified and
supported with good help and status messages;
• Generation of trust: the interface of the tool has to reflect the security level it
provides;
• User-friendliness, especially for new users: the user has to be able to work imme-
diately from the start with the tool, as she is not willing to learn about security
mechanisms as security is not a primary goal;
• Abstraction of security mechanisms: security mechanisms are very technical and
complex, hence familiar concepts should be applied throughout the security tool
for abstraction;
• Avoidance of interaction in every-day use: security should be transparent and
interactions with the users should be held to a minimum during daily activities.
Additionally to these concepts, the authors provide a definition for usable security that
has been in alignment with our understanding and which guided this work:
”Usable security is the degree how efficiently, effectively and satisfyingly an
end user can protect himself and his IT-system in a certain context.”
2.2.3 Model-Driven Security
Model Driven Security (MDS)(cf. [Basin et al., 2006]) aims at integrating security start-
ing from the design phase, thereby creating a better understanding of applied proce-
dures for all stakeholders. MDS adds security requirements into the system’s design
models. This has the advantage of including security at the initial state of the design
and therefore avoiding later integration. MDS also enables direct generation of neces-
sary code from these model; this can turn documentation into actual implementation,
and also helps avoiding typical implementation errors that are still responsible for a sig-
nificant amount of software vulnerabilities according to [CISCO, 2014]. The approach
of [Basin et al., 2006] is used for Role Based Access Control and uses the UML2 extension
SecureUML to achieve this. SecureUML is a vocabulary for annotating UML model el-
ements with access control relevant attributes, like user-roles and permissions. A more
general approach by [Lang and Schreiner, 2008] builds on the capabilities of XACML3.
Their approach integrates with other model-driven approaches, captures rules that are
described there, and by combining them with the access control model it generates
2http://www.uml.org/ Last visited 14th April 2014
3https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc home.php?wg abbrev=xacml Last visited 14th April 2014
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multiple policies that are then deployed in Policy Enforcement Points – these are dis-
tributed in the system at critical points and enforce the high level objectives that have
been formulated.
MDS solutions provide their own modeling language or extend an existing schema as
in the case of SecureUML. We see the Meta-Object Facility (MOF)[, OMG], provided
by the Object Management Group4, as the most general guideline for developing a
modeling schema – called a meta model. MOF is a metamodeling architecture which
had been used for defining UML and other similar modeling languages. It defines
four levels from M0 to M3 for representing models; our approach can be positioned at
the M2 level – meta models. The work presented in section 5.3 builds on the Ecore5
implementation of the Essential MOF, the part of MOF describing the mapping from
models to object-oriented code.
2.3 Related Work
We are not the only ones who have identified the problems stated above, and there
is work available that goes further as currently available surveys. In this section we
present work that is related to our approach, but that follows a different methodology
and could therefore not be integrated with our approach – contrary to the results used
in section 4.1.
[Viljanen, 2005] addresses the problem of incompatible terminology used across trust
management frameworks. Their aim is to have a common trust ontology that enables
the exchange of trust relationship information and information on the methods with
which these relationships have been formed. The authors wish to focus on the descrip-
tion of facts supporting trust and acknowledge that other aspects are missing in their
analysis. Through their analysis the authors propose the ontology presented in figure
2.6.
The work of [Saadi et al., 2011] identifies the problem of context specific trust models
and wishes to achieve interoperability of those. They identify as common elements
of every trust model trust roles, trust relations, trust metrics, and trust operations.
Through the formalization of these concepts they are able to describe every trust model
with the following structure of finite sets, where each set contains simple or complex
values:
TrustModel :=< Roles,Metrics,Relations,Operations > (2.3)
Through the formalized descriptions the authors are able to compose new trust mod-
els by taking the union of the individual sets of the defined structure. For ensuring
interoperability, they additionally add mediator roles and mediation operations as an
4http://www.omg.org/ Last visited 14th April 2014
5http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/?project=emf
28 2 State of the Art and Theoretical Foundations
Figure 2.6: Ontology of trust as proposed by [Viljanen, 2005]
integration layer between the trust models used in the composition. The work places a
strong focus on the algorithmic creation of the mediator roles and mediation operations,
but in the end the functionality behind these transformations has to be implemented by
hand. The results are significantly focused on the mathematical structures but provide
little support with implementation aspects.
The SECURE project (cf. [Cahill et al., 2003]) provides a framework for implementing
security mechanisms for pervasive computing environments. They base their approach
on the human notion of trust and design their system based on decentralized security
management. The SECURE framework includes components for evidence gathering
and storing, entity recognition, trust calculation, risk evaluation, and access control.
The proposed framework is similar to our understanding of a trust management frame-
work, extending functionality beyond the scope of only the trust model. However, this
framework focuses on the implementation aspects and does not provide support in
better understanding the functionality of trust management.
For exchanging trust related information [Trcˇek, 2004] suggests and XML based stan-
dard. Based on standardization experience of the W3C, it focuses on simplicity and
human readability. It describes trust relationships in form of matrices that can be ex-
changed through trustRequest and trustResponse messages. [Liu et al., 2008] describe
a trust model which addresses the limitations of current application specific models
where the underlying mathematical models show deficiencies. They base their trust
model on basic properties of the trust graph of a system. They additionally provide the
2.4 Conclusion 29
facilities for entities to describe and exchange detailed descriptions of trust relation-
ships in form of XML messages. These messages contain feature vectors of constrains
on the relationships – as granularity, preconditions, and influencing events – and de-
scriptions of the functions and their parameters used for evaluating trust.
The Trust Framework Meta Model work group from the Kantara Initiative6 has a sim-
ilar goal as we have. They wish to provide a meta model that defines the components
of trust management frameworks, and through which it shall be possible to compare
mechanisms developed by individual communities. They define a Trust Framework as
follows:
”In electronic communication, a trust framework is a complete set of con-
tracts, regulations or commitments that enables parties of a Trust Federation
to rely on certain assertions by other actors to fulfill their information secu-
rity and privacy requirements.”
It sees Trust Federation to be established by a Trust Framework, the objectives of which
include confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, and privacy
user control. Thereby it sees a Trust Framework to be more on an infrastructure level,
enabling business services. Unfortunately there has been no visible activity in the work-
ing group since 2012, and the link to the meta model prototype from that year is broken;
therefore we cannot see how our work compares to the actual meta model of the initia-
tive.
2.4 Conclusion
The area of trust management evolved from the study and formalization of trust. As
understanding of trust increased in the research community, a number of methods have
been developed to apply the concept in computer science. By starting off from central-
ized and certificate based solutions, trust management has been introduced to multi-
ple environments, applying various techniques. Although environments are different,
there are a number of core aspects addressed across all of them. We have seen that dif-
ferent authors name these aspects differently, making it difficult to establish a certainty
in applied methods and terminology. To overcome this problem, we highlighted termi-
nology and provided definitions that we are going to apply through the remainder of
this work.
The main distinction used throughout trust management research is between different
types of trust. We decided to differentiate mainly between trust and reliability, where
the latter stands for trust about the quality of someone’s referrals. Referrals are collected
in the form of recommendations, that is statements of trust assessed by someone else.
6https://kantarainitiative.org/groups/trust-framework-meta-model-work-group/ Last visited 18th Au-
gust 2014
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Referrals that are not from an individual but rather from an aggregated and thereby
anonymous pool are called reputation.
There are multiple ways to represent the calculated trust measure in someone else, and
they all have benefits and drawbacks. One aspect that can be very well captured by
specific representations is the certainty in an assessment. This assessment is usually
adopted over time, either by the application of decaying or windows. Finally there are
multiple approaches for integrating risk into the use of a trust assessment.
In the second part of this chapter we reviewed research that we build our research
on. There are three main areas that support this work. Literature reviews on trust
management identify similar problems as we have; therefore, they provide a significant
findings base that we can adopt. The area of usable security deals with the problem
that computer security is still highly technical and often considered a burden. There
are multiple techniques we can borrow from this field to support our target user group.
Finally Model-Driven Security (MDS) provides a representation of security concepts
aimed at system designers and operators. Solutions that work in MDS are likely to
work for us as well.
We will start the specification and requirements phase of our research in the next chap-
ter. After a first elaboration on the possible user groups and their role in a software de-
velopment process, we are going to analyze what our chosen user group understands
from the concepts that we presented in this chapter. This understanding will guide the
further development of the TrustMUSE System.
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Chapter 3
Workshops on Understanding the
Needs
According to the user-centered approach selected in section 1.4 we start our work by
trying to understand our stakeholders and finding the initial needs our solution should
target. Necessarily this first requires us to identify who the users of our system actually
are. For this purpose we investigate the different stakeholders of a software application
(cf. [Rozanski and Woods, 2011]) and at what level they deal with it; then we look at
possible levels of trust management abstractions mapped to these stakeholders. Based
on this knowledge, we define the abstraction level for which to provide a solution, and
consequently from which stakeholder group we should acquire our requirements. Af-
ter narrowing our focus to system designers and architects, we hold a number of events
to exchange ideas and thoughts with these stakeholders. We choose to use focus group
workshops with scenarios focusing on different aspects of trust management in order
to get a broad view of appreciated functionality. For each held workshop we intro-
duce the motivation and the set up; then we present the outcomes in form of structured
tables and also via a discussion to better elaborate on them.
Our first workshop aims at the general understanding our target users have about trust
management, investigating whether and how they understand the aim and mecha-
nisms of it; we also want to know what services our target users expect from a trust
management module in an application.
Building on the experience gained through this first workshop, in the second workshop
we focus on the development experience. Our question is, assuming a trust manage-
ment module has the desired services, how architects would integrate these services
into an application: what kind of presentation is preferred by the them, and how can
we support the selection of the most appropriate preferences for the trust management
framework. The input from these workshops goes into the design phase of the later
presented TrustMUSE Model and the accompanying TrustMUSE Builder application.
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3.1 Who Are the Target Users?
When looking at an application that already applies or should include trust manage-
ment functionality, it is possible to discuss trust on multiple levels. [Rozanski and
Woods, 2011] introduce a classification of stakeholders involved in the design, imple-
mentation, and use of a software product. For our purpose we consider the groups
acquirers, architects, developers, and users. We additionally include the trust manage-
ment community as a possible stakeholder of our solution for later mentioned reasons.
Starting from a high level representation, the first group to be presented with the op-
eration of trust management functionality are the decision makers or acquirers – we
can also include end users here as for our discussion they have similar expectations
as acquirers. They want to understand the main services the products provide or con-
sume, and where this benefits the operation. This group is rarely interested in technical
details but expects highly abstract representations with a clear listing of benefits and
disadvantages. We do not plan to target this audience, as we are not aiming for an eval-
uation of different implementations of trust management frameworks. To create the
foreseen listing of benefits it would be necessary to have standardized use-cases and
testing scenarios – the execution of tests could build on standard interfaces, similar to
those we aim to provide, but that is just the basis for such a system. To support the
deployment of trust management we are aware that the approval of this user group
is necessary. However, we wish to achieve this by reducing the effort and expertise
needed for the deployment of trust management frameworks rather than by creating
clear and understandable representations of the services provided by a particular trust
management framework.
The next group involved in the creation of a software product is that of architects and
system designers. They sustain an overall picture of the operation of the modules and
apply best practices according to use-cases and application environment. This level
benefits the most from a model-driven design as it ensures that the designed archi-
tecture is mapped to the implementation, and additionally the implementation is also
continuously documented. This is the stakeholder group which has to be informed
about the capabilities of trust management and has to be supported in selecting the
appropriate mechanisms for their specific challenge. They are already interested in
technical details and mainly base their decisions on a detailed list of services, restric-
tions, and performance indicators. They also have to design how to integrate modules
into the overall operation, and what effects a specific choice has on the architecture.
Consequently, the final goal of our solution is to support this level of design, and when
collecting the requirements we mainly aim for these stakeholders. Although enabling
such support builds on multiple lower level components that is also beneficiary for
other users, the foreseen level of abstraction and visualization of our system is mostly
valuable for system designers. We believe that by targeting this level, we can enhance
the integration of trust management functionality to the greatest extent in tomorrows’
applications. In the reminder of the work, when we speak about our target users –
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compared to end users – we mean system designers and architects.
Developers are the most concerned with the specific implementation of a software
product. Obviously this role is mixed many times with the system designer level,
but it has very specific and different needs compared to other stakeholders. During
the implementation of a module, class, or method a clear separation of functionality
is needed. The more the interfaces and expected functionality are clear, the easier it is
for the responsible person to implement it. Necessarily there are specific areas that re-
quire specific skills, but undoubtedly a clear separation of concerns speeds overall work
and increases maintainability (cf. [Meyer, 1988]). Therefore for the effective implemen-
tation of trust management functionality, clear and usable APIs have to be provided
with exhaustive documentation. The implementing specialists should not be burdened
with functionality they are not familiar with, and common services should be accessible
through common libraries. During the realization of our system we keep these needs
in mind, but they are not our main objective. We realize that any well implemented
design tool can be unprofitable due to poor support on implementation level but deem
this problem out of scope.
The trust research community can also be seen as a possible user of our future system.
They have clear knowledge on the mechanisms available and applicable in trust man-
agement. As there is already an exhaustive amount of surveys and categorizations of
state of the art trust research available, most researchers probably have a picture of sub-
fields and possible broad categories. What they need is a catalog to quickly find specific
research results available and a platform to compare newly designed methods against
the already existing ones. While some of these needs can be covered by the application
of our envisioned system, we do not explicitly design for this purpose. What we are
going to provide to these users is a way to describe their results in a standardized way
and a way to easily integrate different building blocks for experimenting purposes.
3.2 General Requirements of Trust Management
After having decided that architects and system designers are our target user group,
we start by having a look at their general understanding of trust management. We
want to learn whether they are able to use the already commonly accepted terms and
functionality available in the trust community. Additionally we search for the features
an architect would expect from a trust management framework after having decided
to use it. To achieve this, we organized a round of workshops that we present in this
section. The results of this workshop are additionally published in [Vinkovits, 2012].
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3.2.1 Workshop Setup
We held two focus group workshops with five participants each time. Each of them
worked as IT researcher with significant development experience but no explicit train-
ing in IT security. First we presented the users a scenario in which they had to solve
a development task in a distributed Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) environment
(the complete scenario can be found in appendix A). According to the scenario, mul-
tiple independent organizations collected life-cycle information of packages of meat,
from farm until the meat counter. At the meat counter customers got all available infor-
mation of the product – together with quality parameters, comparisons by independent
institutes, and preparation suggestions. The consumable services were considered un-
predictable, dishonest, or even malicious. The workshop was divided into two 1-hour
sessions. During the first part, the participants of the workshop had an open discussion
about solution ideas, with few questions from the moderators to steer the conversation.
This part was more about elaborating on the challenges from the scenario, identifying
main problems to solve, and general solution approaches.
In the second part of the workshop participants described more specifically what kind
of support they would like to receive in the design and development process if encoun-
tering such challenges. During this part, we asked about development and run-time
support, about different representation ways, and about design patterns. From these
discussions we extracted a list of initial needs that had to be further processed, as pre-
sented in the next section.
3.2.2 Results
Against general expectation that non-experts do not understand IT security, our ques-
tioned target users intuitively proposed and then applied trust and reputation based
solutions in the scenario. However, as they were not familiar with current research on
trust management, they had no clear idea how to apply these procedures. This raised
a number of needs, which we sorted and clustered. Looking at these clusters we find
that they form almost the same model elements as are identified by [Go´mez Ma´rmol
and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010]. We list the needs sorted by model elements in table 3.1.
The needs can be clustered into three main areas, namely ’gathering information’, ’scor-
ing and ranking’, and ’entity selection’. ’Gathering information’ is mostly related to
questions of collecting and producing ratings, and especially about ways to deal with
the reliability of this collected data. The feedback in this part makes it evident that
although trust and reputation based security is appreciated, pre-trusted entities and
certificates provided by authorities are still favored in uncertain situations.
’Scoring and ranking’ mainly includes mechanisms that we discuss in section 2.1.2.
Needs formulated for this area remain high level and vague. Our workshop partici-
pants had an approximate idea what the end result of a trust assessment should contain
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Model
element
Element
parameter
Needs
Gathering
information
Direct experi-
ences • Continuously monitor services for current quality
parameters.
• Rate success of each interaction
• Use simple rating scales as they are more intuitive.
Acquaintances
experiences • Consume services from providers with good gen-
eral reputation
Pre-trusted
entities • Trusted party should control and certify services’
quality parameters.
• Use trusted party ratings as starting point for own
trust calculations.
Raters reliabil-
ity • Avoid that initial ratings influence or bias subse-
quent votes.
• Control reliability of raters as they could provide
dishonest ratings.
• Only apply recommendations into trust calcula-
tion if recommenders’ preferences are similar to
own preferences.
Transaction
history • Change and progress of quality is also important
not only the current state.
• With time trust values become invalid.
Scoring and ranking • Quantify trust.
• Compute ”average” rating from available ratings.
Average does not have to mean arithmetic mean
but some measure that illustrates usual behavior.
• Services should be rated based on different as-
pects.
• Service aspects should be weighted individually in
final score.
• At the end have one trust index calculated in a
transparent way.
Entity selection • Filter available services based on trust.
• When selecting a service provider, have a list of
options sorted based on ranking.
• Make possible service providers comparable.
Table 3.1: General requirements for trust management
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– like considering multiple aspects with individual weights – but could not formulate
how to achieve it. At ’entity selection’ they mostly wanted to get a list of compara-
ble eventually trustworthy entities, but not an explicit decision regarding the entity to
interact with.
Our target users also described ways how they would like to handle trust manage-
ment during development. They explained that for the computation of the trust value
they want to rely on a basic set of parameters relevant for their application domain.
They would customize deeper details of the computation method if necessary, based
on categorization or layering. They often demanded a clear, layered, and pluggable
architecture for representing the calculation process of the trust index.
For finding the first basic set of parameters, they preferred to rely on a matching algo-
rithm that semantically maps the required aspects onto the available service parame-
ters. This step should be achieved with proper visualization, domain specific models,
or requirements based search between best practices; this would provide a suggestion
for configuring the trust management framework.
3.3 Requirements of Trust Management Support
For the next step, the aim was to find the most fitting way of supporting our target users
in designing an appropriate trust management framework. Building on the previously
acquired requirements, we organized a follow-up workshop that included topics like
visualization, design process, modeling, code generation, and API. The results of the
workshop is also discussed in [Vinkovits and Zimmermann, 2013].
3.3.1 Workshop Setup
We held a workshop with six users, all working as researchers in an IT institute but
having different specializations. Three worked mainly in the HCI field, one in business
informatics, one in context-aware systems, and one in web development. Each of our
users had significant experience with the development of distributed systems, but had
no explicit training in IT security. We divided the workshop into two 1-hour sessions
based on two different scenarios, in which they had to design different applications.
They had an open discussion about how they would proceed with the development of
the individual applications, assuming they had tool support for the trust management
part. The two scenarios were designed such that they would focus on different aspects,
and enable us to collect several different needs.
The first scenario foresaw a simpler trust management framework, making our users
feel more comfortable in the topic and enabling them to focus on the development pro-
cess. In the scenario they had to develop a mobile app with supporting infrastructure,
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in which users reported and acknowledged the existence of traffic jams in real-time.
The trustworthiness of these reports was to be assessed by the system.
The second scenario was more challenging. It required the participants to design a
trustworthy routing system for a disaster site ad-hoc network, to be used by the first
responders doing the rescue work. As this scenario was difficult to handle for our target
users, it made them envision how they would like to receive support for the design of
an appropriate trust management framework.
Visualization • Visualization should serve as catalogue of options
• Visualization should be similar to UML
• Information flow should be traceable
Suggestions • Support should suggest Trust Model
• Fine tuning should be possible based on defaults
• Higher level categories should be provided
• Colliding requirements should be traceable
Implementation • Code generation is inconvenient
• API should provide base classes to inherit from
• Implementation should be event based
Table 3.2: General requirements for support on integrating trust management frameworks
Attributes • Attribute wording should be self-explanatory
• Additional descriptions about the meaning of attributes
should be provided
• Similar attributes should be grouped
Exclusion • See which attribute caused what exclusions
• Description should be provided why two attributes collide
Implementation • References for further reading should be provided for im-
plementations
• Implementations should be ordered based on relevance
Table 3.3: Requirements on model-based attributing of existing trust management frameworks
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3.3.2 Results
After the workshop, we evaluated the notes we made during the discussions and iden-
tified the main needs concerning the design process. These needs can be divided into
two main categorizes. The first category contains more general needs concerning the
main properties a design process should have, the way it should work, and how it
should be used. These needs are collected in table 3.2. The second category, shown in
table 3.3, is more related to our created design process – presented in section 5.1 – but
also has some more generic elements.
Looking at table 3.2, we see that our users wished to have a visualization that shows
categories of trust management. The visualization should build on standards the users
are familiar with and show dependencies and the information flow. One specifically
mentioned possibility to build visualization on was the Unified Modeling Language
(UML). Based on the presented categories, there should be default suggestions and also
alternatives to browse through – similarly to a catalog. To help users select between
alternatives additional links to literature should be provided. This can be understood
as if the system worked as an e-learning platform. As seen in table 3.3, the system
should be as self-explanatory as possible and provide an explanation for the decisions
it takes.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we identified the main requirements our system should target. Based on
our stakeholder analysis, we found that the role in a software development cycle that
can benefit most from the envisioned contribution of our work and that would enable
the transition of trust management results to applied systems are system designers and
architects. We consider them to be the users of our work and will reference to them
from here on as target users. While other roles in the software development cycle can
also benefit from some of the aspects that we address, we do not explicitly consider
their needs in our designs.
From the organized focus group workshops we learnt that our participants were sur-
prisingly familiar and confident in using trust management. They had a deep under-
standing of problems that should be considered when integrating trust information into
a system, as computation of ”average” service quality, transaction history, reliability of
ratings, etc. However, our participants visibly lacked expertise in distinguishing dif-
ferent trust models, more so integrating them into a scenario. Our target users when
asked how they envision a system that helps them integrating trust management func-
tionality into their application, said they needed a high level overview of possibilities
categorized by functionality and preferably a suggestion about the most fitting solu-
tion. They also wanted to learn more about specific systems that seemed promising,
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but did not want to use code generation functionality, nor implement the functionality
themselves.
All these collected requirements support our design of the TrustMUSE system. In chap-
ter 4, we compose the TrustMUSE Model, which as per requested is able to provide a
high level categorization of trust management functionality. We will design further
solutions that target the remaining stated requirements based on this model.
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Chapter 4
The TrustMUSE Model: Meta Model
of Trust Management
Looking at the requirements presented in chapter 3, our target users demanded a cate-
gorized and clear representation of trust management concepts for browsing them, and
a detailed description for adjusting individual implementation details. If our target
users were presented with excessive implementation aspects from the beginning, they
would lose overview of the overall functionality and miss important details of trust
management sub-functions. Therefore it is important to have a clear separation of con-
cerns from the beginning to help users in gradually exploring distinct sub-functions,
and only go into more technical details where wished so. This conscious exploration
of functionality supports architects in building a more comprehensible overall picture.
This chapter defines the distinguishable concepts of trust management to be presented
to our target users.
There are two usual ways to identify common concepts: one approach is to do it through
surveys and categorizations, as done for example by [Josang et al., 2007] and [Artz and
Gil, 2007]. We follow another approach that applies exact modeling to frameworks’
operation and creates a common ground to interpret them on. Existing models of trust
management are not fit to deal with the task of distributing trust management frame-
works into well defined and clearly separated aspects: they are either too narrowly
focused as the work of [Kinateder et al., 2005] that only deals with trust models, or not
detailed enough similarly to the work of [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010]
who claim it to be a pre-standardization approach themselves. We design our model
with clear requirements in mind, based on the work of [Mohagheghi et al., 2009] that
define following qualities for models:
• Completeness: having all the necessary information included related to trust man-
agement frameworks;
• Consistency: ensuring that elements have the same functionality across models;
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• Confinement: being appropriate for the goal at the right level of abstraction;
• Changeability: allowing easy interchange and expansion of the model.
This chapter starts by describing the design process of a trust management meta model
– called the TrustMUSE Model. This is our approach for providing a model providing
the above defined features. First, we describe the composition process of the model
based on grounded theory. In applying grounded theory, we do not start from raw
data/framework level, but look at existing modeling approaches for trust management
functionality, thus already having a preliminary axiomatic code. In section 4.2, we
present the result of us applying selective coding to these models, providing a detailed
description of our defined elements, their roles, interfaces, and possible implementa-
tions. The design process and the initial description of the elements overlap with what
is already published in [Vinkovits and Zimmermann, 2012].
After having designed the TrustMUSE Model as a way to abstract from specific trust
management frameworks, the subsequent sections show how this abstraction is used
in practice; this demonstrates the capabilities and the value gained by the TrustMUSE
Model. The application of the TrustMUSE Model also serves as a way to validate the
TrustMUSE Model, ensuring that it has the foreseen capabilities.
In section 4.3, we describe four well approved state of the art trust management frame-
works in terms of the TrustMUSE Model, thereby validating the meta model. For this
process we choose frameworks which have very different characteristics, to show how
extremes can be covered by our meta model. We also show how frameworks, which
seem to be very interwoven, can be divided into the respective TrustMUSE Model ele-
ments. The process also shows some examples of specific implementations of the Trust-
MUSE Model’s elements.
Finally we go a step further in validating the TrustMUSE Model and implement new
trust management frameworks for two applications. We use the element and API def-
initions of the TrustMUSE Model as seen in section 4.2, and compose and implement
them as complete trust management solutions that provide relevant functionality for
dedicated applications. In both cases, we amend the originally available functionality
of the application with the newly added trust management component. Through this
process, we identify additional software artifacts necessary for the interplay between
an application and the trust management framework.
4.1 Design of the Trust Management Meta Model (TrustMUSE
Model)
Our aim is to create a meta model, which creates a common ground on which to inter-
pret existing trust management research. We apply grounded theory (cf. [Strauss and
Corbin, 1994]) to achieve this and use existing surveys, categorizations, and models as
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axiomatic codes instead of raw data as starting point. Finally we continue with selective
coding to identify common aspects from these. Having these available descriptions, we
fuse and supplement them in a way to provide the complete and detailed TrustMUSE
Model.
As first step, we analyze and categorize the selected set of existing models. These do not
provide an overall model of trust management as we aim for, but approach the problem
from specific directions. We look at the pre-standardization approach from [Go´mez
Ma´rmol and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010], which concentrates on the evolution of trust from
raw information into a decision; the federated trust management from [Wu and Weaver,
2007] identifies building-blocks for a service-oriented environment; the UniTEC model
(cf. [Kinateder et al., 2005]) defines a generic partitioning of trust models; [Ramana
et al., 2010] modularize trust functionality for mobile ad-hoc networks. We summarize
our analysis of the individual models at the end of the section in table 4.1
4.1.1 Models We Build on
As a start, we go through the different categorizations we select for our approach in
detail, and take a look at what elements they identify. In many cases we transform
the categorizations into a model form to help ourselves at the later fusion process. For
each analyzed work we also provide what the major distinguishing features are, and
where we see deficiencies. When selecting from available models and categorizations,
we were looking for approaches that already draft boundaries between functional com-
ponents; also, we selected approaches that are distinct and do not unduly overlap with
each other.
Pre-Standardization
This early standardization work of [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2010] is the
closest to our approach and thus already partly provides the formalism we require.
The procedures the authors identify are as follows:
1. Gathering information (direct experience, friend experience, pre-trusted entity),
2. Scoring and ranking (recommendation, transaction history),
3. Entity selection (reputation, trust),
4. Transaction (selection),
5. Reward and punishment (received service).
In parentheses we have put the parameters of each given process. In the model these
processes sequentially follow each other, and the output of one process is the input
44 4 The TrustMUSE Model: Meta Model of Trust Management
of the next one. Scoring and ranking also includes a computation model like fuzzy,
Bayesian, etc.
This model is a representation of the process for establishing trust in an entity. It catches
the evolution of trust – starting from pieces of information, turning into trust, and fi-
nally resulting in consuming a service – very well. However, similarly to the authors
who state that this is only a pre-standardization approach, we find that the processes
are not fully defined and sequential ordering is very much simplified.
Federated Trust Management
As different domains interact in SOA environments, it is necessary to create interoper-
ability between different trust management solutions. [Wu and Weaver, 2007] analyze
the requirements of federated trust management realizing that a shared understanding
is necessary for services being able to cooperate. They divide the problem into five
aspects:
1. Trust representation: Language and formalism to make trust related statements.
2. Trust exchange: Methods to exchange trust statements.
3. Trust establishment: The procedure to create a trusting relation.
4. Trust enforcement: Making decisions based on trusting intention.
5. Trust storage: The place to store all the trust related information.
In contrast to the Pre-Standardization model, this classification does not solely focus
on the establishment of trust. It pinpoints very important aspects of trust management
frameworks. However, the authors do not wish to provide a model for trust manage-
ment and only use this classification as a way to systematically analyze their problem
in mind. Because of this, they do not define related data or interfaces for these aspects.
UniTEC
[Kinateder et al., 2005] tackle the fact – as we have also seen in section 2.1.2 – that
there are numerous digital formalizations of trust, called trust models. They identify
that while each trust model is suited for a specific domain, there is no way to compare
or translate the output from one model to another. The authors observe that while
the computation procedures may be different, the outcome of each trust model can be
mapped onto a generic model, called UniTEC. The authors compare trust models based
on following dimensions of trust:
1. Trust measure: The level of trust represented on some kind of scale.
2. Trust certainty: Represents how confident the trusting party is in its estimate.
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3. Trust context: The kind of service that is expected from the trustee.
4. Trust directness: Whether the trusting party trusts the trustee to provide the ser-
vice, or the trustee can forward the request to an adequate provider.
5. Trust dynamics: Describe the procedures that handle the changes in a trust rela-
tionship, like forgiving, fading, etc.
These dimensions identify common components with which the computations of a
trust model can be simulated. However when mapping to UniTEC, details from the
originating trust model are lost. Our TrustMUSE Model does not try to simplify every
framework to a generic one, but wants to describe in detail the properties each one has.
Survey for MANET
[Ramana et al., 2010] provide a survey on trust management for mobile ad-hoc net-
works (MANET). They find that trust is an essential concept in the uncertain and ever
changing environment of MANETs, and collect the characteristics required from a trust
management framework looking at possible classifications. In this approach, they di-
vide trust management into the following aspects:
1. Trust establishment,
(a) Collecting trust evidence,
(b) Evaluation of trust evidence,
(c) Trust generation,
(d) Trust distribution, discovery,
2. Trust update,
3. Trust revocation.
This classification is just mentioned briefly and is not explained in more detail. Al-
though not explicitly intended, this model provides a very good categorization of meth-
ods associated with management of trust evidences. The lesson learnt here is that data
on which a trust model operates is not just simply derived out of the network. Evidence
also has to undergo a complex process before decisions can be made based on it. These
processes play an essential role in trust management and are too often disregarded.
4.1.2 Selective Coding
After having the axiomatic codes, we execute selective coding to fuse the previously
identified elements of each individual model into one complete meta model for trust
management. To identify the elements of the TrustMUSE Model we concentrate on the
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Model name Model elements Pros and cons
Pre-
Standardization 1. Gathering information
2. Scoring and ranking
3. Entity selection
4. Transaction
5. Reward and punish-
ment
+ Standardization of processes
+ Process of establishing trust
+ Evolution of trust
- Sequential ordering
- Very simple elements
Federated Trust
Management 1. Trust representation
2. Trust exchange
3. Trust establishment
4. Trust enforcement
5. Trust storage
+ Broad view on trust manage-
ment
- No real model
- No defined data formats
UniTEC
1. Trust measure
2. Trust certainty
3. Trust context
4. Trust directness
5. Trust dynamics
+ Very specific elements
+ Very thorough modeling
- Transformation of models,
thereby loosing details
Survey for
MANET 1. Trust establishment
(a) Collecting trust
evidence
(b) Evaluation of trust
evidence
(c) Trust generation
(d) Trust distribution,
discovery
2. Trust update
3. Trust revocation
+ Considering trust evidence
- No real model
- No full coverage of trust man-
agement
Table 4.1: Summary of the existing models analysis
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main idea of each separate model or categorization, and amend these in a way to gain a
complete and coherent meta model. The identified elements are then either taken form
one of the basis models, are a combination from different models, or are newly defined
elements filling a gap that had been identified by us. In this section we mostly concen-
trate on the interplay between the elements of our meta model; a detailed description
of the identified elements, their roles, and interfaces can be found in the subsequent
section 4.2. The illustration of the complete created meta model can be seen in figure
4.1.
(While describing the combination process, we refer to the models and their compo-
nents based on the subsection titles and numbers from the previous section – like ’Fed-
erated Trust Management-1.’ refers to Trust representation. The identified elements of
the TrustMUSE Model are typed in italics, written in camel case.)
Based on the ’Survey for MANET’ work, we start off from the very beginning of the
trust management process. The network contains different types of Trust Evidence in dif-
ferent locations. This evidence has to be found (trust distribution, discovery – ’Survey
For MANET-1.d.’), collected (gathering information – ’Pre Standardization-1.’, collect-
ing trust evidence – ’Survey For MANET-1.a.’) and stored (trust storage – ’Federated
Trust Mgmt-5.’). This received information has to be made available through Trust Dis-
tribution. The distribution may exchange evidence but also assessed Trust Values (trust
exchange – ’Federated Trust Mgmt-2.’). The exact implementations of discovery and
distribution are dependent on each other, and are therefore considered as one element.
According to ’Pre-Standardization’, the next step in the evolution of trust is “Scoring
and ranking”. We call it Trust Evaluation, and it includes the application of a Trust Model
onto evidence found in the Evidence Storage. This process results in a Trust Value for an
entity. This Trust Value has an attached Scope (trust context – ’UniTEC-3.’) and Certainty
(trust certainty – ’UniTEC-2.’). These values are stored separately from the Evidence
Storage as they are richer than simple raw data. All the additional information needed
to interpret the data is stored in Trust Representation (trust representation – ’Federated
Trust Mgmt-1.’). Trust Representation includes many sub-components that serve as the
representation of evidence, trust, and identifiers.
The dynamic nature of trust requires that the processes of the framework are repeated
periodically, ensuring that decisions are not based on a false network state. This dy-
namic is handled by Trust Update (trust dynamics – ’UniTEC-5.’, trust update – ’Survey
For MANET-2.’). Trust Update is independent from the update formulas that may be
found in the Trust Model.
Trust Enforcement (entity selection – Pre Standardization-3., trust enforcement – ’Feder-
ated Trust Mgmt-4.’) uses the prepared Trust Values found in the Trust Storage to make
decisions about the trustworthiness of entities. This process uses a risk assessment,
policies and selection methods.
Although the transaction itself (transaction – ’Pre Standardization-4.’) is an elemental
part of the evolution of trust, we do not consider it to be part of a trust management
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framework. However, after a transaction the user gains evidence about the trustwor-
thiness of a provider. This is gained through Interaction Evaluation (reward and punish-
ment – ’Pre Standardization-5.’). It uses the same set of parameters as Trust Enforcement,
and may start the Trust Update after placing the observation into the Evidence Storage.
4.2 Elements of the TrustMUSE Model
This section provides a detailed description of each TrustMUSE Model element, its
functionality, and its relations to other elements. Based on the experience from using
the elements for the before mentioned purposes, we also provide typical implementa-
tions of the elements from different trust management frameworks, as well as interfaces
as they are used in our implementations of the meta model.
Trust Scope
DEFINITION 4.1: TRUST SCOPE
Trust Scope is an identifier based on which to differentiate aspects of trust,
trust related information, and decisions.
As trust is situational and context dependent (cf. [Marsh, 1994], [Josang et al., 2005],
[Kinateder et al., 2005]), it is necessary to be able to differentiate input at many points
of a trust management framework. We decide to use the term ”scope”, contrary to
”situation” or ”context”, as we find the latter terms to be too generic, dealing with a
combination of aspects; Trust Scope is to be more specific and relates to only one aspect
– like ”car mechanic” or ”packet forwarding”.
Figure 4.2: Class diagram of Trust Scope
Dependencies:
• Trust Evidence: Each Trust Evidence is distinguished by a Trust Scope, based
on what environment it originates from or what aspect it provides information
about.
• Trust Value: Each Trust Value has an assigned Trust Scope that describes for what
aspect this value has been assessed for.
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• Trust Enforcement: Trust Enforcement looks at the Trust Scopes to make differen-
tiated decisions for the handled issues; it may also try to deduce trust for specific
aspects from multiple other Trust Scopes.
• Interaction Evaluation: Uses Trust Scopes to differentiate interaction ratings ac-
cording to multiple aspects.
API (figure 4.2):
• TrustScopeFactory: Enforces strong typing of Trust Scopes based on pre-
configured identifiers that may be handled by the framework.
Trust Evidence
DEFINITION 4.2: TRUST EVIDENCE
Trust Evidence is a piece of data that provides any kind of indication about
the trustworthiness of an entity. Evidence always have an attached reliability,
validity and Trust Scope.
Examples of Trust Evidence types are own observations, recommendations, reputation,
etc. Implementations of Trust Evidence include different types of certificates, amount
of positive or negative interactions, or online reputation scores.
Figure 4.3: Class diagram of Trust Evidence
Dependencies:
• Trust Scope: Each Trust Evidence has an assigned Trust Scope that provides the
information about the environment in which this Trust Evidence has been col-
lected, or for what aspect it is valid for. Depending on the Trust Model, Trust
Evidences from different Trust Scopes may or may not influence each other.
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API (figure 4.3):
• getValue():Object: Returns the information from within the Trust Evidence.
Trust Representation may be used to transform the returned Object into meaning-
ful information.
• getValidity()Long: Returns whether the stored information has any kind of
due date, and its value.
• getReliability():Object: Returns to which level this information is reli-
able. Own observations are for example considered completely reliable, but in-
dividual sources may have their own reliability assigned to them. The reliability
may also be a separate Scope of the framework, computed by the Trust Model.
• getTargetEntityId():String: The unique identifier of the entity this infor-
mation is about.
• getSourceEntityId():String: The unique identifier of the entity this infor-
mation is from.
• getTrustScope():TrustScope: The assigned Trust Scope of this information.
Evidence Storage
DEFINITION 4.3: EVIDENCE STORAGE
Evidence Storage is a database of acquired or self created Trust Evidence
made accessible to other elements of a trust management framework.
Evidence Storages may be implemented in many different ways, ranging from simple
in-memory hash tables to protected keystores. The main point is that it stores exclu-
sively Trust Evidences; this emphasizes its position in a trust management framework
and supports implementation with differentiated roles.
Figure 4.4: Class diagram of Evidence Storage
Dependencies:
• Trust Evidence: Evidence Storage exclusively stores and provides access to Trust
Evidence.
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• Interaction Evaluation: Places Trust Evidence, resulting from the evaluation of an
interaction, into the Evidence Storage.
API (figure 4.4):
• addTrustEvidence(evidence: TrustEvidence): void: Stores a spec-
ified Trust Evidence in the Evidence Storage.
• deleteTrustEvidence(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): void:
Removes all Trust Evidence data stored for the entity in the specified Trust Scope.
• getTrustEvidencesbyTarget(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope):
TrustEvidence[]: Returns all Trust Evidence data available about an entity for
the specified Trust Scope.
Trust Value
DEFINITION 4.4: TRUST VALUE
Trust Value is a calculated subjective assessment of the current trust in an
entity for a specific Trust Scope. A Trust Value always has an attached certainty
that indicates the believed probability regarding correctness of the assessed
value.
Trust Values may be any kind of complex structures, where the interpretation meth-
ods for the respective structures are stored in the Trust Representation element. Kinds
of Trust Values may be single numbers, probability functions, or mathematical mod-
els. Possible implementations are discrete values, probability scores, beta functions,
Markov models, etc.
Figure 4.5: Class diagram of Trust Value
Dependencies:
• Trust Scope: Each Trust Value has an assigned Trust Scope that describes for what
aspect this value has been assessed for. At a decision, depending on the Trust
Enforcement, Trust Values from different Trust Scopes may influence each other.
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• Trust Enforcement: Uses Trust Values to decide whether or with whom to interact
with for a specific Trust Scope.
API (figure 4.5):
• getTrust(): Object: Returns the information stored within this Trust Value.
Trust Representation holds all information necessary to interpret the returned Ob-
ject.
• getServiceScope(): TrustScope: Returns the Trust Scope for which this
assessment is valid for.
• getCertainty(): double: Returns a double representation of the certainty
of the held assessment.
• getTargetEntityId(): String: The unique identifier of the entity this in-
formation is about.
Trust Storage
DEFINITION 4.5: TRUST STORAGE
Trust Storage is a database of assessed Trust Values made accessible to other
elements of a trust management framework.
Trust Storage is very similar to Evidence Storage, with the main difference being that
Trust Storage exclusively holds own assessed Trust Values. For the framework this
makes it easier to interpret values held in the two storage elements. Trust Storage is
usually implemented by in-memory hash maps as it can mostly be viewed as a place to
temporary store evaluation results of Trust Evidences. However, if Trust Values should
remain between multiple runs of the framework, values held in the Trust Storage have
to be persisted.
Figure 4.6: Class diagram of Trust Storage
Dependencies:
• Trust Value: Trust Storage provides stored Trust Values for the rest of a trust man-
agement framework. The information stored within a Trust Value may influence
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the method needed to store it securely.
API (figure 4.6):
• setTrust(trust: TrustValue): void: Places an assessed Trust Value
into the Trust Storage. If a previous entry for the same entity was present, it gets
overwritten.
• removeTrust(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): void: Re-
moves the Trust Value stored for the specified entity in the specified Trust Scope.
• getTrust(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): TrustValue:
Returns for the specified entity the Trust Value that has been assessed and stored,
if any.
Trust Discovery and Distribution
DEFINITION 4.6: TRUST DISCOVERY AND DISTRIBUTION
Trust Discovery and Distribution is the process of searching, acquiring and
sharing, disseminating trust related information – namely Trust Evidence and
Trust Value objects – related to potential service providers.
Trust Discovery and Distribution deals with the outer world in any specified way. It
is mostly initiated by Trust Update and helps filling the Evidence Storage with freshly
obtained input. Possible implementations of Trust Discovery and Distribution are cen-
tral repositories, personal meetings, asking trusted friends, asking the ones we interact
with or – as done in ABED (cf. [Jiang and Baras, 2004]) – swarm intelligence.
Figure 4.7: Class diagram of Trust Discovery and Distribution
Dependencies:
• Trust Evidence: All raw information that is acquired by Trust Discovery and Dis-
tribution is transformed into strongly typed Trust Evidence. The type of Trust
Evidence to be regarded may also influence the mechanism to collect them.
• Evidence Storage: Received Trust Evidence is placed into the Evidence Storage.
Additionally, Trust Distribution implementations may be based for the dissemi-
nation of Trust Evidence from the Evidence Storage.
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• Trust Storage: The reliability to be assigned to received Trust Evidence is gained
from the Trust Storage. Furthermore, specific implementations of Trust Discovery
and Distribution may disseminate information out of the Trust Storage.
• Trust Update: Trust Discovery and Distribution is only about the ”how to” com-
municate with the outer world; Trust Update decides the ”when”, and thus usu-
ally initiates the discovery and distribution processes implemented in this ele-
ment.
API (figure 4.7):
• PassableObject: As identified in section 4.4, PassableObject is the standard-
ized format for exchanging messages between TrustMUSE solutions and applica-
tions.
• getIncomingMessages(): void: Asynchronously reads messages from the
incoming message queue and passes them for internal processing.
• handleMessage(source: String, message: PassableObject): void:
Takes the provided message and handles it according to its type.
• distribute(scope: TrustScope): void: Distributes information regard-
ing the provided Trust Scope. It is up to the implementation to decide what infor-
mation and in what manner should be distributed.
• discover(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): void: Queries
the outer world for and collects information regarding the specific entity in the
specific TrustScope.
Trust Evaluation and Trust Model
DEFINITION 4.7: TRUST MODEL
Trust Model is a static set of rules or mathematical computations that assesses
trust in an entity from a set of relevant Trust Evidence objects.
DEFINITION 4.8: TRUST EVALUATION
Trust Evaluation is the process of taking Trust Evidence that is relevant
and required for a specific Trust Model and applying that Trust Model to them.
The best known and most investigated elements of trust management frameworks are
Trust Evaluation and Trust Models; we divide them into two well-defined parts. The
implementation of Trust Evaluation is strongly related to the specific Trust Model as
it has to know what information is needed for its Trust Model and even what further
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steps are required before or after the application of it. The results of the process are
Trust Values that are placed into the Trust Storage. (It is important to note that the
definition of Trust Model found here is related to its role within the TrustMUSE Model
and is therefore not to be confused with definition 2.1, found in chapter 2, which is a
general definition of the term.)
Figure 4.8: Class diagram of Trust Evaluation and Trust Model
Dependencies:
• Trust Evidence: Makes the transformation from Trust Evidence to Trust Values. It
queries and interprets Trust Evidence about a specific target entity, and therefore
depends on the types of available Trust Evidence.
• Evidence Storage: Grabs Trust Evidence objects that are required for a compu-
tation from the Evidence Storage and may afterwards also permanently remove
them.
• Trust Value: Creates according to the specified computational rules Trust Values
with the specified information stored within.
• Trust Storage: Trust Models may solely depend on currently available Trust Ev-
idence, but may also take into account previously assessed Trust Values taken
from the Trust Storage. After the specified computations newly assessed Trust
Values are placed back into the Trust Storage.
API (figure 4.8):
• runTrustEvaluation(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): void:
Evaluates trust for the specified entity, for the specified scope. This consists of tak-
ing Trust Evidence from the Evidence Storage, previous values from Trust Stor-
age, executing the Trust Model, and placing the new value into the Trust Storage.
• calculateTrust(entityId: String, oldValue: TrustValue, evidences:
TrustEvidence[], scope: TrustScope): TrustValue: Applies the rules
specified in the Trust Model to the provided data set and creates a new assessed
Trust Value.
4.2 Elements of the TrustMUSE Model 57
Trust Update
DEFINITION 4.9: TRUST UPDATE
Trust Update is a separately executable operation that ensures the freshness and
validness of data held by the trust management framework.
It is important to see that there are Trust Models which already contain rules decreasing
the significance of older Trust Evidence during computation – these are not included in
Trust Update; Trust Update only holds operations that are separately executable. Typi-
cal implementations would rerun Trust Evaluation or Trust Discovery and Distribution,
or check the validity and remove some Trust Evidence from the Evidence Storage.
Figure 4.9: Class diagram of Trust Update
Dependencies:
• Evidence Storage: Trust Update may directly manipulate the set of Trust Evidence
in the Evidence Storage – e.g. remove old ones.
• Trust Storage: Trust Update may directly manipulate the set of Trust Values in the
Trust Storage – e.g. remove old ones.
• Trust Discovery and Distribution: To keep trust information up to date can mean
to run the procedures implemented in Trust Discovery and Distribution.
• Trust Evaluation: Depending on the implementation of Trust Evaluation, Trust
Update can interact in different ways with Trust Evaluation to keep assessments
up to date.
API (figure 4.9):
• updateTrust(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): void: Up-
dates trust information of the specified entity for the specified scope.
• updateTrust(entityId: String, evidence: TrustEvidence): void:
Updates trust information of the specified entity according to the provided Trust
Evidence.
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Trust Enforcement
DEFINITION 4.10: TRUST ENFORCEMENT
Trust Enforcement is the process of making decisions based on assessed
trustworthiness of entities found in the Trust Storage.
This can either mean to check if an entity is trustworthy or not, but can also mean
selecting the appropriate provider for a transaction. This process builds on policies
that include importance of factors, acceptance ranges, and methods to select the most
appropriate provider from a set of options. Implementation possibilities include simple
boolean decisions, selecting the most trustworthy entity, or selecting entities with a
probability according to the trust in them.
Figure 4.10: Class diagram of Trust Enforcement
Dependencies:
• Trust Storage: Trust Enforcement takes the values from the Trust Storage to make
its decisions.
• Trust Value: In order to be able to make any decisions, Trust Enforcement has to
be able to interpret Trust Values.
• Trust Scope: A specific decision to be made by Trust Enforcement may be influ-
enced by its Trust Scope; also multiple Trust Scopes can have an influence on a
particular decision.
API (figure 4.10)
• getTrustValue(entityId: String, scope: TrustScope): TrustValue:
Returns the trust associated with the referenced entity.
• getTrustee(scope: TrustScope): String[]: Returns the array of en-
tities to be trusted for the provided Trust Scope.
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Interaction Evaluation
DEFINITION 4.11: INTERACTION EVALUATION
After an interaction with an entity, Interaction Evaluation creates first hand
feedback by evaluating the success of the interaction. Interaction Evaluation is
defined by the rules that are used to rate an interaction and the output that it
generates.
First of all, this includes the decision about the quality of the received service. Avail-
able frameworks mostly look at this as a boolean decision of whether the service was
received or not; but another implementation could be a rating from one to five. In-
dependently from the selected rating method, the decision can be complex or simple,
dependent on the number of parameters to be included into the decision. Each pa-
rameter has a different way to be rated, and this information has to be provided to the
Interaction Evaluation.
Figure 4.11: Class diagram of Interaction Evaluation
Dependencies:
• Trust Evidence: Depending on the type of Trust Evidence used in the framework,
different ways of Interaction Evaluation are possible.
• Evidence Storage: Each newly acquired experience is put into the Evidence Stor-
age to be included in later trust assessments.
• Trust Update: After an interaction, depending on the implementation, Trust Up-
date may be informed about the newly acquired experience to act on it.
• Trust Scope: Interaction Evaluation has to distinguish between different Trust
Scopes as they may have different rating functions.
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API (figure 4.11):
• InteractionResult: Contains all information relevant to rate the success of
an interaction; it may hold different scopes of the same interaction.
• InteractionEvaluator: Implements a method to rate an interaction accord-
ing to a specific Trust Scope.
• addEvaluator(evaluator: InteractionEvaluator, scope: TrustScope):
void: This method provides the object which can rate a result in the specified
scope.
• putInteractionResult(result: InteractionResult): void: Pro-
vides the result of an interaction which should be evaluated using the provided
InteractionEvaluators.
Trust Representation
DEFINITION 4.12: TRUST REPRESENTATION
Trust Representation is all information related to structure and interpreta-
tion of data in a trust management framework.
Most trust management frameworks have a representation unique to them; therefore,
this element is rarely interchangeable. The representation holds information about en-
codings, types used, ranges, etc. For the aforementioned reasons we did not indicate
dependencies to Trust Representation in the TrustMUSE Model as every element can be
seen as dependent on it – although it is a different type of dependency. In our imple-
mentation, Trust Representation is a collection of named factories1, where objects can
register their own implementation of a factory.
API (figure 4.12):
• TMuseFactory: An interface for all factories to be used in TrustMUSE.
• registerFactory(name: String, factory: TMuseFactory): void:
Registers a factory under the specified identifier.
• getFactory(rawObject: Object): TMuseFactory: Searches for a reg-
istered TMuseFactory that is able to create a strongly typed object from the pro-
vided raw object, and returns it.
• getFactoryByName(name: String): TMuseFactory: Returns the fac-
tory registered under the specified name.
1http://www.oodesign.com/factory-pattern.html Last visited 12th January 2014
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Figure 4.12: Class diagram of Trust Representation
• getFactdoryByParameters(parameters: String[], expectedOutcome:
Class): TMuseFactory: Searches for a registered TMuseFactory that takes
the provided parameters while returning the specified type, and returns it.
• removeFactory(factory: TMuseFactory): void: Deregisters a factory
from Trust Representation.
4.3 Validating by Describing Existing Trust Management Frame-
works
To validate the TrustMUSE Model we select well known and approved trust manage-
ment frameworks to show that they can be fully described using elements of our meta
model. To this end we choose Public-key Infrastructure as it is the most basic trust
management framework used, Web of Trust because of its wide application through
OpenPGP (cf. [Zimmermann, 1995]), EigenTrust (cf. [Kamvar et al., 2003]) as one of
the first distributed trust management frameworks, the work of [Buchegger and Le
Boudec, 2004] because of its use of Bayesian functions, and finally ABED (cf. [Jiang and
Baras, 2004]) to show how an approach such as the TrustMUSE Model could encour-
age more focused research of trust management sub-functionality. The selected trust
management frameworks are very different in nature and will therefore stress differ-
ent parts of the TrustMUSE Model. We use the element names as seen in section 4.2 in
our descriptions to position respective functionality of the selected trust management
framework into the TrustMUSE Model.
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4.3.1 Public-key Infrastructure Based on X.509
Public-key infrastructure (PKI) (cf. [Housley et al., 1999]) is one of the most basic trust
management frameworks. The Trust Model is very simple: the user has a set of Cer-
tificate Authorities (CA) that are trusted unconditionally. If the provider can show ev-
idence (in this case a signature) that one of the CAs trusts him, she is unconditionally
trusted too. Trust Evidence are X.509 certificates and the respective format is described
in the Trust Representation. Certificates are considered absolutely reliable, and their
validity is described by a date. The Trust Storage contains the information which certifi-
cates are trusted; this can be static or temporally stored. The computed trust is consid-
ered 100% certain, and the Scope is mainly the authenticity of the identity of a company
or a user.
Trust Discovery and Distribution are very simple as they implemented by a plain cen-
tral service. As the CA expressed its trust with the signature, the only evidence to be
retrieved is the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and a real-time status, using the On-
line Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP). Trust Update initiates this check periodically or
if required, even at every transaction. When the discovery is started, it simply goes
through all stored certificates and checks their validity status. Trust Update may also
clear the list of temporary trusted certificates in the Trust Storage.
4.3.2 Web of Trust (WoT)
WoT (cf. [Zimmermann, 1995]) extends the concept of PKI and signatures by making a
central trusted entity unnecessary. The Trust Model includes two concepts: introducer
trust and validity of a certificate. The validity of a certificate in WoT means the proba-
bility that a certificate really belongs to the one it claims to belong to. Introducer trust
reflects how much a signature from an entity increases the chance of validity of the
signed certificate. Thus a signature from an introducer is an implementation of a Trust
Evidence, namely a recommendation. The reliability of the recommendation is equal to
the manually set introducer trust level.
The Trust Evaluation process takes the certificate to be controlled and compares the
signatures on it with the reliability of the recommender’s certificates. Through this, the
validity of the certificate is assessed; this calculated validity is considered certain and
the Scope is similar to that in PKI. The Trust Storage holds the certificate validity Trust
Values and the introducer Trust Values. These are distinguished by the different Scopes
attached to them. Trust Representation includes the general format of OpenPGP certifi-
cates, the levels of introducer trust and validity (complete, marginal, none, unknown),
and the format of user, and key identifiers.
To build the WoT, Trust Discovery and Distribution methods used are physical meet-
ings (Signing parties) and keyservers, providing central certificate repositories. Here,
certificates and signatures are exchanged and imported into the Evidence Storage called
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keyrings. The keyservers may also contain revocation certificates that cancel the valid-
ity of an existing certificate. The Trust Update implementation is therefore identical to
the one presented at PKI.
The compact overview and summary of how Web of Trust implements the TrustMUSE
Model elements can be seen in table 4.2.
TrustMUSE Model element Implementation
Trust Evidence OpenPGP certificate
Reliability: introducer trust
Evidence Storage Keyring
Trust Discovery and Distribution Personal meetings and keyservers
Trust Model Aggregate introducer trust of signatures
Manually set introducer trust
Trust Storage Hashmap for Trust Values
Trust Value Complete, marginal, none, unknown
Context: introducer, validity
Certainty: 100%
Trust Enforcement Check value in hashmap
Trust Update Regularly update validity using Trust
Discovery and Distribution
Trust Representation OpenPGP format
User-, key-identifier format
Trust levels: complete, marginal, none,
unknown
Table 4.2: Web of Trust implementation of the TrustMUSE Model
4.3.3 EigenTrust
EigenTrust (cf. [Kamvar et al., 2003]) is one of the most popular distributed trust man-
agement frameworks available. Distributed frameworks build on exchanging experi-
ence to let entities autonomously assess the trustworthiness of other entities. These
systems seem highly different from the previous two examples, but we show that they
follow the same structure modeled by the TrustMUSE Model.
In EigenTrust experiences are exchanged with the entities the user interacted with; thus,
discovery is very simple, and distribution means sharing of the self-calculated Trust
Values from the Trust Storage. The Evidence Storage keeps the received values until
they are aggregated by Trust Evaluation. The Trust Values placed into Trust Storage are
considered certain and – as the authors presume transitive trust – the same Trust Value
is used in the Scope of service provision and recommendation. This means that this
Trust Value is also the reliability attached to the collected evidences.
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The authors compare two different Trust Enforcement implementations: one where the
provider with the highest trust is selected and one where trust is considered as the
probability of choosing a given provider. After interacting with a node the interaction
is evaluated based on two parameters: the integrity of the received file and the quality
of the connection. If either one of the parameters is unsatisfactory, the interaction is
considered negative. This observation is put into the Evidence Storage, where besides
the received values also the own raw observations are counted.
To adapt to the changes in the network, Trust Update periodically runs the distribution
of experiences and after receiving the values, reruns Trust Evaluation to aggregate the
collected values. This updates the Trust Values, and future decisions are based on new
values.
4.3.4 Bayesian Approach
The Bayesian approach [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] is also a typical example of
distributed systems. Therefore, it has many similarities in its TrustMUSE Model based
division to EigenTrust. The overview of the implementation of the TrustMUSE Model
elements is shown in table 4.3.
TrustMUSE Model element Implementation
Trust Evidence Recommendation holding own observations
Reliability: calculated trust
Validity: linear fading
Evidence Storage Multi-dimensional array storing number of
positive and negative outcomes
Trust Discovery and Distribution Exchange and collect first-hand observations
(not defined with whom)
Trust Model Linear model merging
Deviation test
Trust Storage Hashmap for Trust Values
Trust Value Count of positive and negative outcomes
Context: recommender, service provider
Certainty: included by representation
Trust Enforcement Check expected value against threshold
Interaction Evaluation Boolean decision
Trust Update Periodic rerun of discovery and evaluation
Trust Representation Beta distribution
Table 4.3: Bayesian approach implementation of the TrustMUSE Model
Contrary to EigenTrust, Trust Distribution exchanges the contents of the Evidence Stor-
age instead of the Trust Storage. The authors do not define how to find adequate rec-
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ommender nodes in the network, but several options are referenced.
The most significant difference compared to EigenTrust is the Trust Representation ele-
ment. Trust is similarly calculated from a number of positive and negative transactions,
but in this framework they are used as input to a Beta distribution. Therefore, Trust En-
forcement does not deal with discrete values but with probability distributions; this
automatically includes the concept of certainty. When making decisions, the expected
value of the probability distribution is compared to a predefined threshold.
After an interaction, depending on its success, either the negative or the positive ob-
servation counter is increased in the Evidence Storage. The Trust Evaluation process
uses a deviation test to assess the reliability of received recommendations, and based
on that it stores a Trust Value for the scope of recommendations. After going through
the deviation test own and received evidences are combined using linear model merg-
ing (cf. [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004]). Validity of evidence is handled by fading,
where fading means that with every iteration the weight of old experiences decreases.
The calculated Trust Value is stored for the Scope of service provisioning.
4.3.5 Ant-Based Evidence Distribution (ABED)
ABED (cf. [Jiang and Baras, 2004]) is one of the few works that identifies that investigat-
ing aspects of trust management frameworks individually is as essential as providing
complete solutions for domains – this is the same mindset that we wish to motivate
with the TrustMUSE Model. ABED solely focuses on the Trust Discovery and Distri-
bution process of a trust management framework. It introduces swarm intelligence for
this functionality that is absolutely independent from the type of trust evidence used
throughout the network or any other part of the framework. ABED also supports the
idea – as it could be used in any of the introduced frameworks – that the connections be-
tween the different elements inside a framework are not as rigid as thought previously
by the research community.
4.4 Implementing Trust Management Functionality Based on
the TrustMUSE Model
As a next step of validating the TrustMUSE Model we implement trust management
functionality for two specific applications according to the structure described by the
meta model – we call these implementations TrustMUSE solutions. We select two ap-
plications which have very different characteristics; this enables us to have distinct im-
plementations for TrustMUSE Model elements, and validate whether elements’ defined
APIs really provide access to all functionality possible within that element. This pro-
cess also aids us identifying necessary helper classes and development patterns to be
used by the TrustMUSE Builder tool, presented in chapter 6.
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First, we present in detail the two applications for which we provide TrustMUSE so-
lutions. We conclude this section by presenting lessons learnt gained from this valida-
tion step; this includes specific software artifacts identified as necessary for integrating
TrustMUSE solutions into applications.
4.4.1 Selected Applications
Both applications to which we add a TrustMUSE solution are selected from the EU
FP7 project BRIDGE 2. The first TrustMUSE solution is a reputation module for the
Dynamic Expertise Integration Networks (DEIN) (cf. [Wijngaards, 2013]), an agent-
based platform for finding distributed experts based on their capabilities. The other
TrustMUSE solution is a trust module for a mesh network, an ad-hoc deployed network
of wireless nodes with different capabilities, rating the availability and responsiveness
of its routing nodes.
Reputation Module for DEIN
DEIN is an agent-based platform for finding distributed experts based on their capabil-
ities. Users provide capabilities they need help with and pose their questions over the
system. DEIN automatically finds online experts having stated that they can provide
these requested capabilities and forwards the questions to these experts, who are then
presented with the question form and can reply to their best knowledge.
A new requirement for the DEIN system was, that it should be possible to somehow dis-
tinguish between experts who have similar capabilities. Distinction should be based on
experience gained by the community during interacting with these experts. As DEIN
was designed to be a platform which encourages collaboration in a professional envi-
ronment, the software GUI should not contain elements which make end users look
unprofessional or malicious, and end users should not be requested to provide any
explicit statement of distrust. Therefore trust feedback has to be collected implicitly,
and aggregated trust values should only be shown explicitly during anonymous expert
discovery.
The TrustMUSE solution we provide has to be integrated into an existing application
with a given architecture, identity scheme, and communication facility. On the one
hand, this is a challenge as the TrustMUSE solution has to provide means to adapt to
these given components, but on the other hand it enables to emphasize the fact that the
reputation module is a closed functionality.
User Interaction: As the TrustMUSE solution has been integrated into an existing ap-
plication, there has been strong emphasis on the user interface and interaction. There
2http://www.bridgeproject.eu/ Last visited 1st May 2014
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were two main goals: first, consumers of services should see, additionally to the compe-
tence that was already shown, the reputation of each provider; second, the provision of
feedback about service quality should not slow the speed of the main task, and should
not motivate explicit punishment of providers.
Figure 4.13: Showing for each provider competence as percentage and reputation as five star
rating
We chose to use a five star representation of reputation, as it is widely used across other
applications end users could be familiar with. Every time a consumer asks for bids
from possible providers, she sees an indication of each provider’s reputation, as shown
in figure 4.13. We chose not to explicitly filter any bids because of reputation, and also
not to fuse competence and reputation information into a single value. Cause for this
was that the application wishes to emphasize the human factor, and instead of making
decisions for the user, provide as much supporting information as possible.
To enable the feedback mechanism without an explicit rating step, we chose to provide
a feature for quick sorting of received information. While the user perceives this feature
as a way to bookmark or hide entries from the inbox, in the background this selection is
stored as feedback on the provided quality of service. The user can at any time change
its opinion about entries, and also does not have to use this functionality, thus stay
undecided about the usefulness of any information. An illustration of this functionality
can be seen in figure 4.14. Additionally to further exploit the reputation information in
the system, inbox entries always indicate the provider’s reputation, thereby allowing
the user to reflect the contents of the received information to it.
TrustMUSE Solution: The back-end of the presented system is a very simple imple-
mentation of the TrustMUSE Model elements. DEIN already provides a centralized
infrastructure that could be used for storing reputation information. Therefore observa-
tions are simply published by TrustDiscoveryDistribution to this central repository, and
on demand retrieved from there. Additionally, TrustDiscoveryDistribution includes a
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Figure 4.14: Allowing to mark an inbox entry as useful or hide it
one-way function based security mechanism that ensures that feedback for a message
can only be provided by consumers who actually received it.
The central repository stores the observations in raw format; thereby it is up to each
agent to decide what reputation to assess from these values by defining the method
locally in the TrustModel. We provided one basic implementation for the TrustModel
which aggregates all positive and negative observations into a single double value. The
aggregations are formatted into the required five star rating in TrustRepresentation;
these five star ratings are passed through to the front-end by TrustEnforcement.
Trust Module for a Mesh Network
The IEEE standard 802.11s describes mesh networking based on WLAN interfaces (cf.
[IEEE Computer Society, 2011]). For an understandable definition of a mesh we point
to the definition from The Gartner IT glossary3:
A mesh network has no centralized access points but uses wireless nodes
to create a virtual wireless backbone. Mesh network nodes typically es-
tablish network links with neighboring nodes, enabling user traffic to be
sent through the network by hopping between nodes on many different
paths. At least some nodes must be connected to a core network for back-
haul. Mesh networks are self-healing, self-organizing and somewhat scal-
able, with additional capacity supplied by adding incremental nodes.
The mesh network in our example consists of nodes with different capabilities – as to
battery life, transmission power, antenna form factor, etc., produced by different man-
ufactures. Therefore a solution was needed that would enable continuous observation
of active nodes, in order to optimize deployment and maintenance of the network. It
was not necessary that the TrustMUSE solution actively influences traffic flow, but it
had to report whether nodes are responsive or eventually overloaded. As there is no
3http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/mesh-network Last visited 25th November, 2013
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Figure 4.15: TrustMUSE solution for mesh network in operation
central entity in the envisioned deployment, our solution has to run directly on the net-
work nodes. Every node also has to distribute its observations through the network
as trust information has to be visible by accessing any of the networking nodes. Our
solution was integrated with an already available DOT4 based topology visualization.
A screenshot of our solution can be seen in figure 4.15.
We implemented our TrustMUSE solution as a JAVA application running on each of
the network nodes strong enough to host it. For the TrustMUSE Solution we divided
the framework from [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] according to the elements of the
TrustMUSE Model. As our aim was not the evaluation of the framework, but two vali-
date the APIs of elements, the framework has not been implemented completely. From
4Gansner, Emden, Eleftherios Koutsofios, and Stephen North. ”Drawing graphs with dot.”, 2006.
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the experience with the DEIN system, we implemented the communication facilities
necessary for the TrustMUSE Solution externally to it.
Trust Evidence and Evidence Storage: We have two distinct implementations of the
TrustEvidence interface: Observation and Recommendation. Observations are created
by the application and then passed into the TrustMUSE Solution for processing. Recom-
mendations are created when observations from other network nodes are received. In
summary, Recommendations are similar to Observations, they just have an additional
field for sender ID, and reliability is assigned to them on receipt. EvidenceStorage was
implemented via a HashMap.
Trust Discovery and Distribution: TrustDiscoveryDistribution shares all data from the
TrustStorage, in form of PassableObjects, with every node it interacted with in the net-
work. As our application was to be run in a small network, we knew that this will not
cause significant network load. On the recipient side the same class accepts the incom-
ing messages, gathers the reliability of a recommendation from the TrustStorage based
on sender ID, and puts it into the EvidenceStorage.
Trust Evaluation and Trust Model: For evaluating trust of a node, TrustEvaluation
separately acquires the Observations and Recommendations about the node. These, ac-
companied by the previous TrustValue, are then passed to the TrustModel. The Trust-
Model first updats the parameters of the Beta distribution with the observations ac-
cording equation 4.1, where u is the decaying factor and s is the observation value;
then recommendations are added as in equation 4.2, where Ti, j is the trust i has in j,
and Rk,j is the recommendation k sent about j. After each execution, TrustEvaluation
removes the evidence used during evaluation from the EvidenceStorage.
α := uα+ s;β := uβ + (1− s) (4.1)
Ti, j := Ti, j +Rk, j (4.2)
Trust Update: TrustUpdate is implemented as a separate thread that executes for every
change in the EvidenceStorage, but at least every minute. When executed, it iterates
over all the nodes it interacted with in the network, and initiates TrustDiscoveryDistri-
bution and TrustEvaluation on that node.
Trust Enforcement and Trust Representation: TrustEnforcement is implemented as a
simple event provider, informing the application if any node’s assessed trust changed.
TrustRepresentation transforms TrustValues into a five level color scheme, implemented
as an enumeration.
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4.4.2 Design Consequences
During the described implementation process of the two TrustMUSE solutions, we
gained a significant amount of feedback on how APIs of TrustMUSE elements should
look like, and also what helper classes are necessary in order to integrate a TrustMUSE
solution into an existing application. Experience related to APIs of elements had been
directly incorporated into their descriptions as seen in section 4.2. All other design
consequences are listed here and illustrated in figure 4.16:
Figure 4.16: Class diagram for integration classes for TrustMUSE solutions
• Observer pattern: We found that in order to enforce dependencies described in
the TrustMUSE Model, it is helpful to implement the Observer5 pattern for model
elements. For example, we use this pattern to notify Trust Update in the mesh
application about new additions to the Evidence Storage.
• Entity and Entity Manager: This module is required since identity schemes of
applications and trust management frameworks may be different. The Entity
5http://www.oodesign.com/observer-pattern.html Last visited 25th November, 2013
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Manager enables the mapping of these identity schemes, and also allows the at-
tachment of additional attributes to Entities. Entities also enforce the proper use
of identifiers when passing information between the application and the Trust-
MUSE solution.
• Message Delegator: As we have found that TrustMUSE solutions should not
have their own communication facility, the Message Delegator deals with passing
messages between application and TrustMUSE solution. It also separates the pro-
cessing threads of the application from the TrustMUSE solution, as all its methods
enforce asynchronicity. On the TrustMUSE solution side it is Trust Discovery and
Distribution which consumes the messages from the Message Delegator.
• Passable Object: Related to the Message Delegator, we found that it is good prac-
tice to wrap all kind of information going in and out of the TrustMUSE solution
into a designated object, called a Passable Object. The various message types are
all extensions of the Passable Object, and Trust Discovery and Distribution differ-
entiates the messages by their class type.
• Trust Oracle: We found that the application should not directly consume the
methods of TrustMUSE Model elements. Therefore, the Trust Oracle, as antic-
ipated by its name, hides exact operation of the TrustMUSE solution and only
exports methods relevant for the application, such as
– getTrust(entity: Entity, scope: TrustScope, getEffective:
boolean):Object,
– getEffectiveTrust(value: TrustValue):Object,
– putIncomingMessage(
sourceEntityId: String, message: PassableObject),
– putInteractionResult(result: InteractionResult),
– addTrustObserver(observer: TMuseObserver).
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we saw the novel TrustMUSE Model. This meta model of trust manage-
ment has been built using grounded theory based on preexisting models and surveys.
The different models and surveys used helped to look at trust management from differ-
ent angles, and this way enabled to create a really complete description of it; this was
exactly one of the requirements formulated at the beginning of this chapter. Looking at
the other requirements, the TrustMUSE Model also meets the requirement of change-
ability, dividing trust management functionality into clear functional elements. There is
a clear separation of concerns, enabling to handle the operation of one element almost
independently from other elements – necessarily, dependencies should be taken into ac-
count. As we provided an API for each element, there is no place for misunderstanding
which element has to cope with which tasks, and consistency across implementations
is ensured. If encountering the question where to put some functionality, then it is only
necessary to counter check whether it can be covered by the defined API services or
not. From the validation experience we have also seen that the TrustMUSE Model is
confined: elements of the model can be simply mapped to existing trust management
frameworks, but there is no unnecessary level of detail.
After the design of the TrustMUSE Model, we validated the model by taking a top
down view and dividing existing trust management frameworks into the elements of
the model. Using the model based division of trust management frameworks, it was
easier to see the exact small differences between e.g PKI and WoT, or the large differ-
ences between e.g. WoT and EigenTrust. We also saw that frameworks do not have to
necessarily implement all elements of the TrustMUSE Model. Subsequently, we used
the TrustMUSE Model for implementing trust management functionality for dedicated
applications; these are called TrustMUSE Solutions. This step helped us better define
the boundaries between the application and the TrustMUSE solution and identify the
integration approach to be used, with accompanying APIs.
After having seen that different frameworks can successfully be described and imple-
mented using the TrustMUSE Model, the next chapter will show how to exploit this ca-
pability with the TrustMUSE Process, in support for our target users. The TrustMUSE
Process will move the focus from individual frameworks to services per TrustMUSE
Model element, enabling an easier comparison and exclusion of implementations.
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Chapter 5
The TrustMUSE Process: From
Application Specification to Trust
Management
After having designed and used the TrustMUSE Model for dividing trust management
frameworks into functional elements, we can safely say that it enables separation of
concerns within the trust management domain. What the TrustMUSE Model cannot
provide on its own however, is the ability to know what implementations work in what
environments or for which problems. We develop the TrustMUSE Process to provide
support for this task, which we present with its accompanying artifacts in this chapter.
The design of the TrustMUSE Process is guided by the initial requirements from the
focus group workshops, as presented in section 3.3. We also collect additional feedback
for it by creating two paper prototypes (cf. [Greenberg et al., 2011]). The TrustMUSE
Process is also presented in [Vinkovits and Zimmermann, 2013].
The TrustMUSE Process serves as an interface for our target users with which their
respective expert knowledge, based on the elements of the TrustMUSE Model, is trans-
lated into trust management needs of their application. Building on the TrustMUSE
Model enables to have needs formulated on element instead of framework level, thereby
making these needs more focused and less complex to formulate – this way of thinking
simply resembles the well known paradigm of object or aspect oriented development
[Meyer, 1988]. In the end, taking the needs the user provided for her scenario, the pro-
cess provides specific suggestions as to what trust management implementation should
be used.
In order to have a uniform format for the descriptions of implementations the Trust-
MUSE Process integrates and presents, we define the TrustMUSE Element Markup
Language (TEML). TEML is an XML-based markup language that allows trust man-
agement experts to describe their proposed implementations in standardized format.
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As writing TEML documents by hand is cumbersome and error prone, we provide a
graphical tool which automates this process. This tool is called the TrustMUSE iAnno-
tator. The implementation of the TrustMUSE Process is the TrustMUSE Builder, which
is described in chapter 6.
5.1 TrustMUSE Process
Having validated the correctness and seeing the possibilities provided by the Trust-
MUSE Model, we want to deliver its capabilities – like the defined elemental func-
tional building blocks, the easy exchangeability of element implementations, and the
identified inter-element dependencies – to our target users. The final aim is to have a
design process applicable by architects, who should be able to select possible trust man-
agement frameworks building on their domain knowledge and relevant requirements.
For this aim we create the TrustMUSE Process which draws attention from individ-
ual frameworks to services an implementation provides. Our design process is based
on adding attributes to the elements of the TrustMUSE Model; these attributes char-
acterize typical properties of different implementations. Our target users go through
this process by selecting some of the attributes, depending on which are relevant for
the envisioned scenario, and with this act the number of possible trust management
frameworks continuously decreases. The exploration of possible implementations is
additionally supported by excluding attributes that collide with the already selected
ones, which allows seeing how a decision influences the remaining possibilities. After
having selected all the attributes that seem appropriate, the process provides the set
of remaining possible implementations. The following sections provide more detailed
descriptions of the individual steps of the TrustMUSE Process and also show related
design decisions. An illustration of the TrustMUSE Process can be seen in figure 5.1.
5.1.1 Author Sub-Process: Attributing Elements
As shown in section 4.3, the different elements of the TrustMUSE Model have different
typical implementations. Depending on the application scenario, some implementa-
tions are more appropriate than others, e.g. it is inconvenient to use a central server
if there is no continuous Internet connectivity. Consequently, we propose to assign at-
tributes to each trust management framework that characterize the functionality and
applicability of its implementation. This attribute based descriptions is going to pro-
vide the knowledge base for the consumer sub-process on which it can reason on. For
the description of implementations we propose the use of standardized attributes, en-
suring that different authors select from the same set of attributes to describe their so-
lutions.
This approach also enables the process to be extendable and not just work on the num-
ber of implementations available at initiation. Every time a new implementation is
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Figure 5.1: The TrustMUSE Process: During the author sub-process implementations are at-
tributed to describe their functionality; in the consumer sub-process, functionality is presented
to architects sorted by TrustMUSE Model element.
designed for one of the elements, the author can describe it using the available set of
attributes, or extend the standard set if the available ones are not sufficient for the ex-
act description. Without any change to the consumer sub-process, our target users can
be presented with and use the new attributes together with the already available ones.
This ensures that the knowledge base of the TrustMUSE Process itself does not have to
be updated, but that it is always up to date with the implementations that are loaded
into it.
5.1.2 Consumer Sub-Process: Exclusion of Colliding Attributes
When the process starts, inside each TrustMUSE Model element the user is presented
with a collection of all the attributes the different possible implementations have. As
attributes are standardized and describe different sub-aspects, many listed attributes
are going to belong simultaneously to multiple implementations; this adds a limit to
the total number of individual attributes that are going to be listed.
The consumer now starts selecting attributes that seem appropriate for the specific use
case. There is no limitation to which element should be handled initially as depending
on the use case different aspects may be known in advance. For example, if in the be-
ginning the network structure is known, it is advisable to start with the Trust Discovery
and Distribution element. On the other hand, if rather the interaction with the system is
given, Interaction Evaluation and Trust Enforcement may seem as good starting points.
78 5 The TrustMUSE Process: From Application Specification to Trust Management
As the consumer selects attributes, the process checks which available implementations
include the selected attribute in their description. The attributes of those implementa-
tions that contained the selected attribute stay selectable; attributes that are not present
in any of the remaining implementations get excluded. This process continues as long
as the consumer selects attributes, leaving at the end only a limited number of attributes
and thus limited number of possible implementations remaining.
Additional question to deal with is the relation between different TrustMUSE Model
elements and the exclusion of attributes based on these dependencies. Similarly to
attributing an implementation, the author of an implementation has to look at Trust-
MUSE Model elements her element depends on; from these elements those attributes
have to be chosen, which when selected make the implementation inapplicable. Conse-
quently in the process, when an attribute is selected all depending TrustMUSE Model
elements have to be controlled. The attributes of not colliding implementations remain
selectable, while all other attributes get excluded.
This is a recursive step. As the TrustMUSE Model does not contain any dependency
cycles, this operation will stop after a limited number of steps. As soon as the consumer
is finished with selecting attributes, she can proceed to the next step in the process.
5.1.3 Reviewing the Possible Implementation
When the consumer decides that she is finished with selecting attributes, the final step
of the process may start. As during every step the remaining possible implementations
were checked, it is possible to list them without any further computation. It is advis-
able however to present one implementation for each element as default, based on the
largest set of attributes covered. Then in sorted order further implementations based
on the number of attributes covered should be listed.
During this final step, the consumer can review the implementations that have been
suggested for the individual elements. After reviewing the implementations the con-
sumer may decide to change the implementation from the default one to another, or go
back to selecting another set of attributes. If the consumer has selected the implemen-
tations she would like to use for the elements, the process can be closed. The consumer
has now gained from requirements and attributes of her application a suggestion on a
trust management framework and the implementation of different elements, without
the need to investigate complete trust management state of the art literature but only
that which might be relevant for her problem.
5.2 Interaction and Visualization
Based on the needs collected through focus group workshops and presented in section
3.3 we sketched a possible visualization for the TrustMUSE Process. The developed
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visualization was designed to emphasize the modular division of functionality, give an
intuitive access to supporting texts, and enable a quick filtering of services. After de-
signing two alternative approaches for visualization and interaction – according to the
findings of [Dow et al., 2010] parallel prototypes increase divergence and provide bet-
ter end results – we used paper prototypes as the evaluation tool (cf. [Greenberg et al.,
2011]) for these designs. The created paper prototypes can be seen in figure 5.2. The
prototypes consist of large sheets of paper with the default workspace printed on them;
there are also additional whole paper sheets prepared for simulating larger changes in
the interface. During the tests we could place smaller paper labels as required onto
the workspace as pop-ups. The first prototype (left in figure 5.2) is more focused on
the information flow and gave users a free hand in composing their architecture. The
workspace has at the bottom the TrustMUSE Model elements, which when clicked on
list the assigned attributes. Attributes can be dragged and dropped onto the workspace
and then grouped or connected using a pen. The second prototype (right in figure 5.2)
shows the TrustMUSE Model elements, connected according to functional dependen-
cies. The attribute selection is simulated using a pen. After each interaction of the user,
we either place prepared paper labels onto the workspace or draw the exclusions with
a pen.
Figure 5.2: The two paper prototypes used
These prototypes were shown one by one to the same six target users who participated
in the workshops from section 3.3. We decided to use the same target users, because
we wanted to iterate their formulated needs. The participants were asked to use the
prototype in the traffic jam scenario from the workshop and comment on the usabil-
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ity. After collecting comments about specific usability issues, we always had a short
unstructured interview with them. During these interviews we asked what their gen-
eral opinion was, what they thought as strengths and weaknesses of the individual
prototypes, and whether they would use such process in the design of an appropriate
application. These comments were used to finalize the proposed interaction method
and visualization as it is presented in this section.
5.2.1 Design of a Possible User Interface
At the beginning of the process the architect is presented with an overview of the Trust-
MUSE Model, with the relevant attributes listed within the elements. This helps our
target users know the different aspects of a trust management framework, and avoids
that they feel initially lost in this unknown field. When a user goes over an attribute
with the cursor, a hint is displayed to avoid problems regarding phrasing. An illus-
tration of this can be seen in figure 5.3. There is a button in each element; by pushing
it a more detailed description about the task of the element and the explanation for
dependencies to other elements can be reached.
Figure 5.3: Selecting attributes of a TrustMUSE element
Each attribute selection the user makes is clearly marked – in our initial examples by a
green dot appearing at the end of the line. As some attributes are selected, others get
excluded. A cross icon behind excluded attributes enables the users to see the list of
attributes – both from within this element and from other ones – colliding with the re-
spective one and thereby causing its exclusion. A button in the corner of the workspace
allows the user to proceed to the next step of the process.
The target user is again presented with an overview of the TrustMUSE Model in the next
step. In this view however, each element is filled with a specific implementation, based
on the selection of attributes from the previous step; an illustration of this is presented
in figure 5.4. Below the implementation name a short text is displayed reminding of
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the functionality of the specific implementation. The box can be expanded by the use
of the triangle button in the left bottom corner. When expanded, the user is presented
with the set of attributes the implementation fulfills. There are two additional options:
with the “References. . . ” button additional information about the implementation can
be gained in form of an extended description or a number of papers describing it. To
ensure that the replacement of the implementation is a conscious decision, the list of
further implementations can only be reached over an additional dialog. There the user
can see what attributes other implementations fulfill, and the user can collect additional
details which can support the decision.
Figure 5.4: Showing implementations of elements based on previous selection
The main conclusion we gained from the GUI prototype was that a visualization of the
TrustMUSE Process also serves an e-learning purpose; i.e. our target users, while going
through the design process, learn about trust management and its possibilities. We
decided to support this aspect via a great number of tool tips, help dialogs, and further
visual clues. The provided additional information also serves a better understanding
of trust management as a security method; this is necessary as architects are not going
to integrate components they do not completely understand, or do not know why they
are advantageous.
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5.3 TEML and TrustMUSE iAnnotator
To provide an environment in which researchers and developers working with Trust-
MUSE can operate without compatibility issues, it is necessary to have a standardized
way to describe and operate with implementations of TrustMUSE Model elements. For
this purpose we provide the TrustMUSE Element Markup Language (TEML), which is
an XML based markup language designed to describe results aimed to be integrated
into TrustMUSE. Trust management experts can describe their results with TEML, and
distribute implementations and accompanying TEML descriptions to developers, who
can then start working with them by having them included into the TrustMUSE Builder.
To ease the process of creating TEML documents, we develop the TrustMUSE iAnno-
tator application, which is a model based graphical tool. This section provides a more
detailed description of these two utilities.
5.3.1 TEML
TEML is a collection of defined XML elements and attributes necessary to describe
attributes and dependencies of TrustMUSE element implementations, as presented in
section 5.1. A TEML document consists of one trustMUSEElement XML element that
has a name attribute, and represents the particular implementation to be described.
Other trustMUSEElement nodes in the document are used to describe collisions to
other TrustMUSE elements and their possible attributes. Dependencies are identified
by the fact that they do not have a name attribute. The whole document type definition
for TEML is as follows:
TEML DTD
<?xml version="1.0">
<!DOCTYPE TrustMUSE [
<!ELEMENT TrustMUSE (trustMUSEElement+)>
<!ELEMENT trustMUSEElement (attribute+)>
<!ELEMENT attribute EMPTY>
<!ATTLIST trustMUSEElement name CDATA #IMPLIED>
<!ATTLIST trustMUSEElement className (Scope |
TrustEvidence | TrustValue | EvidenceStorage |
TrustStorage | TrustDiscoveryDistribution | TrustUpdate |
TrustEvaluation | TrustEnforcement | InteractionEvaluation |
TrustRepresentation) #REQUIRED>
<!ATTLIST trustMUSEElement dependencies IDREFS #IMPLIED>
<!ATTLIST attribute name CDATA #REQUIRED>
]>
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5.3.2 TrustMUSE iAnnotator
Although the schema of TEML is not very complex, writing XML documents by hand is
time consuming and error prone. The TrustMUSE iAnnotator tool has been designed to
automate this activity. It is a simple utility which has the TrustMUSE Model as underly-
ing meta model, and in which TrustMUSE Model elements can be dragged and dropped
and attributed in a GUI; at the end, the composed elements and their attributes can be
saved into a TEML document. An illustration of TrustMUSE iAnnotator can be seen in
figure 5.5.
TrustMUSE iAnnotator is a utility based on eclipse’s Graphical Modeling Framework
(GMF)1. Underlying GMF is the Eclipse Modeling Framework2, a modeling system
aligned to the Meta-Object Facility (MOF) (cf. [OMG, 2008]). Based on a meta model
described in EMF, GMF creates the environment required for a graphical editor which
can be further customized during generation. We have set the TrustMUSE Model as
meta model for the generation, and have then added the possibility to add attributes
to elements as described in the design process, section 4.1. Additionally, also depen-
dencies and thus colliding attributes can be defined in the editor. The editor saves the
composed diagram into two separate files. The first file is for saving the diagram layout
– that means position of elements, added notes, current selections, etc. The second file
is of more interest to us as it contains the diagram data in TEML format.
1http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/gmp/ Last visited 1st December 2013
2http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/?project=emf Last visited 1st December 2013
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5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we used the TrustMUSE Model as defined in chapter 4 to define the
TrustMUSE Process, which helps application designers and architects to integrate trust
management into their target applications. To initiate the TrustMUSE Process, trust
management experts describe their frameworks’ elements using standardized attributes
providing the knowledge base for the execution of the process – this is called the au-
thor sub-process. When executing the consumer sub-process, our target users are pre-
sented with these attribute-based descriptions, thereby enabling them to think in terms
of their applications’ requirements while looking for specific trust management solu-
tions. The result is two-fold: on the one hand, the architect gains a trust management
framework specifically composed for the application’s needs; on the other hand, by
using the TrustMUSE Process as an e-learning platform, our target users can also im-
prove their knowledge about relevant security questions, which could be helpful to
them during other parts of their development.
To provide a uniform format that can be used by the TrustMUSE Process to read pro-
vided implementation attributes we created TEML (TrustMUSE Element Markup Lan-
guage). It defines a standard and machine-readable format, which trust management
experts have to comply with when describing their provided implementations. As sup-
port for composing TEML documents, we provided the TrustMUSE iAnnotator tool: a
simple drag & drop graphical editor, where TEML documents can be generated based
on selected TrustMUSE Model elements.
The next chapter introduces the TrustMUSE Builder that implements the TrustMUSE
Process and its steps into a standalone application. It provides the GUI for architects
who want to benefit from the process by discovering the available implementations
usable for their use-case. The TrustMUSE Builder application will also be the platform
for our final user evaluation.
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Chapter 6
The TrustMUSE Builder: A Tool for
Composing Trust Management
Frameworks
In the previous chapter we saw the TrustMUSE Process as a systematic way for archi-
tects finding an appropriate compositions of trust management functionality for their
use-cases, without requiring them to have deep knowledge about trust management.
As next step we wish to implement our concept into a usable tool that in the end can
be used by our identified target users. This implementation is the TrustMUSE Builder:
a tool that builds on all the artifacts that have been introduced so far and that provides
a uniform platform to work with.
The TrustMUSE Builder imports as part of the initialization a number of TrustMUSE
Model element implementations, created and described by trust management experts
in TEML (see section 5.3). All the knowledge base that is present in the tool and that is
necessary for executing the process is coming from these TEML documents, allowing it
to be always up to date with the implementations that are loaded into it. The tool shows
the attributes in the individual TrustMUSE Model elements and handles the automatic
exclusion of attributes based on the user’s selection. It also presents the final possible
implementations with supporting explanations, and at the end copies all selected plug-
ins into one folder for further use. As the users of this tool have to deal with a domain
which is very much unknown to them, it was essential that during design we had a
deep understanding of our target users’ needs to be able to provide a tool that supports
them as much in their work as possible; therefore, we decided to follow a separate
iterative user centered design process for developing the TrustMUSE Builder, which
we present in this chapter.
After having the main features of the graphical user interface from the TrustMUSE Pro-
cess, we implement a first functional prototype; this prototype is used to execute the
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subsequent user evaluation. This evaluation is the first time that our users get actually
in touch with the TrustMUSE Model through the implementation of the TrustMUSE
Process in our prototype and can benefit from the model based division of trust man-
agement frameworks. Therefore, this user evaluation is critical to find out whether the
envisioned TrustMUSE Builder application can support the target users, and increase
their understanding of trust management. Based on the received input we finalize our
software into a full functional prototype (using the same engine as was used for the
first prototype), which is then the target of the final evaluation presented in chapter 7.
6.1 Engine Implementation
In the previous chapter we have seen the specification of the GUI and the process that
led to it. In this section we present our selected approach to implement the underlying
engine for the defined GUI. We present the chosen technologies, architecture, and main
features of the TrustMUSE Builder tool engine. It is not the aim of this section to provide
a developer documentation of the software, but rather to provide an overview of the
work that has been done.
We decided to use Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF) 1 as the graphical subsys-
tem to implement our application. The proposed pattern for implementing WPF appli-
cations is the Model-View-ViewModel (MVVM) pattern [Smith, 2009]. Main feature of
the MVVM pattern is that the View binds itself to specific fields of the ViewModel, and
receives notifications if their values change. This way the implementation of the View
is absolutely independent from the ViewModel. The ViewModel holds reference to the
Model, so that it can forward changes coming from the View. The implementation of
MVVM in the TrustMUSE Builder tool and the respective main classes can be seen in
figure 6.1. At start-up, the application searches its working directory for TEML docu-
ments of implementations and accompanying description files. These are parsed into
respective Model elements. The Model classes are responsible for checking whether a
given selection of attributes can be fulfilled by an implementation or not; it also selects
the most fitting implementation once the attribute selection has been finalized. How-
ever, the Model classes do not hold any kind of state of the ongoing user interaction.
The states are handled in the ViewModel layer.
The MainWindowViewModel holds references to the displayed TrustMuseElements’
ViewModels in order to bind the dependencies. It also handles the transition between
states of the design process. Defined states are following: first, where the user is
still selecting some attributes (“composing” state); second, where the attribute selec-
tion has been finished and the implementation possibilities are reviewed (called “com-
posed” state); finally, where the process has been finished and the respective imple-
mentations are copied together (“finalized” state). The TrustMuseElementViewModel
1http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms754130(v=vs.110).aspx Last visited 2nd May 2014
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Figure 6.1: Class diagram of the TrustMUSE Builder application
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holds a list of attributes to be presented to the user in form of ImplementationAttribute-
ViewModel objects; it is the list of all distinct attributes found in the implementations,
held by the Model object. ImplementationAttributeViewModel objects hold the state
of whether they are selected or excluded, and on exclusion keep track on the cause for
being excluded. When selected, they forward the event to their holding TrustMuseEle-
mentViewModel, which then queries the respective Model element on whether the se-
lection caused or ceased any collisions. In the “composed” state the TrustMuseEle-
mentViewModel gets from its Model object the proposed Implementation and creates
an ImplementationViewModel, which is a compact representation of an implementa-
tion for reviewing purposes for the architect.
6.2 First Functional Prototype
Based on the engine presented in the previous section, we provided a first implemen-
tation of the view layer as seen in figure 6.1. As this software prototype was the first
possibility to present our target users the features of the TrustMUSE Model and Trust-
MUSE Process, we aimed at having a quick first implementation that can be evaluated
by them. Although we tried to achieve as many features of the GUI specification from
5.2.1 as possible, we rather concentrated on achieving an environment where our tar-
get users can autonomously solve a problem using our software. In this section we
present how our first functional prototype looked like, which features we implemented
in it, and where exactly the limitations were compared to the envisioned final software.
After the introduction to the software we describe the user evaluation we held using
it. We conclude this section with a list of lessons learnt from the first functional proto-
type that are then addressed in section 6.3, where we present the final full functional
prototype.
Feature
Level of implementation
None Basic Moderate Full
TEML parsing X
Introduction window and general help X
GUI layout for ”composing” state X
Selection of attributes X
Exclusion of colliding attributes X
Information and help for ”composing” state X
GUI layout for ”composed” state X
Suggestion of implementation X
Selecting alternative implementation X
Information and help for ”composed” state X
Code generation X
Table 6.1: Feature implementation state in first functional prototype
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6.2.1 Prototype Description
For the first functional prototype, we concentrated on providing a quick first implemen-
tation that has all the features required by our target users to be able to autonomously
solve a trust management problem. Therefore the selection of features to be built into
the software mainly included those related to executing the TrustMUSE Process. This
basically included the parsing of TEML documents, general GUI layout, enabling users
to select attributes and consequently exclude colliding attributes, basic level of user
information and help texts, and finally the selection of appropriate TrustMUSE Model
element implementations. A more detailed listing of features of the TrustMUSE Builder
software and the level of implementation in the first prototype can be seen in table 6.1.
Figure 6.2: ”Composing” state as seen in the first functional prototype
For providing the knowledge base of the TrustMUSE Process, we selected some of the
well known TrustMUSE element implementation possibilities based on current state
of the art and assigned a few very basic attributes to those. (A detailed description
of the individual element implementations and the assigned attributes can be read
in appendix C.) Afterwards, we created TEML documents which held the formalized
description of the assigned attributes and collisions specified with other elements’ at-
tributes. We placed these documents into the directory structure as required by our
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TrustMUSE Builder implementation. When the software starts, it reads the provided
implementations from the underlying directory structure, and presents the basic GUI
layout filling the TrustMUSE Model elements with the respective attributes. Each Trust-
MUSE element has a help button in its upper right corner, which when clicked on
presents a short description of the element’s functionality and explanation of its depen-
dencies to other elements. The attributes inside each TrustMUSE element are selectable.
Selection is indicated with a green dot appearing at the end of the line. After a selection,
as defined in the TrustMUSE Process, a number of other attributes get excluded. The
excluded attributes are grayed out, and an ’X’ symbol appears at the end of the line. An
illustration of this can be seen in figure 6.2. As an explanation to our users regarding
the meaning of these ’X’ symbols we added a mouse-over tool tip, saying which spe-
cific selection caused the exclusion of the specific attribute. After finishing the selection
of attributes, the user can get to the next view by clicking the ”Compose” button in the
lower right corner.
Figure 6.3: ”Composed” state as seen in the first functional prototype
When switching to the ”composed” state, each TrustMUSE Model element evaluates
the list of selected attributes within it, and selects from available parsed implementa-
tions the one where overlap between provided and selected attributes is the highest.
These implementations are then presented in the GUI as seen in figure 6.3. Each Trust-
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MUSE element contains the name of the implementation as set in its TEML document.
Additionally to the name, a short description is presented that the software gains from
parsing a text document accompanying the TEML document. Another document that
needs to be provided with the TEML document is the list of literature references where
this implementation is defined. The user can view this list of references by clicking the
”References...” button at the bottom of the TrustMUSE element. If the architect is not
satisfied with any of the suggested implementations, she can switch back to the ”com-
posing” state by going onto the ”Select attributes” button in the lower left corner. The
button then brings her back to the ”composing” state as she left it, with all selections
and exclusions still intact.
Prototype Evaluation
Building on the prepared functional prototype we wanted to find out how our target
users can solve a trust management problem on their own. We invited five system
architects, with experience in software design ranging from 2 years to 6 years, to par-
ticipate in our user evaluation. All of our participants stated to be untrained in security
and to know little about security solutions. We selected users who did not participate
in the workshops of section 3.3, as we wanted to avoid them being aware of the design
decisions we made in TrustMUSE. We composed a scenario where a software had to
be designed that had a clear role and was easy to imagine by our test participants. We
designed the scenario to require our test participants to think about a secure solution,
but which was not obviously demanding trust management. (A complete description
of the scenario and also a full presentation of the results can be found in appendix D.)
After presenting a participant with the scenario, we briefly interviewed them how they
would specify in detail a possible solution. More specifically, we were interested in the
security architecture for the software. Following the initial discussion, we introduced
the TrustMUSE Builder software to them and very briefly described the TrustMUSE
Process to be used. Subsequently we had them use the software while asking them
to think aloud and observing them. We found our users to throw themselves into the
problem and experiment around how the software behaves. Although it was expected
that our users will explore the software, we were surprised to see that they did so before
trying to interpret the presented layout and think about their specific problem at hand
in relation to the TrustMUSE Builder. After their initial experiments with the software’s
GUI they were able to create their cognitive model of its operation and focus on solving
the problem from the scenario. While they looked at the individual TrustMUSE Model
elements and contained attributes, the participating users tended to freely interpret the
texts that were presented as help; they also tried to bend the meaning of words as much
as possible to make the phrases fit their needs. Although there were also some issues
with the GUI and with the general software interaction, all users were able to solve the
problem and received a mostly appropriate proposition from the TrustMUSE Builder
tool.
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After our participants ran through the whole process and received a proposed trust
management framework, we did a structured interview with the participants to collect
their insight. We presented them twelve statements to be rated on a five-point Likert
scale – strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree – which could be
divided into following subcategories:
1. Understanding of trust management: whether the TrustMUSE Model helped
them gain an understanding of the role of trust management and the components
that are present in it.
2. Framework design process: whether the TrustMUSE Process is understandable
and intuitive to use.
3. Gained benefit: whether they feel to have gained a better understanding by us-
ing the tool, and if they feel they could apply the suggestion TrustMUSE Builder
made.
Although there were users who had no plan on how to realize the security solution
requested in the scenario, some could very precisely specify a well applicable PKI and
certificate based architecture. However, none of the involved participants was able
to completely solve the security requirements and adapt a solution for the scenario at
hand. The feedback collected through the interviews was much diffused. While, for
example, three users had no problem of understanding how the TrustMUSE Process
selected the proposed solution, the remaining two users had strong feelings against the
background logic that was in place. Because of this great deviation in responses we ap-
plied hypotheses testing to the result set to exclude specific feedback which could have
resulted simply by chance. As a null hypothesis, we assumed that the mean response
to our question would have been ”disagree”. Table 6.2 shows the results left valid after
the hypothesis testing.
As visible from the results in table 6.2, the TrustMUSE system in general had a positive
reception. Our test users were able to compose a trust management framework without
prior knowledge, each within around 30 minutes. Also, our participants were happy
with the finally proposed framework: they understood how it worked, thought it to be
appropriate for their problem, and even felt confident enough to explain its operation
to someone else. Although the participants stated to have understood the concept of
trust management and understood the connection between the TrustMUSE elements, it
can be seen from the results that they were not able to properly grasp the role of indi-
vidual TrustMUSE elements. One user explicitly stated, when saying to understand the
concept of trust management, that she ”... understood it in general already before, the
tool did not help much.” Similarly, the two participants who had the most problems in
the beginning to draft a solution complained that they would need more information
regarding the proposed solution to actually apply it. We identify that acceptance of
our solution was strongly correlated with prior knowledge of security terms. A partici-
pant specifically stated that ”more time would have been required to grasp all the new
terms and definitions that came with security and trust management in particular”.
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Statement
Mean of re-
sponses
P-Value
You understand the concept of Trust Manage-
ment.
0.02%
You understand the sub-processes present in
Trust Management.
3.32%
You understand the connection between the
Trust Management components.
0.001%
You think the concept of attributes is a good
way to describe your scenario.
0.04%
You understand the Trust Management solu-
tion that has been proposed.
0.02%
You think the proposed framework is appropri-
ate for your problem.
0.001%
You could explain the proposed framework to
someone else.
0.02%
- agree - undecided
Table 6.2: Results of the first user evaluation and p-values from the hypotheses tests
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We observed a similar pattern during our tests, as participants applied a very broad
interpretation of proposed terms and help hints to accommodate the seen text to their
own understanding. With no prior knowledge of security terminology, a complete un-
derstanding was not achievable for them. However, our tool was certainly capable of
exploiting little security expertise IT professionals may have gained through their work
experience, enabling them to solve a more complex security task.
6.2.2 Lessons Learnt from the First Functional Prototype
The experience from the first user evaluation shows that the TrustMUSE system started
in general on a sound track. Target users are able to solve complex security tasks and
agree with the proposed solutions. Consequently, the model-driven separation of func-
tionality and attribute-based description of implementations is capable of supporting
the composition of a valid trust management framework for a specific problem sce-
nario. However, the first prototype system is still too technical, and for people with
very little security knowledge not understandable. Although we were able to decrease
the necessary level of security expertise required for a trust management task, we still
did not reach a level where non-security experts could confidently solve such issues.
(A) The system should target a higher abstraction level to increase the understand-
ing of sub-processes.
It is evident from the tests that our target users still applied a broad interpretation to
terms in order to align them with their own understanding. We acknowledge that this
fact was partially related to the prototype not having all help texts in place, but it still
seemed that some explanations were not clear to our users. Additionally, the majority of
our evaluation participants did feel uncomfortable using the help buttons, and only did
so after being indicated to. (B) The execution of the process should more substantially
include explanations, where these explanations should be made less technical.
Similarly to last paragraph’s issue, the direct selection of attributes was not fully ac-
cepted. Our users applied different tactics for selecting the most preferred attributes.
One participant tried to identify which attributes belong together and then made her
selection based on these 2-3 element attribute groups. Another participant selected at-
tributes as long as no collision was encountered. Then this maximal set was assumed
to be correct. Our participants also preferred to use the first couple of attributes in the
list and ignored the ones at the bottom. While the concept of attributes as a descrip-
tion and filtering mechanism for TrustMUSE elements proved to be effective, the direct
interaction with them only worked from a moderate level of expertise. We would like
to make trust management accessible for system designers with less security expertise
as that. (C) The system should abstract attributes into more comprehensive features,
even if this means less fine tuning. The additional fine tuning may then be made
subsequently.
One last issue we observed at the user evaluation – which got a much diffused response
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– was the understanding of the process. While there were participants who were able
to use the tool very well and absolutely understood how the proposed framework had
been selected, others felt often lost and could not identify the correlations. Multiple
participants stated that they wished to see what influence their decisions had or de-
manded something more similar to a wizard. (It is important to state that we decided
explicitly against a wizard, as in the initial requirements workshops the focus group
voted against it. They said it could be useful once, but apart from that would annoy
them. As a possibility, a wizard style tutorial could be added for first time users or as
an additional view, but we do not consider it as part of our specification.) Therefore (D)
the tool should be more process oriented, where each step visualizes its effects.
6.3 Full Functional TrustMUSE Builder
We are using the lessons learnt formulated from the evaluation of the first functional
prototype to improve the subsequent full functional TrustMUSE Builder software. We
specifically concentrate on the lessons learnt from section 6.2.2. The implementation of
the final functional prototype is greatly relying on the previous implementation. The
implementation level of the individual features is presented in table 6.3. This software
is then used in the final evaluation of the thesis, presented in 7.
Feature
Level of implementation
None Basic Moderate Full
TEML parsing X
Introduction window and general help X
GUI layout for ”composing” state X
Selection of attributes X
Exclusion of colliding attributes X
Information and help for ”composing” state X
GUI layout for ”composed” state X
Suggestion of implementation X
Selecting alternative implementation X
Information and help for ”composed” state X
Code generation X
Table 6.3: Feature implementation state in full functional prototype
During this section we address the lessons learnt presented in section 6.2.2 and refer-
ence them by their letter code. We present what measures we choose to address them
and describe in detail the operation of the software and how it fulfills the requests of
the users. As previously, we are not going to concentrate on the implementation aspects
but rather wish to provide a full description of the motivations and the user interaction.
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6.3.1 Composing State Description
After start-up and initialization of the tool, the target user is presented with the com-
posing state. An illustration of the iterated ”composing” state layout of the TrustMUSE
Builder can be seen in figure 6.4. The main issues addressed, as observable from this
figure, are basic user experience problems that we deduced from the received unstruc-
tured feedback during the evaluation of the first prototype. The interface is more ap-
pealing, checkboxes are more intuitive to use, and each view received a title label as
requested by some users to help navigation within the TrustMUSE Process.
The individual attribute texts are changed to be explicit features which highly correlate
with the functionality provided by specific implementations. Thereby these formula-
tions are more easily understandable by our target users and address the lessons learnt
(A) and (C). Additionally the possibility to see a short explanation of an attribute’s
meaning, thereby avoiding problems with terminology, is made available via tool tips.
The help buttons in the upper right corner of the elements provide a short explanation
of the specific TrustMUSE Model element as tool tip; clicking on the help button opens
a dialog with an extensive description of the functionality, dependencies, and possible
implementations of the TrustMUSE Model element within.
Lessons learnt (A) and (D) requested the interaction with the tool to be more structured.
To achieve this we have to alter the interaction with the TrustMUSE Process as imple-
mented by the tool more significantly. The main alteration is that when an attribute is
selected, all implementations that get excluded because of the selection are presented to
the user; furthermore all attributes that would collide with the selection are not simply
disabled but additionally removed. While this removes complexity of the interface, it
also provides more transparency to the user about the effects of her selection. It also
provides a more structured feedback about what the TrustMUSE Process is doing in the
background. An illustration how excluded implementations are highlighted to the user
is presented in figure 6.5.
For each excluded implementation, the user can review during the composing state
why it is not applicable. This can be done by clicking on the ”Why not?...” buttons next
to the excluded implementations’ names. This opens a dialog as seen in figure 6.6. Aim
of this dialog is to convince the architect about the trustworthiness of the application’s
decisions, and to provide the means to compare the summary of the implementation
and the selected attributes – with this dialog we address lesson learnt (B).
6.3.2 Composed State Description
As in the previous iteration of the prototype, the user progresses to the composed state
when finished with selecting attributes. The composed state of the final functional pro-
totype can be seen in figure 6.8. Identically to the first functional prototype, this view
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Figure 6.5: Displaying the exclusion of specific implementations because of attribute selections
Figure 6.6: Explanation dialog for excluded implementations presenting a comparison of the
implementation’s description and the colliding attributes
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presents the TrustMUSE Model element implementations suggested by the system. Ad-
ditionally to the previously available information, an indicator has been added to vi-
sualize the certainty of the tool in its suggestion – called appropriateness. The value
is calculated by comparing the number of attributes selected of the particular imple-
mentation and the number of total available attributes in the specific element. This
addition addresses lesson learnt (B) and multiple comments of our previous evaluation
participants who did not understand why particular implementations were selected
over others.
As foreseen from the beginning, but missing in the first implementation, the final func-
tional prototype provides the means to switch from the suggested implementation to
alternative valid implementations. This is done via the ”Alternatives...” button, as seen
in figure 6.8 for the TrustEvidence element. Figure 6.7 illustrates the dialog that appears
when clicking this button. The dialog enables the review of other valid implementa-
tions: the user can compare implementations for their appropriateness and learn more
about an implementation in a dialog similar to figure 6.6 – only difference in the dialog
is that not the colliding but the provided attributes are listed.
Figure 6.7: Illustration of the dialog for selecting alternative valid implementations
As seen at the element InteractionEvaluation in figure 6.8, it is possible that one or more
elements are kept blank. This can occur in case of all implementations for that element
having been excluded, or if the user’s selection does not provide any indication on the
necessity of the element for her system. The visual highlighting of the blank element
also serves to assure the user that blank parts are allowed and handled.
We do not provide a full implementation of the code composition and generation func-
tionality for the final evaluation. While for the establishment of the TrustMUSE system
concept the definition of the necessary APIs was necessary and has been described in
chapter 4, the discussed functionality falls outside the scope of our target users’ re-
sponsibilities; therefore we do not plan to include its evaluation in this work’s final
evaluation and will only be handled as future work. The implementation available in
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the final functional prototype goes as far of providing the necessary structures for pro-
viding implementation libraries and copy the selected ones into one folder on clicking
the ”Finalize framework” button.
6.4 Conclusions
After having defined the TrustMUSE Model and TrustMUSE Process, this chapter dealt
with the TrustMUSE Builder tool that implements the two former components. The im-
plementation of the underlying software engine built on the Model-View-ViewModel
design pattern and was done with .NET WPF. This engine was then used for a first and
an iterated final functional prototype, where the latter built on the evaluation results of
the former one.
The evaluation with the first functional prototype showed that the TrustMUSE system
progressed on a sound track. Our participants, who were not able to solve a security
engineering scenario without help, could design with the support of the TrustMUSE
system a sound solution for a common security scenario. The software tool enabled
our participants to better understand trust management functionality, and was able to
clarify an applicable solution good enough that our participants felt confident in its
appropriateness. However, there were a number of issues that hindered our partici-
pants to fully appreciate the functionality of our prototype. To address these issues we
formulated four lessons learnt:
(A) The system should target a higher abstraction level to increase the understanding
of sub-processes;
(B) The execution of the process should more substantially include explanations, where
these explanations should be made less technical;
(C) The system should abstract attributes into more comprehensive features, even if
this means less fine tuning;
(D) The tool should be more process oriented, where each step visualizes its effects.
We used these lessons learnt to iterate our TrustMUSE Builder implementation into
its final functional prototype. Besides addressing basic user experience issues, we sig-
nificantly changed the interaction during the composing state; we added information
about the excluded implementations as soon as they collided with selected attributes,
allowing for an immediate feedback on decisions the system did. With this change
and a number of functionality foreseen from the beginning but not included in the first
functional prototype, in the next chapter we evaluate the TrustMUSE approach.
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Chapter 7
Evaluation: Does TrustMUSE Enable
Expert-Like Decisions?
We started our work with the assumption that by providing a model based division
and an accompanying process for trust management, it will be possible to increase the
applicability and ease the integration of trust management solutions into applications.
Throughout this work we introduced the development of the TrustMUSE system, and
especially in the last chapter, we showed the TrustMUSE Builder tool that should pro-
vide the effects we envision. In this chapter, we present the final evaluation of our work
through which we wish to answer whether our claim is true, that is whether the Trust-
MUSE system really enables our target users – the system designers and architects – to
integrate trust management into their application designs.
As evaluation we designed an experiment with which we wanted to compare how the
same application specification and threat model is addressed by our target users with
the support of the TrustMUSE system and by trust management experts who are expe-
rienced in the application of trust management for various problems. We composed a
scenario that has clear trust management requirements, and of which we learnt from
previous interactions with our target users that it was difficult for them to apply any
familiar solution to. By comparing the responses these two groups provide we are able
to make a statement about the extent the TrustMUSE system is able to support our tar-
get users and help them bridge the gap from research to application. Additionally to
this experiment, we asked our target users to fill out a standard user experience ques-
tionnaire about our tool. This enables us to relate the results of the design task with
the satisfaction with the tool implementation, the effectiveness with which it was able
to answer participants’ questions, and overall how well it was able to make our target
users feel at ease while facing an unfamiliar problem space.
We start this chapter by presenting the evaluation methodology we applied, the ex-
periment design, its contents, and the overall implementation plan of the experiment.
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Section 7.2 presents how our trust management expert participants solved the design
task, how we combined their responses, and what reference solution we deduced from
their responses. In section 7.3 we then present the experiment with our target users:
we introduce the participants, show what type of solutions they came up with, and the
results from the separate usability evaluation.
At the end of this chapter, in section 7.4, we compare the results from the two groups.
Especially, by having assumed that the combined responses from the experts are the
correct response to the scenario, we investigate how much our test users are able to
come close to this solution. Adding the results from the usability questionnaires, we are
able to conclude how much our work is able to address applicability and understanding
of trust management with our target users.
7.1 Experiment and Design
Aim of our work is to create a presentation and process that enables software designers
and architects to understand the security requirements of their use cases, and enables
them to apply trust management solutions to increase the security of their designs. Our
approach to the problem consists of two steps: have a presentation of trust management
that makes the applied concepts understandable – even with little previous knowledge
– and present all results of state of the art related to the problem in easy-to-browse way.
Therefore our evaluation aimed to find out, whether our target users given a specific
scenario are able to search through available trust management solutions and gain a
sufficient understanding of these solutions to be able to pick an appropriate one.
We evaluated our work using agreement testing (cf. [Reggia, 1988]), where we consid-
ered our solution as a black-box and did not consider the internal decision making of
the TrustMUSE system; we only considered the user interaction with the system. By
comparing the responses the users got with the responses of human domain experts
we deduce whether it is possible for our target users to achieve a correct design for
an application specification on their own. The danger of this approach, as pointed out
by [O’Keefe and O’Leary, 1993], is that a human expert might be wrong, and therefore
the use of standardized test cases is preferred for evaluation. However as identified
in section 1.1, trust management lacks such standardized metrics at the moment, and
framework designs are based on subjective assessments of individual experts. We over-
came this problem by collecting designs of multiple experts and fused their responses
into one supposedly correct answer.
In a traditional black-box model the input of the system is considered as a controlled
variable, and the output is taken as is. However in our case, we had to take an ad-
ditional critical look at the contents of this exchange as we could not assume that our
target users are going to provide the correct input, and did not know how well the out-
put of the system – the suggested trust management framework – will be interpreted by
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them. To address this issue we also included the well-approved UEQ (User Experience
Questionnaire, cf. [Laugwitz et al., 2008] into our tests. If the UEQ shows that there are
issues with the user experience of our implementation, we are able to relate that to the
results from the design task. This might enable us to find answers to patterns in the
results that we could not work out otherwise.
For our user evaluation we selected a scenario which has been vividly investigated in
the research community, but which we experienced that our target users have difficul-
ties to handle (see also section 3.3). The scenario dealt with packet routing in ad-hoc
networks and can be read in full detail in appendix E. Challenges in ad-hoc packet rout-
ing include the lack of per node Internet connectivity, limit on resources, lack of global
view and direct communication with other nodes, and very quick changes in the net-
work topology. The common approach in the trust community to tackle this scenario
(cf. [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004], [Zouridaki et al., 2007], [Theodorakopoulos and
Baras, 2006]) is to make observations about neighboring nodes’ packet forwarding be-
havior. For non-neighboring nodes, either regularly or on-demand recommendations
are collected, where these recommendations are also thoroughly evaluated regarding
their trustworthiness. Trust values are then mostly derived by applying a function that
uses a continuous trust value range and deals with uncertainty. We used these avail-
able approaches and divided them into implementations for the respective TrustMUSE
Model elements, providing possible attributes to them stored in TEML documents. We
ended up with three to five options for most elements, mostly building on implemen-
tations we already defined for the last evaluation as shown in appendix C; these were
provided to the participants of our two test cases as possibilities.
7.2 Test with Trust Management Experts
As first part of our evaluation we composed a questionnaire aimed for trust manage-
ment experts (also presented in appendix F). The questionnaire contained the scenario,
an overview of the TrustMUSE approach, and a question for each TrustMUSE Model el-
ement with the previously identified implementation options. The options were briefly
described with their technical approach, supported with a reference to the specific trust
management framework from where we extracted the implementation. We invited the
members of the IFIP Trust Management working group to fill out the questionnaire and
received three responses. We present the responses in table 7.1.
For merging the received expert designs together we follow the guidelines from [Reg-
gia, 1988]. As our questions only had discrete response options, we decide to take a ma-
jority vote for questions where responses do not match. There are no questions where
the responses are different for all three experts, thereby clearly defining the merged so-
lution. This solution is used in the next section as correct answer when evaluating the
responses of our target users.
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Trust
Evidence
Trust
Discovery
and Distri-
bution
Trust
Evaluation
Trust
Update
Trust
Enforce-
ment
Interaction
Evaluation
I. Recommen-
dations
Direct ask-
ing
BR-
Hermes
On-
demand
Rule-
based
Rule-based
II. Recommen-
dations
Direct ask-
ing
BR-
Hermes
Regular
asking
Simple
decision
Rule-based
III. Recommen-
dations
Direct ask-
ing
BR-
Hermes
On-
demand
Simple
decision
Rule-based
Table 7.1: TrustMUSE solutions from the trust management experts
7.3 Test with Target Users Applying TrustMUSE
We invited ten software engineers to participate in our final evaluation. The selected
participants had not used the TrustMUSE system before and were also not involved in
any of the previous iterations or workshops. This limitation has been made to avoid
any factors in the tests due to training or familiarity to trust management because of
being involved in our work. Our participants were from different European countries
and worked in research institutes, small and large enterprises. All of them had more
than five years of software engineering work experience, and worked currently in the
field of distributed systems. Based on a self-evaluation, all of them stated that they
would not be able to independently solve a security engineering task.
The participants received all the necessary material needed for conducting the test over
Internet, and had to work without any human help. They received an introduction
document which described the aim of the test, included the application scenario, and
contained a brief description of the TrustMUSE system. The documents also included
a brief description of ad-hoc networks and additionally stated that any kind of online
help was allowed to be used. Next to the document, the participants received the binary
of the TrustMUSE Builder with the accompanying TEML documents of possible trust
management implementations. The provided binary copied the selections the users
made and the implementations they chose into the document that also contained the
UEQ questionnaire. After filling out all the parts of the test, the participants submitted
their results over Internet.
7.3.1 Composed Trust Management Frameworks
All of our participants successfully finished the exercise, on average in around 30 min-
utes. For each selected implementation in the trust management framework we con-
sider an answer wrong or correct, depending on whether it matches with the solution
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provided by the trust management experts for the particular TrustMUSE Model ele-
ment. Dependencies between elements and the level of severity of selections for the
problem are ignored, and handled equally as mistake – this is the most restrictive ap-
proach for classifying the responses. Figure 7.1 provides the overview how many par-
ticipants had a correct answer for the individual elements of the TrustMUSE Model.
Figure 7.1: Percent of participants with correct responses per TrustMUSE Model element
Before we can make any further statements about the collected responses, we have to
analyze their significance. The question we have to answer for this is: how large is the
probability that the selections that have been made are due to chance only. To decide
this we have to work out the probability of receiving the results we have assuming
random selections. The question can be answered with the application of the G-test for
goodness-of-fit (cf.[Sokol and Rohlf, 1981]), as presented in formula 7.1, Oi being the
observed andEi being the expected values. Our null-hypothesis for the goodness-of-fit
test is that the received responses follow a uniform distribution across the options per
element. The observed and expected values for our case are presented in table 7.2. As
observed values we take the number of participants who had the correct answer for an
element; expected value is the number of correct answers that would be expected with
the given number of participants if they chose by random between the options.
G = 2
∑
i
Oiln
(
Oi
Ei
)
(7.1)
Element 1 2 3 4 5 6
Oi 6 3 8 6 8 10
Ei 3 3 3 3 5 2
Table 7.2: Observed and expected values as used for the G-test
For evaluating the result of the G-test we choose a p-value of 0.001 and determine the
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degrees of freedom as Ncategories − 1 = 5. For this case the critical value below which
we have significant evidence that our null-hypotheses holds is 20.51. Additionally com-
pensating the result of our G-test result due to our small sample size with the Williams
correction factor (cf. [Williams, 1976]) our result is 36.31, thereby disproving our null-
hypotheses. This result means that there is at most a probability of 0.1% that our obser-
vations result from chance.
7.3.2 User Experience
In the second part of our tests our participants had to fill out the UEQ form. We selected
this questionnaire because it provides a complete tool1 for filling in and evaluating the
received responses. Additionally there is a benchmark of 163 evaluated products be-
hind the tool that allows to put the achieved result in comparison with other products,
thereby providing valuable help in interpreting the scores of the test.
The UEQ form consists of 26 pairs of opposing attributes, where the participant has to
rate the system on a scale from one to seven. These individual ratings are combined into
six overall categories that describe different aspects of the evaluated system. The results
of the questionnaire for our system are presented in figure 7.2. From the categories
measured by UEQ we excluded dependability, as the correlation of the responses was
not high enough according to UEQ’s own evaluation tool.
Figure 7.2: Results of the UEQ evaluation
Comparing our results to the benchmarks shows that the overall attractiveness of the
TrustMUSE system is average, even though our system achieved good results in most
categories. The only category where our system was rated below average was perspicu-
ity. Perspicuity for our case includes aspects as terminology, help texts, and tool tips;
1http://www.ueq-online.org/ Last visited 30th July 2014
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this category is very significant in terms of the evaluation of the TrustMUSE Builder as it
is needed for our target users to understand the concepts present in trust management.
7.4 Analysis of the Results
Having collected designs from our target users and from trust management experts, in
this section we evaluate how close our target users were able to come to an expert de-
sign. We analyze the correctness of the individual designs and evaluate how much the
TrustMUSE system was able to support our target users to solve the scenario correctly.
These results are put in relation to the statements about the user experience of the tool
to draw a final conclusion of how much the TrustMUSE system is able to address the
problems that have motivated our work.
Figure 7.3: Comparison of the results to relevant domain experience
We collected an overview of the evaluation results in figure 7.3. In this figure we com-
pare for each participant her years of experience, her stated security expertise, and how
many correct answers she achieved from the maximum of six. Surprisingly there is
no relation between the achieved results and the experience of the participants. This
illustrates that trust management is a novel area of security, and it is hard to adapt ex-
isting security knowledge to it. It also shows that our tool provides an abstraction that
is equally valuable for people with no or medium level of security engineering experi-
ence. If we consider figure 7.1, we find that the rate at which our participants selected
the correct implementation strongly depends on the particular TrustMUSE Model ele-
ment. We find two reasons for this. First, that the naming of attributes was more clear
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in some elements than in others, thereby influencing the effectiveness of translating the
scenario’s requirements into these attributes. Secondly, for some elements the function-
ality included and the possible implementations are more clear than for others. This
causes – as we have also observed during the evaluation of the first functional proto-
type – our users to try integrating additional functionality that seems to make sense in
their opinion, which however impairs the proper reasoning of the tool.
Figure 7.4: Overall distribution of correctness of responses for the final evaluation
In figure 7.4 we see the overall distribution of how close our participants came to the
correct solution with the application of the TrustMUSE system. The results indicate
to follow a normal distribution with a mean of 33% and a standard deviation of 18%.
There are two factors because of which this result should be considered more positively.
First of all, in the evaluation of the responses we equally rated selections that did not
match the expert solution as being wrong. This is a very conservative approach, as even
not all of our experts agreed on the solution for each element. Therefore the responses
can be considered to be more close to a correct solution as presented here. As sec-
ond positively influencing factor, even though it is due to a bad realization of the tool,
we highlight the scores from the UEQ. As we pointed out previously, our participants
indicated to have encountered problems regarding the perspicuity of the TrustMUSE
Builder tool. From the gathered information we cannot identify where our users had
difficulties in understanding the presented information; wherever it was, it necessarily
influenced the selection of implementations in a negative way.
7.5 Conclusions
Concluding our work, we recapitulated the claim and research questions of this work.
To evaluate how much the TrustMUSE system is able to address the identified prob-
lems we designed an experiment that would test how our target users can integrate
trust management into specific scenarios. We composed two tests building on eval-
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uation methodology from the area of expert systems. One test was designed for our
target users taking the TrustMUSE Builder tool, the other one for trust management
experts who provided a reference solution for the scenario. To have more options for
interpreting the results we also added a standard user experience evaluation to the test.
Our user test was filled out by ten experienced distributed system engineers, who
stated not to be able to solve security engineering tasks independently. We evaluated
their responses against the reference solution composed from the responses of three
trust management experts. There was a significant statistical relation between the re-
sponses of our target users and that of trust management experts. The results of the user
experience questionnaire also showed that the TrustMUSE Builder tool had a positive
user experience, but had deficiencies in terms of perspicuity.
The results from our test participants indicate that the TrustMUSE system is able to –
independently from security engineering experience – support users in integrating trust
management into real-world application designs. The results are further improved by
the facts that we applied a conservative approach for evaluating the responses, and that
the designs were close to the expert solution in spite the perspicuity issues our users
faced during the use of the tool.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Outlook
In this work we have discussed a novel approach for moving current research results
of trust management into real world use. We identified two major factors hindering
this process: the high complexity of current trust management frameworks and the
lack of security expertise present during the design of most software products. These
factors have a number of consequences, but in the end it all comes down to the problem
that current trust management results are not applicable for non-security experts. To
overcome this problem we proposed an approach that breaks down the complexity of
individual trust management frameworks and provides a representation that can be
used during the development of commercial systems.
Our approach is called TrustMUSE (Trust Management Usable Software Suite), and
it tries to achieve the above mentioned goal by dividing trust management into more
elemental blocks through the use of a meta model. By providing a complete process and
tool-chain on top of this model, the TrustMUSE approach targets software designers
and architects and builds on their experience in thinking in terms of abstract services
that a dedicated system should provide. With TrustMUSE our target users are able
to use the same terminology and practices to deal with trust management issues as
they already apply for other aspects of distributed systems, building on basic object-
and aspect-oriented thinking. Additionally to a presentation process, in this work we
also provided a software tool that enables an easy browsing between available trust
management implementations, and that helps architects to quickly narrow down the
great number of possibilities to a manageable set of applicable solutions.
We structured our research according the user-centered design process of [Nielsen,
1993]. We initiated our work with a stakeholder analysis and identified system de-
signers and architects as the user group through which we could maximize the impact
of our solution. With this selected target user group we held a number of initial fo-
cus group workshops, where we identified the needs that have driven our research.
We used multiple iterations in our work to receive early feedback on our prototypes,
and ensure that we developed a solution that was really able to achieve our envisioned
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goal. Our final evaluation showed that our approach is able to significantly support
our target users, however it is not able to completely substitute the knowledge a trust
management expert could bring into a system design process.
8.1 Contribution Summary
The main contribution of this work is the TrustMUSE system. It consists of the Trust-
MUSE Model, TrustMUSE Process (including the TrustMUSE iAnnotator software and
TEML format), and the TrustMUSE Builder software. All of these individual compo-
nents were developed through a user-centered design process and were iterated via
multiple prototypes. From each iteration we gained feedback and used it to either
improve the individual component or to iterate the complete TrustMUSE approach.
Through this process we developed a system that our final evaluation proved to be
truly beneficial for our target users; thereby the TrustMUSE approach is able to de-
crease the gap between research and application in the area of trust management. This
section will summarize for each TrustMUSE component how it has reached it state for
the final system, and how it contributes to the overall TrustMUSE system.
8.1.1 TrustMUSE Model
To decrease the complexity of individual trust management frameworks we first needed
to identify elemental blocks of such systems and formalize them adequately. We achieved
this through the TrustMUSE Model, that is a meta model for trust management frame-
works. The main structure of the model was driven by the needs that were formu-
lated by our target users. The meta model defines elemental functionalities, formalizes
them through well-defined APIs, and declares dependencies between these elements.
The TrustMUSE Model enables the description of individual results of trust manage-
ment research. Through these descriptions it is possible to break down frameworks
and thereby decrease their complexity – this results in a number of implementations
made available for the individual elements of the TrustMUSE Model.
We validated and proved the power of the meta model by taking four characteristic
trust management frameworks and described them by the means of it. These four
frameworks had different mechanics, included concepts that were either still experi-
mental or already widely applied, and ranged from traditional solutions to current re-
search results. Via the TrustMUSE Model division of these frameworks we found that
these seemingly distinctive solutions had a number of core concepts that re-appeared
in multiple places. Through this validation step we finalized the role of the individual
elements in the model and clarified dependencies between them.
For evaluating the interfaces between the model elements we implemented two trust
management frameworks for dedicated applications using the TrustMUSE Model’s struc-
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ture. The applications for which these solutions have been implemented were already
existing systems that had the new requirement to collect and represent trust related in-
formation within them. We designed and implemented respective trust management
solutions with the support of the TrustMUSE Model. Additionally to gaining feedback
on the APIs, the implementations helped us identify an additional set of artifacts that
serve as an integration layer between a TrustMUSE based solution and the system using
it.
8.1.2 TrustMUSE Process
While the TrustMUSE Model provides the capabilities to divide trust management
frameworks into elemental blocks, the TrustMUSE Process – consisting of an author
and consumer sub-process – annotates these blocks with attributes that are employ-
able by our target users. These attributes are conditions, services, properties of the
respective implementations. During the author sub-process the author of a trust man-
agement implementation provides the attributes that describe her implementation; ad-
ditionally she also defines attributes of dependent elements with which the implemen-
tation collides. These attributes are then stored as TrustMUSE Element Markup Lan-
guage (TEML) documents, thereby making them interoperable and machine readable.
The writing of these documents is supported through the TrustMUSE iAnnotator tool,
which provides a drag&drop mechanism for composing and generating TEML output.
In the consumer sub-process our target users are presented with these attributes, sorted
by respective TrustMUSE Model element. As they select attributes that are applicable
for their design scenario, the TrustMUSE Process verifies which implementations pro-
vide the requested attribute and the remaining ones are removed from the options.
Also defined collisions are controlled for excluding implementations from other ele-
ments. As the architect selects more and more attributes, the space of possible imple-
mentations continuously decreases, until only a limited and manageable set of options
remains. These can then be reviewed by the user for selecting the implementations that
are to be included into the final framework.
Through the application of standardized attributes, the TrustMUSE Process is a light-
weight and extendable approach for presenting our target users trust management in
a way more familiar to them. We developed the process based on user needs we col-
lected specifically for this means, and evaluated it through the application of paper
prototypes. These prototypes have been shown to several users, who provided exten-
sive feedback regarding possible visual interaction with the process. From these we
learnt that we also had to consider the TrustMUSE Process as an e-learning platform,
through which our target users would learn about the various processes and options
present in trust management and gain a better understanding of common threats and
solutions of distributed systems.
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8.1.3 TrustMUSE Builder
Implementing the individual concepts of the TrustMUSE system into a single tool, the
TrustMUSE Builder is the main interface towards system designers and architects. It
automates the TrustMUSE Process by parsing individual TEML documents, building
a logical structure of available implementations, and presenting a layout with the ele-
ments of the TrustMUSE Model containing all respective attributes. The software also
provides the envisioned e-learning functionality and guides our target users through
the process; it presents sufficient information and explanations to the user, thereby
avoiding her to get lost in the unfamiliar domain.
By using the TrustMUSE Builder tool, target users receive specific suggestions for the
trust management framework applicable for the use case described by them. For every
part of the framework the architects receive a description of the individual function-
ality provided by the selected implementation, links to additional sources where this
implementation is described, and an understandable comparison to other possible im-
plementations and why those were not suggested. With one click the architect can then
have the tool copy all the proposed implementations into one folder that can be used as
library in the final implementation; thereby only requiring the developers to implement
an integration layer in their system for it.
We implemented the TrustMUSE Builder tool in two iterations. We used the first it-
eration to gain feedback on the complete TrustMUSE system as it was the first truly
executable contact our target users had with our approach. After improving the Trust-
MUSE Process and implementing the new interaction into the TrustMUSE Builder, we
finalized the second version of the tool. This tool was used to execute the final evalua-
tion that showed that the TrustMUSE approach is able to address aspects of the problem
we identified in the beginning of our work. Although our participants stated to appreci-
ate the novelty and operation of the tool, they still found it partially hard to understand
and felt uncertain in the frameworks they were able to compose using the tool.
8.2 Outlook
Throughout our work we focused on establishing a model-driven approach for trust
management. We did this with the goal of decreasing the investment necessary for
research to result in real-world applications. While our work mainly concentrates on
establishing the basics for this direction and proving its validness, it also opens way
for various additional research directions. In this section we would like to summarize
directions that we believe are interesting and promising for further investigation.
Building on the TrustMUSE Model, we see the possibility to create standard threat sim-
ulations and compare various trust management implementations against it. A similar
approach has been initiated by [Go´mez Ma´rmol and Martı´nez Pe´rez, 2009], but they
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lacked a thorough standardized API to test elemental blocks. Such a direction could
result in a set of best practices regarding implementations for various scenarios. This
would both benefit the research community and architects who are searching for proper
solutions.
The TrustMUSE Model in its current state is not believed to be finished and final. On the
one hand, considering the collected requirements, it should include additional layers
below the current elements; as an example we see the model provided by [Kinateder
et al., 2005] to be a possible division of the current Trust Model element. On the other
hand, researchers who have already investigated specific areas of trust management
can probably extend and improve the meta model in their respective area – either by
dividing current elements or by adding novel ones. We wish the TrustMUSE Model
to be a reference for the trust management community, and be continuously improved
and adapted based on current research trends.
As stated above, the TrustMUSE Process is a light-weight and extendable approach for
presenting something abstract in simply employable terms. We believe that this ap-
proach can be simply translated to other domains that face similar challenges. Strictly
speaking the only requirements for the application of the process are the presence of a
standardized set of attributes and a model by which options can be sorted.
A shortcoming of the current TrustMUSE Process and TrustMUSE Builder are that they
are only one dimensional. As presented by the Scope element within the TrustMUSE
Model, one system and thus one trust management framework may be interested in
multiple distinct scopes of individual entities. Currently the APIs and implementa-
tions of TrustMUSE only allow to manage individual Scopes separately, but they do
not enable the handling of various Scopes with distinct implementations. It can easily
be imagined that such capabilities would be appreciated: for example when a provider
has a general reputation within the community but also holds a particular accredita-
tion, these distinct pieces of Trust Evidence could be acquired through different means
of Trust Discovery. Similar examples can be envisioned for other elements of the Trust-
MUSE Model. To enable such trust management framework compositions the com-
plete TrustMUSE system has to be reviewed. Especially the TrustMUSE Process and
TrustMUSE Builder have to be redesigned to enable the presentation of simultaneously
existing implementations and support the architect in deciding when to add additional
dimensions to her framework.
Although explicitly stated to be undesired by our participants during our focus group
workshops, code generation could be included into the TrustMUSE Builder to ease
some of the development activities. While we believe it to be essential in realizing
the above described multi-dimensional frameworks, we also see it valuable in the in-
tegration of TrustMUSE solutions into systems. Especially for enabling integration of
TrustMUSE Model element implementations provided by different developers, we sug-
gest the use of code generation for the factories registered in the Trust Representation
class. This and many similar activities should be considered for supporting developers
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in their duties, as currently the support TrustMUSE provides ends at the system design
stage of a software development process.
8.3 Closing Remarks
The main goal of this work is the support of non-security expert users. We concentrated
on providing a system that could enhance the existing knowledge of system designers
and architects into the domain of trust management. Until now we did not discuss
how the TrustMUSE approach could be applied by or with the involvement of trust
management experts. A similar approach has been used in the design of [den Braber
et al., 2007].
Motivation behind such an approach is that our target users are unlikely to introduce
our solution as they have to take responsibility for it. As shown in our evaluation,
there is still a problem of understanding the trust management solutions; thereby an
architect may fear to be introducing a vulnerability rather than protecting the system
by integrating trust management. Building on the TrustMUSE approach, a trust man-
agement expert is likely to be more effective in designing an appropriate system, and
she can do so with the involvement of our target users who are able to understand the
decisions that are made through the received tool support. Such cooperation in the
work may result in an increased effectiveness, and in case the trust management expert
is only contracted for the design phase also in a decrease of costs. Thereby the main
goal of our work, that is the transition of trust management research into real-world
applications, is more likely to be achieved in practice.
As identified by [Jensen, 2014], the realization of security relies on the trust and com-
munication between multiple stakeholders – including security professionals and archi-
tects. There are multiple obstacles to this communication – as difference in expertise,
understanding, used terminology, etc. However, to ensure the security of implementa-
tions this communication has to be flawless. The TrustMUSE Builder can support this
communication and increase the effectiveness of the dialog between the various human
experts present during software design.
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Appendix A
Scenario for the Initial
Requirements Workshop
A.1 Food Traceability scenario
A.1.1 Vision for applications in agriculture Life-Cycle-Management (LCM)
The main scope of the traceability scenario is to provide consumers with enhanced de-
tails about the products they are buying from upstream actors, while at the same time
allowing the up-stream actors in the supply chain to track and manage their products
as they progress down-stream to the consumer. The traceability scenario thus contains
both real-time or near real-time data collection and fusion as well as historic data min-
ing.
The key component in the traceability scenario is the Consumer Experience Network
(CEN).
The CEN service has specific focus on service management functions which shall pro-
vide support in finding historic data from the life-cycle of the specific foodstuff in a fast,
transparent and platform agnostic way. The CEN repository will discover and cache
services that are provided from various applications about the life-cycle and quality of
the product. The added features of the CEN scenario are:
• The CEN service repository is created that searches and pre-categorizes services.
This is required because relevant information about a product is spread over
many actors in the supply chain and discovery is a resource expensive procedure.
• The CEN service provides meta-data about services. This is required to pro-
vide consumers of the CEN service repository with additional information like
response times, costs, description, etc. of the services.
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• The CEN service keeps records of consumer ratings. This adds value for all stake-
holders in the traceability scenario, as information about consumer preferences
are highly valued by producers and retail stores.
Actors
For a food traceability platform to be successful it needs to provide added value for all
actors in the supply chain, such as consumers, food processors, slaughterhouses and
farmers. All actors have the opportunity to be part of the CEN service and provide
data to the CEN repository and, in turn, subscribe to the CEN services and thus receive
valuable feedback for use in their business decisions.
Consumers
The consumers play an important role in this system. They interact with the system
through applications on a Smartphone, a smart home network, a refrigerator or some
other device with appropriate computing power. A Smartphone demonstrator appli-
cation will allow consumers to scan packages of meat directly in the supermarket and,
with minimum delay, obtain information about:
• Enhanced information about additives, nutritional value, daily recommended
values, CO2 footprint etc. The information is not only presented factual, but the
information is enhanced with explanations and descriptions, comparisons and
recommendations provided, glossaries and Wikipedia links, and the possibility
to use multimedia
• Other consumers experience with meat of identical race, from the same farm etc.
Ideally this would be an index calculated from the correlation of known infor-
mation about this meat and previous ratings. For example, a piece of meat from
organic Angus filet will be compared with previous ratings for organic meat, An-
gus meat and other filet meat.
• Simple rating for the production methods used. All production steps are rated
where best practice gets the highest rating according to consumer preferences
such as organic vs. non-organic; locally produced vs. imported; low CO2 foot-
print vs. low price. If the consumer chooses to rate according to organic vs. non-
organic, organic production methods get higher ratings calculated in all steps in
the life-cycle, e.g. the farm, slaughterhouse and packages/transportation pro-
cesses.
• Small description on the cut. These include cooking information and a selection
of relevant recipes.
• Subscription to various reminder services. These services will interact with smart
home infrastructures to provide the consumer with reminders about ”best before”
information (such as ”the meat should be consumed today!” to be displayed in the
A.1 Food Traceability scenario 123
TV set) or on-line warnings via emails, SMS and TV notices, of products that have
been officially recalled.
Food processors
Actors in the food process chain allow the CEN network to access their information. In
return they get consumer feedback related to their business. With CEN they have access
to even more detailed consumer data which will allow them to price differentiate the
meat on more parameters than now which will increase the value of the meat in the
long term.
Farmers
The greatest opportunity for the farmer in using CEN is the direct contact with the
consumer. The farmers get feedback on the products they deliver can market other
products and promote their brand. As an example, the farmer would be interested in
knowing whether the feed he is using affects the rating of the meat he produces. If so,
he can optimize meat quality related to feed – and potentially obtain a higher price.
CEN service provider
The CEN service provider gathers information from all producing actors to store in the
CEN service repository in order to be able to serve consumer requests on personalized
platforms within a reasonable amount of time. This is also where the rating data is
stored and used to generate reports for producing actors for feedback on their produc-
tion.
Enhancements to the traceability scenario
RFID and Smart Homes
RFID tagging products opens up for many new possibilities. Combining RFID readers
with environmental sensors allows for identifying storage, transport and production
conditions for every single product to be documented. RFID readers in refrigerators
would allow intelligent refrigerators to keep track of the contents of the fridge and
allowing for ordering missing items and suggesting recipes from the current contents.
In the supermarket, consumers can check the contents of the fridge at home. Near Field
Communication (NFC) may be used concurrently with RFID.
Recall of unsafe food Authorities regularly recall food deemed unsafe for consump-
tion. The smart refrigerator could warn the consumer that it contains recalled products.
Automatic systems in stores and warehouses could identify products on the recalled
lists. This could save considerable time for authorities and employees when tracing the
recalled products. CO2 footprint and route tracking
For some products a large part of the CO2 released in the production is from transporta-
tion. Food usually needs to be transported between 2-3 stakeholders for processing be-
fore being delivered to the store. This can in many cases considerably increase the CO2
footprint compared to the initial production. When detailed location information can
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be obtained for most products it will be possible to estimate, with reasonable accuracy,
the real time CO2 footprint of all products.
Analyzing tools for producers and interest groups
Better tools for analyzing the food production add value for many stakeholders. An
example could be the farmer wanting to know how value is added to his products in
later processing stages. Another example is that the farmer’s interests group could ana-
lyze trends to improve production. This could also be authorities analyzing production
conditions.
Improve safety and reliability of information
Food safety is an ever increasing concern. A service could increase food safety and
reliability with automatic analysis of traceability data. For example weight information
could be used to make sure that 500 kg organically raised cow doesn’t turn into 2000
kg of processed meat.
A.2 Developer scenario
You should develop a mobile application using the CEN platform with which a user
may scan a package of meat and get the various information available about it. The
system is based on SOA and you have to implement a workflow which consumes the
different services. The user should be able to configure whether he would only like to
receive free of charge information or, to ensure better quality of data, pay for it some
small amount of money. For example he/she could use recommendation information
from some independent test institute (Oekotest, Stiftung Warentest, ...) instead of using
the free governmental service. However, the user would define a limit for costs per
scan (e.g. 10 cents) or a maximal timespan, like 5 seconds, to receive the full response.
Costs could be due for different services included in the workflow like for reviews,
recommendations, product comparison, recipes, etc. The user should be able to weight
preferences to optimize profit.
During the implementation you should consider that meta-information provided by
the CEN platform may be expired or not accurate anymore. The list of services may
contain malicious ones charging costs for irrelevant information, not applying to QoS
parameters or even exploiting your application. The rating mechanism included in the
CEN is not malicious but operates as a black-box and may not fit your ideas.
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Appendix B
A Simple Illustration of the
TrustMUSE Model
The concepts presented in the TrustMUSE Model are abstract and complex. But they are
not irrelevant! There is a simple illustration of the concepts that everyone has applied
before. I have successfully used this illustration multiple times to explain the Trust-
MUSE Model. It all started with organizing an event. (This section is highly informal
and non-technical. This is on purpose!)
B.1 Organizing an Event
Imagine you want to organize an event. Let’s say a birthday party! How would you
compose the list of people to be invited? Well, obviously there are the close relatives,
good friends; but you also need someone who will keep good mood, someone bringing
a lot of beverages, couples, and the famous younger sisters. So there is a lot to consider,
a lot to tackle. How does the TrustMUSE Model help here?
First, you need to identify the various aspects that have to be considered when selecting
people: relation, fun, supplies – to name a few. This is the Scope within TrustMUSE. So
now, you have to find information about your candidates. You may have some of this
information yourself, but in some cases you have to ask others to tell you. What you
basically do here, is retrieving Trust Evidence: things you saw yourself, recommenda-
tions from friends, general reputation of some individuals. And how do you retrieve
this information? Via Trust Discovery, that is speaking, phoning, looking up, etc.
Now you have all your information, all the pieces of evidence together. In the Evi-
dence Storage. This may be your desk, a drawer, or a folder on the desktop. How do
you approach this vast information base now? You will probably define some rules for
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yourself: family over neighbors, people your own age over younger or older genera-
tions, being funny weights more than bringing cookies, etc. Well, this will be your Trust
Model. A simple collection of rules. Now you take what information you have, and
apply these rules to it. The process will be the Trust Evaluation, and what you will gain
from it are Trust Values for individual persons.
Having collected all the assessed Trust Values into the Trust Storage, you are now able to
compose the invitation list. You simply take a piece of paper and write all the names
on it, you wish to have at your party. This is your Trust Representation – a rather simple
one.
When the big day arrives, and all the people come, you have to select who gets in, and
who stays out. This is not something you want to do personally, so you hire a bouncer
who stays in front of the door. He gets the invitation list, after explaining him what
the names mean, and he does the Trust Enforcement: deciding based on the assessments
who to trust. So there is a number of people inside the house, and you all have a good
time. You speak with people; you see whether they behave the way you expected.
Some may fulfill you expectations, some may behave worse – you are doing Interaction
Evaluation, that results in a number of observations.
The next day comes. You may be tired, but you still remember the observations you
did. Well, now is the time to categorize them, so you initiate the Trust Update. And now
everything starts anew, categorizing your evidences, applying the rules, and eventually
organizing a new party.
B.2 Mapping of Real Life to the TrustMUSE Model
We have seen the TrustMUSE Model in a real life example. Table B.1 reviews the ele-
ments and their roles.
TrustMUSE Model element Example
Scope Relative; Funniness; ”Brings cookies.”
Trust Evidence Observation about a person; Recommendation
over phone; ”Someone told me, who heard it
from...”
Trust Discovery and Distribution Asking people; Looking up on facebook; Regu-
larly talking to friends.
Evidence Storage Drawer with papers; Folder on desktop.
Trust Model All relatives should come; Singles should come;
Family members are more important than
friends.
Table B.1: Review of the TrustMUSE Model elements
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Appendix C
Example Implementations of
TrustMUSE Model Elements and
Their Attributes
For executing the first user evaluation we required a set of example TrustMUSE Model
element implementations. These were used to fill the TrustMUSE Builder to have a
set of options when executing the tests; therefore they did not have any underlying
implementations. We present the implementations we used grouped by TrustMUSE
Model elements, providing a short description for what the implementations stand for
and what attributes we thought provide a proper description of them.
C.1 Trust Evidence
We distinguished four types of Trust Evidences: observation, recommendation, repu-
tation, certificate. However, these Trust Evidences are often used in combination; as
our TrustMUSE Process only supported selecting one exclusive implementation for a
TrustMUSE Model element we needed to create combinations of these Trust Evidences.
We did not assign any attributes to these implementations as we believed them to be
clear enough for non-security experts.
C.2 Trust Discovery and Distribution
We considered three Trust Discovery and Distribution implementations to be interest-
ing for our tests: central server, regular exchange of experience and random walkers.
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Main aspects we used to distinguish implementations – and got included into the at-
tributes – were network traffic, change frequency and subjectivity.
C.2.1 Central Server
Central server serves as a repository for trust related information. Its use can be seen
for example in [Housley et al., 1999]. Attributes we used to describe it were:
• Continuous connectivity
• Trusted third party
• Global view
• Low traffic overhead
• On demand queries
• Long living entities
C.2.2 Regular Exchange
Many distributed Trust Management frameworks build on entities regularly exchang-
ing their experiences - like in [Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004] and [Kamvar et al.,
2003]. It could be further distinguished based on whether experience is only exchanged
with friendly entities or everybody. We assigned following attributes to this implemen-
tation:
• Small networks
• Quick adaption
• Personalized view
C.2.3 Random Walker
A method to gain Trust Evidences, as presented in [?] or [Chandra et al., 2012a], is
based on randomly sending out crawlers. The information they actually collect can be
manifold but the Trust Discovery and Distribution mechanism is always similar. We
described it as follows:
• Low traffic overhead
• Large networks
• Personalized view
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• On demand queries
C.3 Trust Model
Without proper simulation based comparison of Trust Models’ performance it is diffi-
cult to determine proper distinguishing features; therefore we only included two main
implementations for our tests: PKI[Housley et al., 1999] and UniTEC[?]. We used
UniTEC as a representative for most distributed Trust Models.
C.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure
We already dealt with the applicability of the TrustMUSE Model to PKI. We found the
distinguishing features of PKI being relevant for users to be:
• Trusted authorities
• Pre-trusted entities
• Entity registration
C.3.2 UniTEC
UniTEC, as a generic trust model, was one of the starting points of this research. It is
however, by its design, a Trust Model built on commonly used features of distributed
Trust Management. The main aspects that distinguish it from PKI are:
• Uncertainty handling
• Unknown entity handling
• Slow forgetting
C.4 Trust Update
As already emphasized in the description of the TrustMUSE Model in chapter 4, Trust
Update includes processes that exclusively deal with keeping trust information up to
date. That is the only way to really separate implementations from Trust Model. We
took two example implementations: Feedback Windows and Validity Times.
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C.4.1 Feedback Window
The technique of applying windows is well known. In case of Trust Update it means
that only a limited number of Trust Evidences are kept of one target entity; this enables
very quick adaption to changing behavior. Therefore we assigned following attributes
to this implementation:
• Quick forgetting
• Interaction number based
• Quick trust changes
C.4.2 Validity Times
As typically applied to certificates, Trust Evidences may have an assigned due date after
which they are no longer to be considered. This method is really simple to implement;
but it has the disadvantage that the Trust Management framework can only adapt as
quickly as the validity times have been defined in the beginning. Attributes describing
this behavior are:
• Very slow changes
• Calendar based
C.5 Trust Enforcement
Trust Enforcement is the part of Trust Management users are most acquainted with.
For our tests we used two implementations: best selection and aggregated index with
ordered list.
C.5.1 Best Selection
Selecting the best possible entity for an interaction is the simplest Trust Enforcement
strategy used - although finding the best possible entity is a hard task sometimes. We
described it as:
• Always best match
• Weighted aggregation
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C.5.2 Aggregated Index With Ordered List
This is the Trust Enforcement implementations user encounter most often: an indica-
tion of the reputation on an online store. This implementation does not decide, it only
supports the user making a decision. The attributes we assigned the implementation
were:
• Only propositions
• Weighted aggregation
• Multiple possibilities
C.6 Interaction Evaluation
For Interaction Evaluation we mainly distinguished possible implementations based on
whether the evaluation is done manually or automatically based on predefined rules.
Obviously a finer distinction would have been possible, but this has been sufficient for
the sake of our tests.
C.6.1 Manual Feedback
As known from e-commerce portals, the user is asked after each interaction to provide
subjective feedback about its experience. The feedback can be about multiple scopes
and on different scales. Therefore our assigned attributes were:
• Multiple scopes
• No fixed rules
• Multilevel scale
C.6.2 Rule-based evaluation
To automate the feedback generation from the previous section, it is possible to pre-
define a set of rules according to which an interaction can be rated. A simplified version
of this is to only determine whether a transaction has been successful or has failed - for
example by comparing to a hash value. This implementation of Interaction Evaluation
has been described by us in following way:
• Binary feedback
• Autonomous
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Appendix D
User Evaluation of First Functional
Prototype
In this chapter we give a more detailed description of the first user evaluation as pre-
sented in section 6.2. We provide here the scenario we have described to our users, and
show the questionnaire with all the collected responses.
D.1 User Evaluation Scenario
What the customer said: We are a marketing company having contact to many sup-
pliers and distributors. We provide two kinds of services. People can come to us with
requests for goods, services or whatever and we forward their request to our contract
partners. This way, our contract partners do not need to do marketing for themselves
but can benefit from our extended network. This is the other service we provide. Com-
panies sign a contract with us and automatically get customer requests. And as our
customers know that we have a lot of relations they rather come to us then search for
providers themselves. We sign half year contracts with our partners and are very cau-
tious that they do not stay in touch with customers they’ve gained over our services. As
the number of our contracted partners has increased heavily we can no longer run the
communication between our contract partners and our customers over our network.
Also we often encounter disturbances with our internet provider. Therefore we would
like to only forward the customer request to our contracted partners. They should then
individually contact the customer with offers. However, to protect ourselves, we would
like to enforce that all business goes through us.
What the specification is: We will create two rich client applications and one server
application. The server application will run on the marketing company’s server and
select appropriate providers. The server application will then send the requests to the
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contract partners’ rich client. As sending out offers can be delayed a couple of hours
their server availability should be no problem. In this rich client the contract partners
will see open requests and be able to send offers to them. The customer side client will
receive these messages but has to filter the received messages. Someone could try to
fake to be a contract partner. Also this client will have to regularly contact the server to
check whether contracts have expired.
What you are doing: You are the team leader responsible to implement the customer
side rich client. You have a competent team: WS developers, designers and GUI de-
velopers. As the client explicitly requested that old contractors cannot contact the cus-
tomer, you have to come up with a solution to filter valid requests.
D.2 Structured Interviews
D.2.1 Questions
1. You understand the concept of Trust Management.
2. You understand the processes present in Trust Management.
3. You think that the components of a Trust Management Framework are difficult to
understand.
4. You understand the connection between the Trust Management Framework’s com-
ponents.
5. You found it difficult to understand where the proposed solution came from.
6. You felt lost using the tool and did not know what to do next.
7. You think the concept of attributes is a good way to describe your scenario.
8. You think the topic of Trust Management is really hard to understand.
9. You understand the Trust Management Framework that has been proposed.
10. You have too little information and do not know what to search for to actually use
the proposed Trust Management Framework.
11. You think the proposed Trust Management Framework is appropriate for your
application.
12. You think you could explain to someone how your Trust Management Frame-
work works.
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D.2.2 Responses
Users answered the questions on a five level scale depending how much they agreed
with the statement. When presenting the results in table D.1 we have put ’0’ for an
absolutely negative feeling and ’4’ for a totally positive feeling; in this we inverted
negatively phrased questions for easier evaluation - this means totally agreeing to a
negative statement (user stating ’4’) is bad for our system thus we have put ’0’ in table
D.1 there. (These questions have been indicated with bold typed headings.) We have
also visualized the responses on a high-low-median chart in figure D.1.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
User 1 1 1 0 2 3 0 2 0 1 1 2 1
User 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 3 3
User 3 3 1 2 4 3 1 4 3 3 1 2 3
User 4 3 3 2 4 1 3 2 3 3 4 4 4
User 5 4 2 4 3 0 3 2 3 3 1 4 3
Median 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 3 3
Table D.1: Reults of first user evaluation
Figure D.1: High-Low-Median chart of responses of first user evaluation
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Appendix E
Final User Evaluation Scenario
After a disaster, centralized network infrastructure is often damaged or overloaded.
Therefore, your task is to design the communication layer of a smartphone app that
enables message exchange after such incidents. Main purpose of the app is to enable
ad-hoc communication in-between victims, and between victims and emergency per-
sonnel at the location. The app should be able to communicate with other devices in the
proximity, and forward messages hop-by-hop, until the intended recipient is reached.
Manufacturers are going to provide this app on their handsets at purchase, therefore
you may assume a significant availability on devices.
Main features that have to be considered in the app are as follows:
• Limited battery life time; be resource efficient!
• Highly dynamic and mobile topology;
• Regular neighbor changes, interaction with unknown devices;
• Root access on devices for development, including hidden APIs.
• Missing central authority; however, there may be friends present in the network,
who should have improved visibility.
The manufactures requested us – because the significant distribution of the app, and the
continuous pressure from governments fearing a terrorist attack – to integrate measures
that increase the reliability of routing of messages within the ad-hoc network. That is,
malicious entities in the network should not be able to degrade message forwarding,
or create black-holes in the network. In your design, you cannot assume the use of any
central authority, presence of pre-installed certificates or keys, or any other procedure
that could be target of attacks or analysis previously to an eventual incident.
Most common attacks to be considered in ad-hoc networks include misrouting of pack-
ets, dropping of packets, altering packet contents, or delaying packets.
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Background information on ad-hoc networks1
A wireless ad hoc network is a decentralized type of wireless network.,[1][2] The net-
work is ad hoc because it does not rely on a pre existing infrastructure, such as routers
in wired networks or access points in managed (infrastructure) wireless networks. In-
stead, each node participates in routing by forwarding data for other nodes, so the
determination of which nodes forward data is made dynamically on the basis of net-
work connectivity. In addition to the classic routing, ad hoc networks can use flooding
for forwarding data.
An ad hoc network typically refers to any set of networks where all devices have equal
status on a network and are free to associate with any other ad hoc network device in
link range. It refers to a network device’s ability to maintain link status information
for any number of devices in a 1-link (aka ”hop”) range, and thus, this is most often a
Layer 2 activity. Because this is only a Layer 2 activity, ad hoc networks alone may not
support a routeable IP network environment.
An ad hoc network is made up of multiple “nodes” connected by “links.” Links are in-
fluenced by the node’s resources (e.g., transmitter power, computing power and mem-
ory) and behavioral properties (e.g., reliability), as well as link properties (e.g. length-
of-link and signal loss, interference and noise). Since links can be connected or dis-
connected at any time, a functioning network must be able to cope with this dynamic
restructuring, preferably in a way that is timely, efficient, reliable, robust, and scalable.
The network must allow any two nodes to communicate by relaying the information
via other nodes. A “path” is a series of links that connects two nodes. Various routing
methods use one or two paths between any two nodes; flooding methods use all or
most of the available paths.
Description of the TrustMUSE Builder
You will find the TrustMUSE Builder application running on the computer. It is a tool
that helps designing trust management solutions by providing characteristics and re-
quirements of your use case. Underlying the TrustMUSE Builder is a model of trust
management, which is illustrated by the structure seen in the tool’s layout. The indi-
vidual elements of the model represent independent characteristic functionality present
in trust management. Information about the functionality present in an element and its
connection to other elements can be found via the help dialogue. Not all functionality
is necessarily present in every trust management solution.
Underlying each model element, is a number of implementations providing the el-
ement’s functionality. Implementations realize the functionality differently, and can
1As from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless ad hoc network Last visited 25th May
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therefore be more or less effective in given situations. To select between these imple-
mentations, you should select from the services/requirements/restrictions presented
within individual elements by the tool. While selecting some items from the lists, oth-
ers may be excluded if there is no implementation available that can fulfill both. This
is not bad, but the intention of the selection! Also, there may be multiple implementa-
tions providing similar items; therefore, it is not necessary to select items from the list
as long as there are selectable elements left. You may decide to select only a few, very
characteristic items from the list of each element. If you feel uncertain, you may also
decide to avoid one or more elements completely; the tool will then try to guess an ap-
propriate solution, based on inputs to other elements. When you feel confident enough
in your selection, you may proceed in the design process by clicking the ”Compose
framework” button.
In the next view, you will be presented with the suggestions of the tool. The tool se-
lected these element implementations based on the items you selected. Review each
suggestion! Beneath each suggestion, you will find an indication how certain the tool
is in its suggestion – related also to your selection. You may find additional informa-
tion about an implementation via its help dialogue. If you do not feel happy with one
or more of the suggestions, you can either replace the implementation manually, or go
back to the previous view, and adapt your item selection accordingly. If you agree with
the suggestions, click ”Generate framework”, and finish the process.
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Appendix F
Questionnaire for the Trust
Management Experts
WHAT KIND OF TRUST EVIDENCE WOULD YOU USE FOR THE ABOVE APPLI-
CATION?
Trust Evidence is a piece of data that provides any kind of indication about the trust-
worthiness of an entity. Evidence always has an attached reliability, validity and Trust
Scope.
1. Certificate authority signed certificate for each device;
2. Purely first-hand observations;
3. First-hand and second-hand observations exchanged via recommendations;
4. First-hand observations aggregated into reputation.
WHAT KIND OF TRUST DISCOVERY AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS WOULD
YOU USE FOR THE ABOVE APPLICATION?
Trust Discovery and Distribution is the process of searching, acquiring and sharing, dis-
seminating trust related information – namely Trust Evidence and Trust Value objects –
related to potential service providers.
1. Central server where all information is made available;
2. Asking neighboring nodes, where trusted nodes are preferred over unknown
ones;
3. Sending out a number of crawlers in the network who return after a number of
hops; when returning they provide information about the nodes that were most
trusted by those the crawler passed on its way.
WHAT KIND OF TRUST EVALUATION AND TRUST MODEL WOULD YOU USE
FOR THE ABOVE APPLICATION?
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Trust Model is a static set of rules or mathematical computations that assesses trust in
an entity from a set of relevant Trust Evidence objects.
1. Computing the weighted arithmetic mean of available Trust Evidence;
2. Using a four level discreet scale and selecting the value that has the most support-
ing evidence (in case of equality including an uncertainty value), as by (Abdul-
Rahman and Hailes, 2000) ;
3. Assessing trustworthiness by taking a beta distribution based trust value and a
standard deviation based certainty value and combining them as by (Zouridaki
et al., 2007) ; the weight of old evidence is linearly decreased in the assessment;
4. Using a trusted Certificate Authority and check for its signature in certificates;
5. Calculating trust by averaging observations over multiple scopes, where the num-
ber of evidence and their variety is considered in assessing certainty. Over time
old assessments are losing weight by a linear fading factor, as by (Kinateder et al,
2005) .
WHAT KIND OF TRUST UPDATE WOULD YOU USE FOR THE ABOVE APPLI-
CATION?
Trust Update is a separately executable operation that ensures the freshness and valid-
ness of data held by the trust management framework.
1. Before starting an interaction, the collection of trust evidence and the execution of
the trust evaluation are done; all computations are only done on demand receiv-
ing fresh information;
2. A sliding window is applied to available trust evidence, thereby only holding a
limited number of most recent information;
3. Assigning a due date to pieces of trust evidence in terms of a calendar date.
WHAT KIND OF TRUST ENFORCEMENT WOULD YOU USE FOR THE ABOVE
APPLICATION?
Trust Enforcement is the process of making decisions based on assessed trustworthiness
of entities found in the Trust Storage.
1. Providing a trust index based on user defined weights, and presenting this list in
descending order to the user who can then choose his or her preference;
2. Calculate a trust index based on user defined weights and select from the options
automatically the node with the highest index;
3. For each interaction compare the trust assessments to a defined threshold, and
include all nodes whose assessed trustworthiness is above the threshold.
WHAT KIND OF INTERACTION EVALUATION WOULD YOU USE FOR THE ABOVE
APPLICATION?
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After an interaction with an entity, Interaction Evaluation creates first hand feedback
by evaluating the success of the interaction. Interaction Evaluation is defined by the
rules that are used to rate an interaction and the output that it generates.
1. Present the user with the outcome of the interactions and let him or her provide
feedback;
2. Define automatically evaluable rules based on which a binary decision can be
made whether an interaction was successful or not.
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